

# The Political Right's Exception: Foreign Aid for Migration Management

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## Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that rising conservatism limits international cooperation, especially when global commitments fail to advance partisan goals. From this perspective, right-wing governments are expected to curtail foreign aid and retreat from international engagement. This study argues instead that right-wing governments engage with the international arena when delegation is decreased and the issue area is relevant for their electoral platform. In the case of migration, rather than delegating migration control to multilateral institutions or NGOs, governments prefer direct aid to origin and transit countries using flexible financial incentives to externalize border enforcement. This strategy allows them to project toughness on migration while avoiding domestic political costs, retaining the greatest degree of control. Drawing on data from twenty-seven Western donor countries and seventy-six recipients, alongside a falsification test, I find support for this theory. Findings reveal that right-wing governments are instrumentalists in practice. They actively employ foreign policy tools to fulfill partisan promises and manage domestic pressures, highlighting a strategic, outward-looking dimension of modern conservatism. (164)

**Keywords:** *international relations, right-wing governance, foreign aid, immigration, foreign policy*

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## Introduction

Right-wing governments are widely expected to retrench from international engagement once in office. Foreign aid, in particular, is often portrayed as an area where right-wing governments scale back commitments to prioritize national interest over global redistribution.<sup>1</sup> Two poignant examples of this trend include Trump administration's termination of most foreign aid<sup>2</sup> in early 2025 and 2026, and the Dutch right-wing government's plan to cut two thirds of their development aid by 2027.<sup>3</sup> In both cases, foreign aid was framed as foreign-policy issue misaligned with domestic interests, damaging for the national economy, and even likely exacerbating issues with recipient states. From this perspective, amid economic shocks, globalization, and the prioritization of domestic goals, right-wing governments should prefer economic austerity over aid commitments.<sup>4</sup> Yet, even as foreign aid is highly politicized and criticized by right-wing governments, migration-management aid presents an important exception. Far from retrenching, right-wing governments frequently continue and expand bilateral aid when migration management is at stake.<sup>5</sup>

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1. S. Dietrich, H. V. Milner, and J. B. Slapin, "From text to political positions on foreign aid: analysis of aid mentions in party manifestos from 1960 to 2015," *International Studies Quarterly* 64, no. 4 (2020): 980–990; D. H. Lumsdaine, *Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton University Press, 1993); T. Heinrich, Y. Kobayashi, and E. Lawson Jr, "Populism and foreign aid," *European Journal of International Relations* 27, no. 4 (2021): 1042–1066; D. Hammerschmidt, C. Meyer, and A. Pintsch, "Foreign aid in times of populism: the influence of populist radical right parties on the official development assistance of OECD countries," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 35, no. 4 (2022): 478–499.

2. The largest foreign aid agency in the world before its dismantlement. In the 2023 fiscal year, nearly three of every five foreign assistance dollars were distributed by United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In fiscal year 2023, USAID was in charge of donating a total of 43.8 billion USD in aid. See Pew Research Center recent report.

3. See the executive order "Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid," and Reuters, "Dutch right-wing government cuts development aid as deficit balloons," September 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-right-wing-government-cuts-development-aid-deficit-balloons-2024-09-17/>.

4. I. Colantone and P. Stanig, "The trade origins of economic nationalism: Import competition and voting behavior in Western Europe," *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 4 (2018): 936–953; C. Hackenesch et al., "Populist Radical Right Parties' Impact on European Foreign Aid Spending," *Jcms: Journal of Common Market Studies* 60, no. 5 (2022): 1391–1415.

5. The second Trump administration's Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification, for example, further slashed "divisive or ineffective foreign assistance programs" while "only fund[ing] efforts that can clearly be tied to making America stronger, safer, and more prosperous;" with their first budget item being programs tackling "mass and illegal immigration" U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (Fiscal Year 2026)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, May 2025). In the same document, the Migration and Refugee

Under what conditions do right-wing governments expand rather than retrench foreign aid, and why does migration emerge as the exception? Building on delegation costs in foreign aid<sup>6</sup> and credit-claiming in populist foreign policy,<sup>7</sup> I argue that right-wing governments expand migration-management aid through reallocation when two conditions are met. First, (1) when delegation to third parties such as international organizations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is minimized to ensure that funds remain flexible and under executive control.<sup>8</sup> Second, (2) when the issue addressed by the aid fits within the ruling government's political platform.<sup>9</sup> Bilateral aid for migration management to origin and transit countries satisfies both conditions as increasing migration-management aid is an instrumental adaptation to avoid the constraints of delegation, provide flexibility to adjust funding over time, and offer visible evidence of "toughness" that can be marketed to domestic audiences if needed. Adjacent research has found similar policies entangled with migration to be strategic in nature.<sup>10</sup>

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Assistance (MRA) fund and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) were both also gutted. The PRM was the humanitarian bureau of the State Department, focused on "providing protection, easing suffering, and resolving the plight of persecuted and forcibly displaced people around the world...by coordinating humanitarian policy and diplomacy" and by "working with multilateral organizations to build global partnerships" U.S. Department of State, "Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration," 2021, <https://2021-2025.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-population-refugees-and-migration/>. Their funds were cut to \$0 in alignment with the "administration's policy direction." However, funds for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) program were kept for general migration management and to "support efforts aimed at curbing illegal migration" U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (Fiscal Year 2026)*. The current administration's move exemplifies the multilateral, delegation-reliant humanitarian channel being weakened, opting to repurpose programs like ERMA for bilateral migration management under direct executive control.

6. E. V. McLean, "Donors' preferences and agent choice: Delegation of European development aid," *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 2 (2012): 381–395; E. Neumayer, "The determinants of aid allocation by regional multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (2003): 101–122; S. H. Allen and M. E. Flynn, "Donor government ideology and aid bypass," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14, no. 4 (2018): 449–468.

7. C. Thiers and L. E. Wehner, "The personality traits of populist leaders and their foreign policies: Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump," *International Studies Quarterly* 66, no. 1 (2022): sqab083; A. Chrysogelos et al., "New directions in the study of populism in international relations," *International Studies Review* 25, no. 4 (2023): viad035; J.-C. Boucher and C. G. Thies, "'I am a tariff man': The power of populist foreign policy rhetoric under President Trump," *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 2 (2019): 712–722.

8. S. Dietrich, "Bypass or engage? Explaining donor delivery tactics in foreign aid allocation," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013): 698–712.

9. A. Alrababa'h, R. Myrick, and I. Webb, "Do donor motives matter? Investigating perceptions of foreign aid in the conflict in Donbas," *International Studies Quarterly* 64, no. 3 (2020): 748–757.

10. I. Salehyan, "Strategic Humanitarianism and US Refugee Admissions after the Cold War," *Interna-*

I additionally argue that the development of flexible bilateral migration aid is not solely driven by exclusionary policies targeting practical migration pressures such as asylum applications and refugee population. Right-wing governments continue to draw leverage from their restrictive migration platforms,<sup>11</sup> but their ascent ultimately reflects combination of socio-economic and electoral determinants beyond exclusionary views alone.<sup>12</sup> Accordingly, while migration pressures play a role, aid commitments to migration management are steered by political incentives and strategic calculations.

To evaluate these claims, I synthesize a pivotal dataset incorporating 27 developed Western liberal democracies with a constructed measure of bilateral aid commitments targeting 76 aid-receiving countries from 1990 to 2013. I focus on migration-management aid, defined as foreign aid commitments explicitly targeting the containment, return, or support of cross-border migrants and refugees, including funding for border enforcement, asylum processing, and repatriation assistance. I utilize a set of donor and year fixed effects model and falsification test<sup>13</sup> on 48,000 dyad-year observations. This approach covers a robust period of

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*tional Studies Quarterly* 69, no. 3 (September 2025): sqaf045; A. S. Rosenberg, "Measuring racial bias in international migration flows," *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2019): 837–845; B. J. Connell, S. L. Moya, and A. J. Shin, "Migration and economic coercion," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 17, no. 3 (2021): orab019; K. J. Han, "When will left-wing governments introduce liberal migration policies? An implication of power resources theory," *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (2015): 602–614.

11. M. A. Vachudova, "Populism, Democracy, and Party System Change in Europe," *Annual Review of Political Science* 24 (2021): 471–498; M. Lubbers, M. Gijsberts, and P. Scheepers, "Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2002): 345–378; T. Akkerman, S. L. De Lange, and M. Rooduijn, *Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?* (Routledge, 2016); E. Ivarsflaten, "What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases," *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 1 (2008): 3–23.

12. J. D. Kertzer, "Microfoundations in international relations," *Conflict Management And Peace Science* 34, no. 1 (2017): 81–97; H. Kitschelt and D. M. Kselman, "Economic development, democratic experience, and political parties' linkage strategies," *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 11 (2013): 1453–1484; H.-G. Betz, *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe* (Springer, 1994).

13. In tandem with recent foreign aid literature and dyadic analyses such as J.-C. Berthélemy and A. Tichit, "Bilateral donors' aid allocation decisions—a three-dimensional panel analysis," *International Review of Economics & Finance* 13, no. 3 (2004): 253–274; J.-C. Berthélemy, "Bilateral donors' interest vs. recipients' development motives in aid allocation: do all donors behave the same?," *Review of Development Economics* 10, no. 2 (2006): 179–194; S. B. Bermeo and D. Leblang, "Migration and foreign aid," *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015): 627–657; S. B. Bermeo, "Aid allocation and targeted development in an increasingly connected world," *International Organization* 71, no. 4 (2017): 735–766; L. L. Ferry, E. M. Hafner-Burton, and C. J. Schneider, "Catch me if you care: International development organizations and national corruption," *The Review of International Organizations* 15, no. 4 (2020): 767–792; O. Hammoud-Gallego and L. F. Freier, "Symbolic Refugee Protection: Explaining Latin America's Liberal Refugee Laws,"

engagement with transit and origin countries in which foreign aid allocations amount to over 1 trillion USD<sup>14</sup> to Africa, Asia, and Europe from the selected donors. The longitudinal and cross-national nature of my methodology exploits the variation of right-wing governments, migrant flows, colonial legacies, and aid commitments encountered in European Western liberal democracies, depicting a robust pattern lasting over 20 years.

This paper makes three key contributions. First, my theoretical framework synthesizes the foreign aid, right-wing governance, and border externalization literature to improve our understanding of right-wing governments counterintuitive interest in foreign aid.<sup>15</sup> Second, this study supports the nascent literature on right-wing governance, and to some extent right-wing populist foreign policy<sup>16</sup> and the international implications of right-wing populist actors.<sup>17</sup> Though this paper cohesively provides an exception to the retrenchment of right-wing governments, populism requires a different type of analysis and measurement that would undercut the sample of cases—given that populist leadership is present but not completely widespread across Western states during the study's time frame—and their influence varying

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*American Political Science Review* 117, no. 2 (2023): 454–473

14. Constant to 2023.

15. J. Gamso and F. Yuldashev, “Targeted foreign aid and international migration: Is development-promotion an effective immigration policy?,” *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 4 (2018): 809–820; Connell, Moya, and Shin, “Migration and economic coercion”; K. P. Norman and N. R. Micinski, “The European Union’s migration management aid: Developing democracies or supporting authoritarianism?,” *International Migration* 61, no. 4 (2023): 57–71; M. Angin, A. Shehaj, and A. J. Shin, “IMF: International Migration Fund,” *International Interactions* 49, no. 1 (2023): 86–113.

16. A. Chrysosgelos, *Populism in Foreign Policy*, July 2017; M. Copelovitch and J. C. Pevehouse, “International organizations in a new era of populist nationalism,” *The Review of International Organizations* 14 (2019): 169–186; S. Destradi, D. Cadier, and J. Plagemann, “Populism and foreign policy: a research agenda (Introduction),” *Comparative European Politics* 19, no. 6 (2021): 663; E. Voeten, *Ideology and international institutions* (Princeton University Press, 2021); D. Cadier, “Populist politics of representation and foreign policy: evidence from Poland,” *Comparative European Politics* 19, no. 6 (2021): 703; D. F. Wajner, “The populist way out: Why contemporary populist leaders seek transnational legitimation,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 24, no. 3 (2022): 416–436; C. Lacatus and G. Meibauer, “Saying it like it is’: Right-wing populism, international politics, and the performance of authenticity,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 24, no. 3 (2022): 437–457; Chrysosgelos et al., “New directions in the study of populism in international relations.”

17. Boucher and Thies, “‘I am a tariff man’: The power of populist foreign policy rhetoric under President Trump”; J. C. Pevehouse, “The COVID-19 pandemic, international cooperation, and populism,” *International Organization* 74, no. S1 (2020): E191–E212; Thiers and Wehner, “The personality traits of populist leaders and their foreign policies: Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump”; A. Carnegie, R. Clark, and A. Kaya, “Private participation: How populists engage with International Organizations,” *The Journal of Politics* 86, no. 3 (2024): 000–000; A. Carnegie, R. Clark, and N. Zucker, “Global governance under populism: The challenge of information suppression,” *World Politics*, 2024,

considerably across the countries included. That said, this paper does provide an analysis of right-wing governments that share many characteristics to what we would call right-wing populists, and the measure and theory make those overlaps visible without overstating what the data establish. The measures constructed and theory present demonstrate the several overlaps without undermining the data or generalizability of the study. Lastly, the findings should point our discussion on the significant risks when relying on bilateral channels. As right-wing leadership grows across Western democracies, migrants may face greater hardships linked to unsupervised funding and disdain for tenets of the liberal international order when partnering with non-democratic actors.

## Foreign Aid and Migration Management

Western democracies have long used foreign aid to manage migration.<sup>18</sup> In doing so, donor countries and organizations strive to reduce migrant incentives to leave their country of residence. Advocates of foreign aid affirm its utility in alleviating poverty if accompanied by effective policies<sup>19</sup> and by considering the spending priorities of the receiving country.<sup>20</sup> The Khartoum Process, for example, brought African and European nations together to address migration across the Horn of Africa by strengthening economic and “public administration in security and rule of law as well as improve border management.”<sup>21</sup> In 2015, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) made way for hundreds of migration-related programs across 26 African nations with an endowment of 4.8 billion euros. The

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18. Early research highlights future income prospects as an important factor in individuals' decision to migrate L. A. Sjaastad, “The costs and returns of human migration,” *Journal of political Economy* 70, no. 5, Part 2 (1962): 80–93; P. W. Blair, “The dimension of poverty,” *International Organization* 23, no. 3 (1969): 683–704; G. J. Borjas, “Economic theory and international migration,” *International migration review* 23, no. 3 (1989): 457–485.

19. C. Burnside and D. Dollar, “Aid, policies, and growth,” *American Economic Review* 90, no. 4 (2000): 847–868; E. Neumayer, “Bogus refugees? The determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe,” *International studies quarterly* 49, no. 3 (2005): 389–409.

20. M. Baliaoune-Lutz and G. Mavrotas, “Aid Effectiveness: Looking at the Aid-Social Capital-Growth Nexus,” *Review of Development Economics* 13, no. 3 (August 2009): 510–525.

21. First introduced in the EU-Africa Action Plan on Migration and Mobility 2014-2017 Valleta Summit, *Valleta Summit Action Plan*, 2015.

EUTF for Africa was a broad attempt to address governance and poverty issues driving migration towards Europe while working directly with institutions of transit-countries.<sup>22</sup> Both programs reflect attempts to effectively target and administer foreign aid on migration through a multilateral, comprehensive engagement.

However, critics of foreign aid generally highlight the propensity of recipient governments to become rent-seeking,<sup>23</sup> or to forgo political incentives to democratic accountability<sup>24</sup>—particularly when forced migrants are involved. Refugee rentierism has been successfully implemented to extract revenue from donor countries to maintain refugee populations within recipient states.<sup>25</sup> For example, Czaika and Mayer<sup>26</sup> assert countries such as Australia and the United States (U.S.) are sensitive to asylum seekers when formulating their aid strategies, making it easier for migrant-sending countries to extract benefits from donors. Micinski<sup>27</sup> further describes how the ‘deportability’ of refugees can be a credible threat for donor countries to extract concessions, exemplified by the cases of Kenya and Pakistan. Governments have thus paid careful attention to the mode of the aid, rather than simply the recipient.

In response to concerns over impact, rentierism, and foreign aid misuse, donor governments revise their approach by delegating implementation to trusted organizations that can manage funds transparently and effectively. Two main benefits arise from this strategy. First, donors can bypass corrupt or inefficient domestic institutions by channeling funds through credible intermediaries such as NGOs or regional IOs.<sup>28</sup> Second, delegation offers normative and reputational gains: international organizations bring technical expertise, political legiti-

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22. E. Kervyn and R. Shilhav, *An emergency for whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – migratory routes and development aid in Africa* Publication date, November 2017.

23. J. Svensson, “Foreign aid and rent-seeking,” *Journal of International Economics*, 2000, 25.

24. S. Djankov et al., “The law and economics of self-dealing,” *Journal of Financial Economics* 88, no. 3 (June 2008): 430–465; K. M. Morrison, “Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability,” *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (January 2009): 107–138.

25. L. F. Freier, N. R. Micinski, and G. Tsourapas, “Refugee commodification: The diffusion of refugee rent-seeking in the Global South,” *Third World Quarterly* 42, no. 11 (2021): 2747–2766.

26. M. Czaika and A. Mayer, “Refugee movements and aid responsiveness of bilateral donors,” *The Journal of Development Studies* 47, no. 3 (2011): 455–474.

27. N. R. Micinski, “Threats, deportability and aid: The politics of refugee rentier states and regional stability,” *Security Dialogue* 54, no. 6 (2023): 529–547.

28. Dietrich, “Bypass or engage? Explaining donor delivery tactics in foreign aid allocation.”

macy, and a stronger guarantee of visible returns on aid investments. Humanitarian organizations are typically staffed by regional specialists with years of field experience and policy knowledge. For instance, the EU–IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration was designed to stabilize migration corridors through support for entrepreneurship, rehabilitation, and access to basic services based on trust cultivated by IOM's 'participatory approach'.<sup>29</sup> Sweden has similarly partnered with IOM to implement joint disaster-response and migration-related projects through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency;<sup>30</sup> meanwhile the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) provides data that supports operational and policy decisions aimed at preventing future displacements, drawing expertise from a board composed of senior UN personnel and practitioners with on-the-ground experience.<sup>31</sup> These multilateral approaches are expected reduce migration pressures at home while creating economic and societal incentives for people to remain in their countries of origin.

Multilateral engagements nonetheless can also impose significant financial and electoral costs for donor governments. In 2022, multilateral outflows from members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) amounted to 259 billion USD in aid commitments, an increase of 12% from 2021. More recently, even with a drop in 7.1% of international assistance, members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) still committed 212.1 billion USD in 2024.<sup>32</sup> Yet, ideological affinities and partisanship could soften these costs if aligned with the elected government's foreign policy vision. On the other hand, these costs can become unbearable for executives denouncing the cost of foreign intervention, the rising domestic challengers for national industries competing with China, and the understatement of the impact of globalization in everyday life. As such, donor

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29. IOM, *EU-IOM Joint Initiative*, April 2022.

30. International Organization for Migration, "Swedish Funding to Allow Greater Humanitarian Assistance," 2006, <https://www.iom.int/news/swedish-funding-allow-greater-humanitarian-assistance>; International Organization for Migration, *Sweden and IOM: Saving Lives and Building on Migration's Opportunities*, technical report (2015).

31. IMDC, *About Us - IMDC*, April 2022.

32. Refer to OECD's Multilateral Development Finance 2024 report, and recent April 2025 press release.

ideology is inevitably a key factor in how foreign aid, specifically migration-management aid, is allocated.

## Donor Ideology and Aid Strategy

Similar to foreign aid, migration control in developed democracies has long been politicized and securitized,<sup>33</sup> often sparking political backlash and fueling exclusionary attitudes across Western democracies.<sup>34</sup> Such politicization shapes not only domestic debates but also the foreign policy arena, where migration-related pressures intersect with partisan cleavages in aid allocation. The literature on donor ideology and foreign aid largely converges on the notion that left-leaning governments prioritize development aid as an extension of their social welfare agenda.<sup>35</sup> Poverty alleviation and reducing inequality, for example, are especially associated with a “leftist” policy agenda in developed liberal democracies. In contrast, right-leaning administrations are more skeptical of internationalism and tend to retrench aid, favoring domestic stability and national interest over global redistribution.<sup>36</sup>

A number of empirical studies further confirm these ideological tendencies with across po-

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33. On the securitization of migration, see Wæver et al., Weiner, Buzan et al., and Huysmans (*Securitization and desecuritization*; “Security, stability, and international migration”; *Security: A new framework for analysis*; “The European Union and the securitization of migration”).

34. R. M. Dancygier, *Immigration and conflict in Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2010); K. Bansak, J. Hainmueller, and D. Hangartner, “How economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns shape European attitudes toward asylum seekers,” *Science* 354, no. 6309 (2016): 217–222; D. Hangartner et al., “Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile?,” *American Political Science Review* 113, no. 2 (2019): 442–455.

35. J.-P. Thérien and A. Noel, “Political parties and foreign aid,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 1 (2000): 151–162; R. K. Fleck and C. Kilby, “How do political changes influence US bilateral aid allocations? Evidence from panel data,” *Review of Development Economics* 10, no. 2 (2006): 210–223; Dietrich, Milner, and Slapin, “From text to political positions on foreign aid: analysis of aid mentions in party manifestos from 1960 to 2015”; H. V. Milner and D. Tingley, “Who supports global economic engagement? The sources of preferences in American foreign economic policy,” *International Organization* 65, no. 1 (2011): 37–68; H. V. Milner and D. Tingley, “The political economy of US foreign aid: American legislators and the domestic politics of aid,” *Economics & Politics* 22, no. 2 (2010): 200–232; V. Brech and N. Potrafke, “Donor ideology and types of foreign aid,” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 42, no. 1 (2014): 61–75.

36. Lumsdaine, *Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-1989*; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Lawson Jr, “Populism and foreign aid”; Hammerschmidt, Meyer, and Pintsch, “Foreign aid in times of populism: the influence of populist radical right parties on the official development assistance of OECD countries.”

litical systems. Thérien and Noel<sup>37</sup> find evidence of for this by examining social-democratic parties' impact on foreign aid across 16 OECD countries. Brech and Potrafke<sup>38</sup> similarly find that left-of-center governments are more willing to invest and provide foreign aid due to its similarities to social welfare spending. Milner and Tingley<sup>39</sup> show comparable results in presidential systems, where left-leaning US Representatives are more inclined to support foreign aid compared to conservative representatives. Milner and Tingley<sup>40</sup> additionally find the effect of ideology on foreign aid to be three times as large as on trade, with some fluctuation once national security is attached to foreign aid. Furthermore, when Democrats control Congress, concerns over development feature more prominently in foreign aid allocations.

Right-wing governments, by contrast, are more likely to reduce aid or redirect it toward commercial and domestic priorities. When Republicans control Congress, foreign aid allocations reflect commercial interests rather than a focus on poverty reduction or development.<sup>41</sup> Conservative ideology favors domestic economic stability over economic development in other countries. For instance, during Donald Trump's first tenure, the USAID budget was slashed and redirected towards an 'America First' agenda that discarded human rights and democracy promotion.<sup>42</sup> In his second term, USAID was altogether systematically dismantled through severe funding reductions and any remaining operations being merged into the Department of State. Right-wing governments often extend their commitment to economic austerity by cutting foreign aid budgets and framing such allocations as unjustified burdens on the national taxpayer.<sup>43</sup> This aligns with an electorate that often overestimates spend-

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37. Thérien and Noel, "Political parties and foreign aid."

38. Brech and Potrafke, "Donor ideology and types of foreign aid."

39. Milner and Tingley, "The political economy of US foreign aid: American legislators and the domestic politics of aid."

40. Milner and Tingley, "Who supports global economic engagement? The sources of preferences in American foreign economic policy."

41. Fleck and Kilby, "How do political changes influence US bilateral aid allocations? Evidence from panel data."

42. P. Norris and R. Inglehart, *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism* (Cambridge University Press, 2019), 416.

43. Hackenesch et al., "Populist Radical Right Parties' Impact on European Foreign Aid Spending"; Lumsdaine, *Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-1989*.

ing and underestimates foreign aid impact.<sup>44</sup> Although Scotto, Reifler, Hudson, et al.<sup>45</sup> argue foreign aid framing could decrease such misconceptions, misinformation is not easily undermined even under time-intensive and multi-pronged interventions.<sup>46</sup> The relationship between foreign aid and ideology generally primes scholars and the public to align the pursuit of core ideals with foreign policy—left gives more, the right retrenches—at the risk of simplifying underlying exceptions to these rules.<sup>47</sup>

Yet, given the different ways governments can fund projects abroad, ideology as an indicator of foreign aid allocation remains contested. In earlier work, Noël and Thérien<sup>48</sup> argue that partisanship is less of a predictor when compared to the robustness of their welfare institutions.<sup>49</sup> agree and find that populism, conceptualized in a particular way, does not track well for actual aid decisions compared to anti-elitism and nativism. Recent examples similarly find little support for the idea of partisanship affecting foreign aid allocation.<sup>50</sup> Socialist governments might not always allocate more foreign aid than conservative governments, for example. Indeed, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Schmaljohann<sup>51</sup> find that a more Socialist-led Germany allocates actually *less* foreign aid on average. These concerns underscore the nuance of ideology and partisanship in foreign aid policy. However, this does not mean the relationship is not present but rather might not be easily seen if looking at aggregate or general aid programs.

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44. T. J. Scotto, J. Reifler, D. Hudson, et al., “We spend how much? Misperceptions, innumeracy, and support for the foreign aid in the United States and Great Britain,” *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 4, no. 2 (2017): 119–128.

45. Scotto, Reifler, Hudson, et al.

46. S. Badrinathan, “Educative interventions to combat misinformation: Evidence from a field experiment in India,” *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 4 (2021): 1325–1341.

47. Lumsdaine, *Moral vision in international politics: the foreign aid regime, 1949-1989*; A. Noël and J.-P. Thérien, *Left and right in global politics* (Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2008); A. Rapport and B. Rathbun, “Parties to an alliance: Ideology and the domestic politics of international institutionalization,” *Journal of Peace Research* 58, no. 2 (2021): 279–293.

48. A. Noël and J.-P. Thérien, “From domestic to international justice: The welfare state and foreign aid,” *International organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 523–553.

49. Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Lawson Jr, “Populism and foreign aid.”

50. A. Fuchs, A. Dreher, and P. Nunnenkamp, “Determinants of donor generosity: A survey of the aid budget literature,” *World Development* 56 (2014): 172–199.

51. A. Dreher, P. Nunnenkamp, and M. Schmaljohann, “The allocation of German aid: Self-interest and government ideology,” *Economics & Politics* 27, no. 1 (2015): 160–184.

This study theorizes how right-wing governments strategically align their political platforms with the delivery channels of foreign aid, favoring bilateralism to retain control, claim credit, and sidestep the constraints of multilateral delegation. Right-wing parties executives, not unlike other executives, are assumed to be office-seekers, constantly working to maintain their position,<sup>52</sup> but this is only possible if voters are paying attention. Although this study acknowledges the public's inability to fully observe policy-making even in liberal democracies, voters *can* attribute policy influence when policies have “strong” issue salience among the electorate.<sup>53</sup> It would appear counterintuitive for right-wing governments to be interested in allocating national funds to other countries as their presence in office suggests a combination of domestic economic anxiety and cultural backlash. Yet this paper argues the strategic nature of migration-management aid follows similar strategic intentions comparable to policies over who to support and who to ignore and strategic humanitarianism more generally.<sup>54</sup>

## Shrinking Delegation under Right-Wing Governance

For right-wing governments, delegating migration-management aid multilaterally is problematic. To start, it dilutes their ability to claim credit for policy change and makes them appear to be perpetuating established international practices. Right-wing governments capitalize on cultural and economic anxieties alluded to migration, tagging in people-centric and anti-elitist remarks to their discourse on migration.<sup>55</sup> These tensions have been further

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52. A. Downs, “An economic theory of political action in a democracy,” *Journal of Political Economy* 65, no. 2 (1957): 9; W. C. Müller and K. Strøm, *Policy, office, or votes?: how political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

53. D. Fortunato et al., “Attributing policy influence under coalition governance,” *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 1 (2021): 252–268.

54. Salehyan, “Strategic Humanitarianism and US Refugee Admissions after the Cold War.”

55. Thiers and Wehner, “The personality traits of populist leaders and their foreign policies: Hugo Chávez and Donald Trump”; Betz, *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*; H. Kitschelt and A. J. McGann, *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis* (University of Michigan Press, 1997); P. Taggart, *Populism* (Open Univ. Press, 2000); C. Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2007); M. Rooduijn et al., “Persuasive populism? Estimating the effect of populist messages on political cynicism,” *Politics And Governance* 5, no. 4 (2017): 136–145; A. Shehaj, A. J.

amplified by anti-immigrant movements that exploit perceived cultural and economic threats from migration, as well as by the rising electoral success of right-wing and far-right parties across developed democracies.<sup>56</sup> Far-right parties in particular mobilize support through pro-people,<sup>57</sup> xenophobic, and anti-globalization rhetoric.<sup>58</sup> Donald Trump's "Draining the Swamp" and "Make America Great Again" were popular, successful slogans indicating challenges to the status quo and capitalization of popular anxieties.<sup>59</sup> Italy's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Transportation Matteo Salvini (*Lega*) has similarly been on the spotlight for hard-liner comments on migration and the future of European integration, claiming its uncontrolled growth has eroded European spirits.<sup>60</sup><sup>61</sup> By delegating, governments risk diluting their distinctiveness, appearing to extend the trends of prior administrations instead of delivering on their own commitments.

Multilateral engagements further clash with right-wing governments who frame disengagement from international organizations as a point of pride. Delegation counteracts such distancing by requiring governments to operate under negotiated rules instead of engaging selectively. Whether these framings are genuine or not, such rhetoric can foster a sense of betrayal within the party and among its voters if they delegate sovereignty over an issue of

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Shin, and R. Inglehart, "Immigration and right-wing populism: An origin story," *Party Politics* 27, no. 2 (2021): 282–293.

56. M. A. Vachudova, "Ethnopolitism and democratic backsliding in Central Europe," *East European Politics* 36, no. 3 (2020): 318–340; Kitschelt and McGann, *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis*; P. Taggart, "Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9, no. 3 (2004): 269–288; C. Mudde, *The far right today* (John Wiley & Sons, 2019).

57. Focusing on those within an imagined group part of the "heartland" Taggart, "Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe."

58. Kitschelt and McGann, *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis*; Mudde, *Populist radical right parties in Europe*; E. Carter, "Right-wing extremism/radicalism: Reconstructing the concept," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 23, no. 2 (2018): 157–182; Norris and Inglehart, *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism*.

59. Norris and Inglehart, *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism*, 75, 258.

60. E. Schaart, "Matteo Salvini quotes controversial fascist-era poet," Accessed: 2024-11-04, *POLITICO*, 2019,

61. In a 2018 interview published by TIME magazine, Matteo Salvini claimed that "history will entrust [*Lega*] with the role of saving European values—from Judeo-Christian roots to the right to work, the right to security, the right to life." He further claimed [the EU] has grown too much, and too quickly" while *Lega* is trying to bring back the "European spirit" V. Walt, "'We Want to Change Things from Within': Italy's Matteo Salvini on His Goal to Reshape Europe," Interview with Matteo Salvini published by TIME, *Ministero dell'Interno*, 2018,

high intrinsic value. This tension was evident during the 2015 refugee crisis, when EU-wide burden-sharing schemes, including the relocation quota system under the Dublin Agreement, faced fierce opposition from right-wing governments. In 2015, close to 1.25 million refugees were at the doors of the EU seeking assistance and entrance to European nations, with some 221,000 arriving at the Union's southern borders in October 2016 alone.<sup>62</sup> Against this backdrop, right-wing leaders in Central and Eastern Europe challenged and rejected quotas, particularly Poland and Hungary, framed compliance an affront to their national identity<sup>63</sup> and a betrayal to the values of voters.<sup>64</sup>

Furthermore, delegation can inadvertently generate political tensions even in cases where it might have offered reputational or normative benefits to the donor government. For example, the EUTF for Africa was under attack due to increasing the capabilities to surveil, control, and hurt migrants even though it was framed as a responsible, collaborative effort.<sup>65</sup> Norman and Micinski<sup>66</sup> highlight the precarious effects of foreign aid commitment in recipient states, noting that it often funds migration control efforts with harmful spillover effects on local populations. Additionally, the partnership between the EU and Sudan during the EUTF for Africa was particularly tenuous as it might have involved the use of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—one of the most abusive paramilitary groups in the country—to surveil Sudan's borders.<sup>67</sup> Between 2015-2016, the RSF began receiving money from the EU

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62. E. Greussing and H. G. Boomgaarden, "Shifting the refugee narrative? An automated frame analysis of Europe's 2015 refugee crisis," *Journal of Ethnic And Migration Studies* 43, no. 11 (2017): 1749–1774.

63. On 2 October 2016, Hungary held a referendum asking whether the EU should be allowed to mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary without parliamentary approval, and Orbán further argued that "redraw Hungary's and Europe's ethnic, cultural and religious identity, which no EU organ has the right to do" European University Institute, "The Invalid Anti-Migrant Referendum in Hungary," Accessed September 5, 2025, 2016, <https://blogs.eui.eu/constitutionalism-politics-working-group/invalid-anti-migrant-referendum-hungary/>.

64. Cadier, "Populist politics of representation and foreign policy: evidence from Poland."

65. Enough Project, "Border control from Hell: How the EU's migration partnership legitimizes Sudan's 'militia state'," *Enough: The Project To End Genocide And Crimes Against Humanity*. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/55954>, 2017, Kervyn and Shilhav, *An emergency for whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – migratory routes and development aid in Africa* Publication date; Norman and Micinski, "The European Union's migration management aid: Developing democracies or supporting authoritarianism?"

66. Norman and Micinski, "The European Union's migration management aid: Developing democracies or supporting authoritarianism?"

67. Enough Project, "Border control from Hell: How the EU's migration partnership legitimizes Sudan's

in the form of projects and foreign aid, becoming at that point Sudan's primary force in patrolling Sudanese borders to intervene with migrant's flows.<sup>6869</sup> Other agreements, such as the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan which funded Turkey's domestic institutions with an initial 3 billion EUR, have remained contentious since inception especially as Turkey's human rights' record plummets.

Lastly, delegation requires continuous monitoring of agents, often leading to complex multilateral negotiations and delays in achieving desired outcomes.<sup>70</sup> Right-wing governments, which emphasize domestic control, are particularly likely to struggle in securing long-term agreements through delegation or multilateral forums and even reaching ratification,<sup>71</sup> especially when dealing with a highly politicized topic such as migration.<sup>72</sup> If principals adjust to transnational shocks or diverging interests, delegation can become especially burdensome, as governments must navigate across multiple organizations to identify suitable agents. This process postpones opportunities for executives to demonstrate that they are "doing something" about migration if asked by their constituency. Consequently, right-wing governments are expected to favor bilateral migration-management aid, where they can retain control, avoid cumbersome negotiations, and claim credit more directly. These drivers would only apply to those areas that are deemed necessary to show competency. These considerations motivate my first conjecture.

*H1: Right-leaning governments increase bilateral migration-management aid to origin and transit countries substantially more than they increase migration-related aid overall.*

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'militia state'."

68. Enough Project, "Border control from Hell: How the EU's migration partnership legitimizes Sudan's 'militia state'."

69. Yet, the RSF has been a staple of Sudan for oppressing political dissent and as a dependable militia for Sudan's regime. In 2013, the RSF deployed against peaceful demonstrations demanding basic commodities resulting in 170 deaths within a month.

70. McLean, "Donors' preferences and agent choice: Delegation of European development aid."

71. V. Vignoli and M. Onderco, "Leader ideology and state commitment to multilateral treaties," *The Review of International Organizations*, 2024, 1–30.

72. A. Acharya, A. Estevadeordal, and L. W. Goodman, "Multipolar or multiplex? Interaction capacity, global cooperation and world order," *International Affairs* 99, no. 6 (2023): 2339–2365.

However, shifts to the political right in migration policy are often attributed to two factors: pressures from rising migration flows and the extension of partisan or ideological preferences. While the latter aligns with my expectations, the former should not be taken at face value. Reported migration figures, such as the number of asylum seekers or refugees residing in a country, can be distorted, politicized, or even manipulated regardless of actual inflows. Such practices of “crisis creation” are consistent with the securitization and politicization strategies employed by right-wing populist and far-right actors.<sup>73</sup> As such, ongoing portrayals of migration as a security or economic concern can be developed over time without matching current migration pressure, as equally as they can be downplayed. This perspective motivates my second conjecture.

*H2: Migration-related pressures, such as asylum applications and refugee populations, are not positively associated with bilateral migration-management aid commitments.*

## Empirical Approach

To measure the preference over bilateral migration aid, I construct two measures. The first one is a measure of migration-management aid encompassing all types of commitments where I define migration-management aid as aid commitments that include project descriptions referencing activities related to the management, support, or containment of cross-border population movements. This includes emergency relief for refugees and asylum seekers, capacity-building for transit or origin states, repatriation assistance, and support for international organizations engaged in migration control. Project classification is based on keyword identification in the short description field, combined with qualitative review to ensure alignment with migration-specific objectives rather than broader humanitarian aims. I

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73. V. Bello, *The Spiralling of the Securitisation of Migration in the EU: From the Management of a ‘Crisis’ to a Governance of Human Mobility?*, 6, 2022, 1327–1344; V. Squire, *Europe’s migration crisis: Border deaths and human dignity* (Cambridge University Press, 2020).

then focus on bilateral migration-management aid excluding the involvement of third parties as this type of commitment is in line with the argument that right-wing populist executives would prefer less delegation on foreign policy, both descriptions of the data collection are available on Appendix E.1. This allows us to compare the propensity by which right-wing governments prefer for one over the other, while allowing us to measure the impact of additional controls independently. I construct a dataset of aid commitments from this by filtering aid from 27 donor countries (shown in Appendix A.2) and 76 recipient states (both transit and origin countries) in Africa, Europe, and Asia (shown in Appendix A.1) to measure the effect of cabinet ideological position on migration aid. This country selection provides variation in the region, political structures, and socioeconomic characteristics.

Foreign aid data is sourced from the AidData Core Research Release V3.1 (AidData).<sup>74</sup> AidData provides description of aid commitments and organizations involved in administering funds. Project descriptions allow for the identification of key words indicating migration-focused third parties such as the United Nations, the UNHCR, and CARE international.<sup>75</sup> Any disbursement given to recipient countries excludes any mention of unspecified programs or aid given to a third-party organization present in the recipient country such as the UNHCR or IOM.<sup>76</sup> This results in 5.6 billion USD allocated for migration-management aid, with the unfiltered total assigned for management aid being a little over 9 billion USD.

I bundle transit and origins countries together for two specific reasons. First, states can be both transit and origin countries—such as the case of Libya or Morocco—at any given year based on political, economic, or environmental issues. Claiming that a country is either one or the other would provide an imprecise picture of migration flows and would attribute

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74. M. J. Tierney et al., “More dollars than sense: Refining our knowledge of development finance using AidData,” *World Development* 39, no. 11 (2011): 1891–1906.

75. Refer to Appendix E.1 for specific keywords.

76. A qualitative inspection of the cleaned AidData was additionally conducted to account for grammatical mistakes affecting data selection, which encompasses the whole universe of aid commitments that mention a mixed flow of migrants (asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants) in line with my definition. Refer to Appendix E.1 for more on data construction. Refer to Norman and Micinski (“The European Union’s migration management aid: Developing democracies or supporting authoritarianism?”) for an additional measure of migration-management aid that includes funds distributed by international organizations.

incorrect characteristics to the data. Second, if migrants arrive to European shores they have incentives to change their country of origin. Marking particular states as origin countries based on migrant data would wrongly label states as transit or origin. Bundling transit and origin countries together limits the scope of the study but treats migration as constantly changing phenomenon beyond time-specific labels.<sup>77</sup>

### Estimation Strategy

I estimate the models using fixed effects Tobit and Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) for several reasons.<sup>78</sup> The dependent variable is zero in the large majority of dyad-years, and those zeros are substantively meaningful rather than an artifact of measurement. We should not expect donors to allocate migration aid to every transit country in every year,<sup>79</sup> especially since some donors face little migration pressure that would prompt allocation of this kind at any level, and even donors receiving large numbers of asylum seekers may decline to enter these commitments. The outcome is therefore bounded below at zero, with a large mass of observations at that bound and a continuous positive tail above it. Both estimators accommodate that structure, and they do so in ways that recover different quantities.

The Tobit model treats the outcome as bounded at zero and estimates a single index governing both whether a commitment is made and how large it is. Models include donor and year fixed effects, with donor effects absorbing time-invariant differences in aid programs and administrative changes, while year effects absorb shocks common to all donors, including global displacement events and the general expansion of migration-related spending across the period, both accounting for events such as 9/11 which affected perceptions of

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77. Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN, makes this point in his 2006 address to the High-Level Dialogue of the UN General Assembly on International Migration and Development: “more countries are now significantly involved in, and affected by, international migration than at any time in history. And they are no longer so easily divided into ‘countries of origin’ and ‘countries of destination.’ Many are now both” K. Annan, “Address of Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General, to the High-Level Dialogue of the United Nations General Assembly on International Migration and Development, New York, September 14, 2006,” *The International Migration Review* 40, no. 4 (2006): 963–965.

78. Additional pooled and fixed effects OLS regressions are found in Appendix C.

79. Berthélemy and Tichit, “Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions—a three-dimensional panel analysis.”

migration and aid priorities.<sup>80</sup> The PPML estimation complements this approach because aid commitments are often skewed and heteroskedastic, and the model performs well despite overdispersion and high numbers of zeros in the data.<sup>81</sup> PPML models the conditional mean of aid in levels, so no transformation of the dependent variable is required and zeros enter as ordinary outcomes with positive probability. Consistency requires only that the conditional mean is correctly specified, and the estimator is robust to the form of the error distribution, which is why it has become standard for gravity-type models of bilateral flows.<sup>82</sup> PPML absorbs the same donor and year effects and drops observations that those effects predict perfectly, which removes donors with no bilateral migration aid commitments in any year. The estimation sample is therefore restricted to those who have committed aid.

Reported together, Tobit models indicate *whether* a donor commits while PPML indicates *how much* the donor commits. This distinction is important as donors can differ, such as Austria recording many small commitments while Norway records fewer and larger ones. The two estimators are therefore informative in a way that either alone would not be. Coefficients across models are not comparable in magnitude, as the Tobit estimate lies on a latent logged scale while the PPML estimate is a proportional effect on aid in levels. Both are interpreted in the results section.

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80. I use donor rather than dyad effects given that dyad effects require estimating over two thousand parameters in a model where most dyads never receive a commitment, which produces the incidental parameters problem in nonlinear estimation, and absorbing the dyad removes colonial history and geographic distance, both of which carry substantive interest here. Although fixed effects in Tobit models can distort standard errors, Greene (“Fixed effects and bias due to the incidental parameters problem in the Tobit model”) uses Monte Carlo simulation to show the distortion is negligible at panel lengths comparable to this one. This is also in line with Tobit models in the foreign aid and policy literature such as Bermeo and Leblang (“Migration and foreign aid”), Neumayer (*The pattern of aid giving: The impact of good governance on development assistance*), Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Schmaljohann (“The allocation of German aid: Self-interest and government ideology”), and Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider (“Catch me if you care: International development organizations and national corruption”).

81. J. S. Silva and S. Tenreiro, “Further simulation evidence on the performance of the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator,” *Economics Letters* 112, no. 2 (2011): 220–222; J. S. Silva and S. Tenreiro, “The log of gravity,” *The Review of Economics and statistics*, 2006, 641–658.

82. M. Weidner and T. Zylkin, “Bias and consistency in three-way gravity models,” *Journal of International Economics* 132 (2021): 103513.

## Migration-Management Aid

For my first dependent variable I measure the logged amount in USD of committed migration-management aid, constant to 2023. Refer to Appendix A.1 for foreign aid commitment totals. I lead the dependent variable up to two years to analyze the explanatory variable’s effect on future disbursements. My second dependent variable is a subset of the first, focusing on *bilateral* logged amount in USD of committed migration-management aid.

## Government Identification

My main independent variable is a logit-scaled right-left leaning score (RILE) of government in office in line with Prosser,<sup>83</sup> which recombines Lehmann et al.<sup>84</sup> and the original Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR)<sup>85</sup> RILE measure for a better account of the content and comparison of the propensity of the content across party manifestos.<sup>86</sup> The RILE measure includes 23 left-leaning and 10 right-leaning dimensions to account for a wide array of socioeconomic dimensions governments signal. On immigration, the measure includes “National Way of Life: Positive” and “Traditional Morality: Positive” with the corresponding opposite pole on the left, and “Multiculturalism: Negative.”<sup>87</sup> But it also includes views on internationalism (*per109*), welfare state limitation (*per505*), democracy (*per202*), market regulation (*per403*), and European integration (*per108*), to name a few. The RILE measure therefore carries content along which right-wing and centrist cabinets diverge sharply, such as nation and immigration, which is the dimension my argument

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83. C. Prosser, “Building policy scales from manifesto data: A referential content validity approach,” *Electoral Studies* 35 (2014): 88–101.

84. P. Lehmann et al., *The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR)*, v. 2024a, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) / Göttingen: Institut für Demokratieforschung (IfDem), 2024.

85. P. Lehmann et al., *The Manifesto Project Dataset - Codebook. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR)*, v. 2024a, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) / Göttingen: Institut für Demokratieforschung (IfDem), 2024.

86. The approach taken by Prosser (“Building policy scales from manifesto data: A referential content validity approach”) improves the original MARPOR RILE measure and builds upon Lowe et al. (“Scaling policy preferences from coded political texts”) measure by accounting for items not mentioned in manifestos and weighting across manifesto size.

87. Descriptions of these are available in Appendix A.4.

concerns.<sup>88</sup> aggregates these to the cabinet as the mean position of the parties holding cabinet membership. This means parties represented in parliament but outside government receive no weight. Each cabinet’s score applies from its formation until the next cabinet takes office. The scale takes negative values throughout its range in this sample with higher values indicating positions further to the right. Summary statistics for variables and RILE measures are available in Appendix A.3.

Models also include a range of donor- and recipient-level controls to account for alternative explanations of aid commitments. First, I control for refugee stocks and asylum applications in line with my second hypothesis. Countries currently caring for a large number of refugees might be less willing to further allocate resources to migration in any way—especially if funding is tight.<sup>89</sup> To incorporate this into the model, the stock of people recognized as refugees in the donor country (Donor Refugee Stocks (log)) is included. These are refugees recognized under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, the 1969 African Unity Convention, and in accordance with the UNHCR. The measure also includes people with refugee-like humanitarian status or temporary protection granted within the state. Moreover, asylum seekers are accounted for using the logged total asylum applications submitted to the donor (Asylum Applications to Donor (log)) provided by Eurostat’s historical and current application data.

To capture domestic political cohesion, I include an indicator for an Ideologically Connected Cabinet, equal to 1 when coalition parties are adjacent in the RILE scale. Economic capacity and need are controlled using donor and recipient GDP per capita and life expectancy,<sup>90</sup> which approximate both fiscal resources and domestic welfare provision. Migration-related pressures are measured through donor refugee stocks and asylum applica-

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88. J. Hellström, T. Bergman, and J. Lindahl, *Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Coalition Governance in Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset*, Version 2024.09, 2024.

89. For a test focusing on how migrant stocks affect foreign aid allocation refer to Bermeo and Leblang (“Migration and foreign aid”).

90. The World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, April 2022.

tions (obtained from World Bank and Eurostat measures), along with the count of migration-related protests in donor countries.<sup>91</sup> These variables capture domestic exposure to migration and public salience of the issue.

Furthermore, recipient instability is controlled through a binary civil war indicator,<sup>92</sup> while historical and geographic ties are addressed with a binary previous colony variable and logged dyadic distance.<sup>93</sup> Finally, I include a binary measure for recipient non-democracy (V-Dem), reflecting whether donors punish or tolerate autocratic partners. Together, these controls account for economic, institutional, and geopolitical conditions that may influence foreign aid patterns beyond ideological orientation. Summary statistics and further description of controls can be found in Appendix A.3.

## Results

Table 1 reports the models of bilateral migration-management aid and Table 2 the models of all migration aid. Columns 1 through 3 present fixed effects Tobit estimates for the contemporaneous outcome and for one- and two-year leads, while columns 4 through 6 present the corresponding PPML estimates.<sup>94</sup>

The two estimators recover different quantities and I interpret them separately. Because the great majority of dyad-years record no commitment, the Tobit coefficient is driven principally by whether a donor commits at all, and it lies on the latent logged scale rather than on the scale of aid itself. PPML models the conditional mean of aid in levels, so its coefficients are proportional effects and can be read as elasticities. In Table 1, the PPML estimate of 0.301 implies that a one standard deviation rightward shift in cabinet position is associated with roughly a 31 percent increase in expected bilateral migration aid, and the estimate

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91. D. Clark and P. Regan, “Mass Mobilization Protest Data,” 2016,

92. R. Sundberg and E. Melander, “Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (2013): 523–532; S. Davies, T. Pettersson, and M. Öberg, “Organized violence 1989–2022, and the return of conflict between states,” *Journal of Peace Research* 60, no. 4 (2023): 691–708.

93. T. Mayer and S. Zignago, “Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: The GeoDist database,” 2011,

94. All models include donor and year fixed effects. Tobit models set the lower limit at zero. PPML models absorb the fixed effects and cluster standard errors by dyad. Donor profiles are available in Appendix A.2, and complete tables including all controls in Appendix B.

holds at one year out.

The contrast between the two tables is the central result. In Table 1, cabinet position predicts bilateral migration aid under both estimators and at all three horizons. In Table 2, the Tobit estimates on all migration aid is close to three times that on all migration aid, 2.743 against 0.962, and the two are estimated on the same sample under the same specification, with the PPML estimates are indistinguishable from zero for Table 2. Right-leaning cabinets are therefore more likely to commit migration aid generally, but they do not commit more of it in total, which the PPML estimates state more directly by returning a null on the aggregate migration-management aid results in Table 2.

| <i>DV: Bilateral Migration Aid Committed to Recipients</i> |                      |                      |                      |                     |                      |                     |
|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
|                                                            | Tobit                |                      |                      | PPML                |                      |                     |
|                                                            | (1)<br><i>Full</i>   | (2)<br><i>t+1</i>    | (3)<br><i>t+2</i>    | (4)<br><i>Full</i>  | (5)<br><i>t+1</i>    | (6)<br><i>t+2</i>   |
| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>                           |                      |                      |                      |                     |                      |                     |
| Cabinet RILE (Prosser)                                     | 2.743***<br>(0.362)  | 2.716***<br>(0.362)  | 2.821***<br>(0.361)  | 0.301**<br>(0.102)  | 0.324***<br>(0.0785) | 0.124<br>(0.0940)   |
| <i>Selected Control Variables</i>                          |                      |                      |                      |                     |                      |                     |
| Asylum Applications to Donor (log)                         | -1.077*<br>(0.445)   | -1.792***<br>(0.441) | -1.509***<br>(0.434) | -0.0708<br>(0.214)  | -0.0639<br>(0.154)   | -0.460**<br>(0.160) |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                                 | -3.684***<br>(0.480) | -2.152***<br>(0.478) | 0.528<br>(0.492)     | -0.402*<br>(0.175)  | -0.178<br>(0.199)    | -0.355<br>(0.200)   |
| Non-Democracy (Recipient)                                  | 4.151***<br>(0.815)  | 4.235***<br>(0.831)  | 4.209***<br>(0.840)  | 1.664***<br>(0.361) | 1.651***<br>(0.370)  | 1.593***<br>(0.359) |
| Constant                                                   | 32.41<br>(30.01)     | -1.906<br>(28.28)    | -28.82<br>(27.73)    | 15.89<br>(9.884)    | 9.131<br>(9.131)     | 0.887<br>(11.55)    |
| Observations                                               | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                | 26448               | 25296                | 24128               |
| Standard errors in parentheses                             |                      |                      |                      |                     |                      |                     |
| * $p < 0.05$ , ** $p < 0.01$ , *** $p < 0.001$             |                      |                      |                      |                     |                      |                     |

Table 1: FE Tobit and PPML models of bilateral migration-management aid committed from 1990 to 2013, with up to 2 years lead. PPML SE clustered in donor-recipient pair. Complete tables are available on Appendix B.

The migration pressure measures behave the same way, but in the opposite direction. Asylum applications to the donor are negative and significant in the bilateral Tobit models,

at -1.077 contemporaneously and -1.792 at one year out, and are indistinguishable from zero in the bilateral PPML models. In Table 2 the same variable turns positive, at 0.721 in the Tobit and 0.434 in PPML. Aggregate migration aid responds to asylum pressure, which as stated does account for migration management, but the targeted bilateral funds do not. Donor refugee stocks show the same asymmetry, at -3.684 in the bilateral Tobit against -1.432 for all migration aid. Migration pressure is associated with more migration aid in general but not for bilateral aid, which is the evidence for my second hypothesis.

The control estimates reproduce the standard findings in the aid allocation literature, which gives some confidence that the models are well specified. Recipient GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant throughout but one column in PPML model from Table 1, indicating that poorer recipients receive more. Donor GDP per capita is statistically significant and positive, substantially so in the lead Tobit models for both tables, which reflects donor capacity to give in the first place. Recipients experiencing civil war receive considerably more, at 7.096 in the bilateral Tobit and 0.843 in PPML, both statistically significant, consistent with conflict producing both humanitarian need and outward displacement which countries seek to manage through aid. Distance is negative and significant across all specifications, in line with the gravity literature and with the observation that more distant origin countries are less relevant to a donor's migration management. Recipient life expectancy is not significant in these models. Yet, colonial history is positive and significant in the Tobit estimates but indistinguishable from zero under PPML, which is interpretable as historical ties predicting whether a migration aid relationship exists at all, yet not how much money moves through it once it does.

Taken together, the estimates indicate that ideological orientation rather than migration pressure is the decisive driver of bilateral migration aid. Cabinet position predicts these commitments under both estimators and at every horizon, while the measures of migration pressure predict aggregate migration aid and not the bilateral funds. The findings support my first and second hypotheses, and indicate that migration management through aid is more

| <i>DV: All Migration Aid Committed to Recipients</i> |                      |                      |                      |                      |                     |                       |
|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>                     | Tobit                |                      |                      | PPML                 |                     |                       |
|                                                      | (1)<br><i>Full</i>   | (2)<br><i>t+1</i>    | (3)<br><i>t+2</i>    | (4)<br><i>Full</i>   | (5)<br><i>t+1</i>   | (6)<br><i>t+2</i>     |
| Cabinet RILE (Prosser)                               | 0.962***<br>(0.275)  | 1.390***<br>(0.272)  | 1.180***<br>(0.269)  | -0.00885<br>(0.0585) | -0.0454<br>(0.0632) | -0.255***<br>(0.0770) |
| <i>Selected Control Variables</i>                    |                      |                      |                      |                      |                     |                       |
| Asylums Applications to Donor (log)                  | 0.721*<br>(0.351)    | 1.077**<br>(0.349)   | 0.574<br>(0.339)     | 0.434*<br>(0.169)    | 0.535***<br>(0.115) | 0.0107<br>(0.130)     |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                           | -1.432***<br>(0.400) | -0.150<br>(0.402)    | 1.724***<br>(0.416)  | -0.0341<br>(0.156)   | 0.206<br>(0.173)    | 0.00961<br>(0.165)    |
| Non-Democracy (Recipient)                            | 4.680***<br>(0.663)  | 4.834***<br>(0.674)  | 4.743***<br>(0.678)  | 1.667***<br>(0.320)  | 1.662***<br>(0.329) | 1.601***<br>(0.314)   |
| Constant                                             | -54.87*<br>(24.11)   | -86.61***<br>(22.98) | -112.5***<br>(22.70) | 11.68<br>(10.79)     | 11.02<br>(11.32)    | -5.214<br>(14.25)     |
| Observations                                         | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                | 26448                | 25296               | 24128                 |
| Standard errors in parentheses                       |                      |                      |                      |                      |                     |                       |
| * $p < 0.05$ , ** $p < 0.01$ , *** $p < 0.001$       |                      |                      |                      |                      |                     |                       |

Table 2: FE Tobit and PPML models of all migration-management aid committed from 1990 to 2013, with up to 2 years lead. PPML SE clustered in donor-recipient pair. Complete tables are available on Appendix B.

nuanced that what is believed. It is not just migration pressure or colonial ties, though they are influential, that determines such aid. Similarly, as the U.S. example shows, governments will still rely to some extent on migration-management aid that is multilateral, but it does not mean they will disregard their preferences for delegation altogether.<sup>95</sup>

95. Appendix F reports a supplementary specification interacting far-right cabinet participation with a manifesto-based measure of anti-immigration emphasis, created from PopuList and MARPOR respectively. I treat those estimates as suggestive rather than as evidence the argument rests on given that far-right participation occurs rarely, forcing the interaction to be identified on a narrow and geographically concentrated set of cases. Results indicate larger size for Tobit coefficients for bilateral migration aid compared to all migration aid, though similar results under PPML. These should be taken as rough estimates rather than decisive and are presented for transparency.

## Choosing the *Right* Issue Area

Migration is closely tied to right-wing governance and is likely to remain a highly salient political issue for their platform. Policy areas of lower political importance should not attract comparable attention. To assess whether the main results reflect something specific to migration rather than a general property of the models, I conduct a placebo outcome test following Eggers, Tuñón, and Dafoe,<sup>96</sup> replacing the outcome with health-related aid commitments.<sup>97</sup> Health aid shares migration aid's budget cycle, recipient set and implementing agencies, but offers little-to-no migration-control function as it cannot reduce arrivals, cannot be presented domestically as border policy, and earns no credit on an anti-immigration platform. The channel the comparison removes its domestic credit-claiming on migration control, while the budgetary and bureaucratic channels are held fixed under the same government. I re-estimate the models on all health-related aid and on bilateral health aid excluding third-party implementing organizations, using the classification described in Appendix E.2, with complete tables in Appendix B and OLS specifications in Appendix D.

Cabinet position does not predict health aid in the way it predicts migration aid across the models. There is no association between the RILE measure and health commitment presented in the PPML estimates both types of health aid. The Tobit estimates are positive and reach conventional significance in three of six columns, but between 0.374 to 0.577, they are at most a fifth of the size of the corresponding migration estimates and none are significant contemporaneously for the bilateral measure. What the health models do show is a different allocation logic. Recipient regime type reverses as non-democracies receive substantially more migration aid and significantly less health aid, at -3.056 in the bilateral health Tobit against 4.151 for bilateral migration aid. Distance reverses as well, entering positively for health where it is negative for migration, and colonial ties are far stronger predictors of

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96. A. C. Eggers, G. Tuñón, and A. Dafoe, "Placebo tests for causal inference," *American Journal of Political Science*, 2023,

97. For recent examples see Cruz and Schneider ("Foreign aid and undeserved credit claiming") and Peisakhin and Rozenas ("Electoral effects of biased media: Russian television in Ukraine").

health commitments than of migration commitments. Migration aid and health aid are therefore allocated on different criteria by the same donors in the same years, as expected. Migration aid is directed by political strategy toward the countries that matter for migration control, while health aid follows the conventional determinants of development assistance and provides no support for their strategic and policy goals the further right they are.

| Outcome                 | Tobit    | PPML    |
|-------------------------|----------|---------|
| Bilateral Migration Aid | 2.743*** | 0.301** |
| All Migration Aid       | 0.962*** | −0.009  |
| Bilateral Health Aid    | 0.374    | −0.073  |
| All health Aid          | 0.490*   | −0.031  |

Table 3: Cabinet RILE (Prosser) across the four outcomes, contemporaneous models with full controls, and PPML SE clustered in donor-recipient pair. with complete tables in Appendix B and OLS specifications in Appendix D.

## Conclusion

Understanding the preferences and choices of right-wing executives in government is critical as democratic governments confront the growing power of challenger parties.<sup>98</sup> The presence of right-wing governments in Western liberal democracies has transformed the approach to foreign policy by placing emphasis on domestic gains at the cost of international engagement. The rise of right-wing governments in Western liberal democracies has reshaped foreign policy priorities, often privileging domestic political gains over international commitments. Successive waves of right-wing governance and populist leadership<sup>99</sup> have signaled a decline in pluralist practices, particularly in Europe.<sup>100</sup> These dynamics require a recon-

98. Pevehouse, “The COVID-19 pandemic, international cooperation, and populism”; C. E. De Vries and S. B. Hobolt, “Political entrepreneurs,” in *Political Entrepreneurs* (Princeton University Press, 2020).

99. Mudde (*The far right today*) describes the current right-wing presence as the fourth wave, with nativism and authoritarianism at its core.

100. Kitschelt and McGann, *The radical right in Western Europe: A comparative analysis*; Taggart, “Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe”; K. Van Kersbergen and A. Krouwel, “A double-edged sword! The Dutch centre-right and the ‘foreigners issue’,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, no. 3 (2008): 398–414; Akkerman, De Lange, and Rooduijn, *Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream?*; Mudde, *The far right today*.

sideration of how foreign aid, as part of foreign policy, reflects the cost–benefit calculations of executives in power.

That said, this study set out to examine the relationship between right-wing governments and foreign aid allocation towards transit and origin countries for the purpose of migration management. Though the link to right-wing populism can generally be made given the construction of the main explanatory variable, I do not engage with it given that populist leadership has been present but not fully widespread across executive offices for the time period of the study. That said, results are robust across several specifications and modeling techniques, indicating that the pattern observed here would likely be replicable with additional data. This takes me to the second limitation of the study. Further analysis is necessary to understand more recent development of populist parties in Western governments beyond the specified time frame. Nonetheless, the study combines complementing models and a placebo outcome tests to show that right-wing governments in power are significantly more likely to disburse bilateral migration aid. Counter to our expectation of right-wing governments to detach from foreign aid to focus on national matters, the findings suggest that right-wing presence in government matters when foreign aid on migration is disbursed.

More broadly, the findings highlight how domestic political pressures in donor states shape international responses to migration. In a context of democratic erosion in international governance, rising populism across Western democracies, and the presence of extremist groups seeking recognition,<sup>101</sup> migration emerges as a central issue where right-wing governments break from the traditional norms of liberal democracies towards strategic intervention. This shift could continue to reconfigure international cooperation to enhance the bargaining leverage of autocratic regimes, which can capitalize on migration flows to secure favorable terms and external resources. It follows this research should also invite more engagement with the domestic effects of right-wing governance at the nexus of international migration

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101. D. A. Lake, L. L. Martin, and T. Risse, “Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization,” *International Organization* 75, no. 2 (2021): 225–257; S. Haggard and R. Kaufman, *Backsliding: Democratic regress in the contemporary world* (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

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cooperation its effects in the international arena.

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## A General Supplements and Additional Models

### A.1 Foreign Aid Commitments to Recipient, by Region (AidData)

The tables showcase aid commitments from EU members only to recipients excluding the Americas and Far East Asia, as previously stated. Notice that South Sudan will only receive aid after 2011 when it became a UN member. Regions are defined by AidData and USD is constant to 2023. AidData combines financial data from a wide array of organizations such as the African Development Fund or World Trade Organization in conjunction with donor documents from government websites and other resources. It is a robust collection of aid commitments with descriptive characteristics, allowing to identify aid commitments with higher level of certainty than other resources available. The complete dataset compiles a total of 1.5 million projects or 9.5 trillion USD in commitments in its entirety.<sup>102</sup>

|   | Recipient              | Net Aid        | Net Migration Aid | Migration Aid (Filtered) | Health Aid (Filtered) |
|---|------------------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | Iran                   | 6,580,547,482  | 360,936,009       | 263,314,229              | 7,248,782             |
| 2 | Iraq                   | 32,527,697,721 | 1,119,035,219     | 683,270,326              | 71,099,443            |
| 3 | Israel                 | 1,611,586,924  | 88,970            | 88,970                   | 6,071,199             |
| 4 | Jordan                 | 6,232,572,865  | 161,877,967       | 149,551,751              | 64,447,807            |
| 5 | Lebanon                | 6,017,209,943  | 141,717,067       | 111,766,941              | 116,535,357           |
| 6 | Palestinian Adm. Areas | 12,057,509,607 | 93,803,085        | 43,218,280               | 326,797,424           |
| 7 | Saudi Arabia           | 80,901,507     | 343,323           | 343,323                  | 106,933               |
| 8 | Syria                  | 3,797,828,640  | 150,121,457       | 79,857,361               | 13,657,164            |
| 9 | Yemen                  | 5,040,518,746  | 15,722,750        | 13,892,776               | 439,084,308           |

Table 4: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to the Middle East (1990-2013)

|    | Recipient       | Net Aid        | Net Migration Aid | Migration Aid (Filtered) | Health Aid (Filtered) |
|----|-----------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1  | Afghanistan     | 18,310,116,353 | 563,218,213       | 392,733,355              | 305,352,677           |
| 2  | Armenia         | 1,916,555,619  | 113,420,828       | 64,570,312               | 29,275,322            |
| 3  | Azerbaijan      | 1,314,264,192  | 100,713,830       | 49,807,774               | 35,967,384            |
| 4  | Bangladesh      | 18,337,774,761 | 58,080,865        | 31,773,979               | 1,869,460,785         |
| 5  | Bhutan          | 915,049,231    | 2,700,283         | 1,474,171                | 117,049,340           |
| 6  | Georgia         | 2,941,810,066  | 94,785,250        | 57,670,414               | 32,871,845            |
| 7  | India           | 38,354,578,732 | 53,683,317        | 40,544,469               | 3,127,347,956         |
| 8  | Kazakhstan      | 1,287,204,204  | 10,135,931        | 6,434,738                | 18,518,052            |
| 9  | Kyrgyz Republic | 1,128,926,215  | 10,426,107        | 8,742,625                | 121,465,110           |
| 10 | Maldives        | 243,126,158    | 28,793            | 28,793                   | 931,346               |
| 11 | Nepal           | 6,467,973,979  | 17,136,329        | 14,227,054               | 298,993,517           |
| 12 | Pakistan        | 14,906,799,098 | 163,506,563       | 76,844,685               | 1,013,089,406         |
| 13 | Sri Lanka       | 6,206,716,981  | 184,062,475       | 75,076,883               | 96,301,243            |
| 14 | Tajikistan      | 967,277,470    | 24,343,925        | 19,204,969               | 35,862,573            |
| 15 | Turkmenistan    | 61,661,790     | 1,604,252         | 1,468,895                | 968,188               |
| 16 | Uzbekistan      | 1,085,925,523  | 12,598,502        | 10,365,477               | 77,311,721            |

Table 5: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to South and Central Asia (1990-2013)

102. M. J. Tierney et al., “More dollars than sense: Refining our knowledge of development finance using AidData,” *World Development* 39, no. 11 (2011): 1891–1906.

|   | Recipient | Net Aid        | Net Migration Aid | Migration Aid (Filtered) | Health Aid (Filtered) |
|---|-----------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | Algeria   | 10,933,835,601 | 90,547,008        | 40,066,649               | 19,819,523            |
| 2 | Egypt     | 26,012,170,113 | 12,356,921        | 7,214,472                | 186,861,445           |
| 3 | Libya     | 450,909,346    | 12,980,292        | 7,821,818                | 1,767,629             |
| 4 | Morocco   | 22,420,099,778 | 44,842,215        | 38,455,851               | 116,854,897           |
| 5 | Tunisia   | 12,777,404,431 | 11,635,267        | 1,976,339                | 23,963,708            |

Table 6: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to African Countries, North of Sahara (1990-2013)

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|    | Recipient                     | Net Aid        | Net Migration Aid | Migration Aid (Filtered) | Health Aid (Filtered) |
|----|-------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1  | Angola                        | 7,789,703,043  | 219,512,435       | 101,183,741              | 195,720,000           |
| 2  | Benin                         | 5,715,390,890  | 1,823,682         | 1,048,288                | 180,218,589           |
| 3  | Burkina Faso                  | 9,155,871,636  | 2,524,010         | 1,479,882                | 352,608,667           |
| 4  | Burundi                       | 3,726,021,753  | 181,543,678       | 106,482,650              | 85,862,475            |
| 5  | Cameroon                      | 21,038,816,772 | 29,245,743        | 17,748,350               | 153,874,743           |
| 6  | Cape Verde                    | 2,827,619,681  | 545,249           | 293,655                  | 20,300,379            |
| 7  | Central African Republic      | 1,875,823,816  | 5,748,050         | 1,794,571                | 45,919,780            |
| 8  | Chad                          | 3,294,927,779  | 86,468,818        | 47,522,053               | 44,401,343            |
| 9  | Comoros                       | 620,392,792    | 3,630,177         | 79,221                   | 10,116,269            |
| 10 | Congo, Democratic Republic of | 24,484,904,093 | 244,521,853       | 112,842,561              | 433,272,331           |
| 11 | Congo, Republic of            | 9,099,539,377  | 49,949,835        | 19,810,389               | 22,264,242            |
| 12 | Cote d'Ivoire                 | 19,068,324,650 | 44,502,159        | 18,579,388               | 67,547,058            |
| 13 | Djibouti                      | 1,549,062,305  | 9,715,911         | 9,314,031                | 38,837,199            |
| 14 | Equatorial Guinea             | 678,924,919    | 144,828           | 44,045                   | 24,444,398            |
| 15 | Eritrea                       | 2,094,828,606  | 111,342,187       | 87,364,188               | 91,149,722            |
| 16 | Ethiopia                      | 15,969,258,773 | 186,224,539       | 150,939,789              | 965,495,704           |
| 17 | Gabon                         | 4,120,892,486  | 962,979           | 454,347                  | 26,178,847            |
| 18 | Gambia                        | 460,793,138    | 7,111,654         | 6,406,721                | 16,287,738            |
| 19 | Ghana                         | 14,997,048,883 | 15,337,178        | 12,848,256               | 1,163,262,438         |
| 20 | Guinea                        | 3,453,139,171  | 53,070,071        | 36,656,687               | 82,358,143            |
| 21 | Guinea-Bissau                 | 1,933,721,027  | 23,201,039        | 1,733,060                | 85,319,414            |
| 22 | Kenya                         | 15,726,819,318 | 168,570,831       | 109,461,016              | 1,094,328,880         |
| 23 | Liberia                       | 3,635,326,234  | 127,232,502       | 79,406,190               | 178,606,472           |
| 24 | Madagascar                    | 6,978,326,920  | 5,068,820         | 36,968                   | 58,706,642            |
| 25 | Malawi                        | 7,398,399,562  | 9,891,261         | 8,608,678                | 724,354,243           |
| 26 | Mali                          | 8,771,978,925  | 26,535,448        | 13,465,535               | 264,305,226           |
| 27 | Mauritania                    | 3,305,981,062  | 40,460,177        | 7,607,936                | 44,380,967            |
| 28 | Mauritius                     | 2,286,862,869  | 528,055           | 186,608                  | 657,267               |
| 29 | Mozambique                    | 31,769,567,954 | 67,158,613        | 34,417,081               | 1,630,447,820         |
| 30 | Namibia                       | 3,511,034,281  | 4,513,882         | 4,513,882                | 148,796,761           |
| 31 | Niger                         | 4,988,888,720  | 10,068,839        | 8,535,517                | 131,625,938           |
| 32 | Nigeria                       | 31,690,432,529 | 107,246,775       | 81,445,727               | 1,169,338,239         |
| 33 | Rwanda                        | 6,911,493,723  | 127,235,588       | 84,918,274               | 186,060,947           |
| 34 | Senegal                       | 12,089,445,454 | 9,942,354         | 5,956,792                | 126,429,069           |
| 35 | Sierra Leone                  | 3,547,860,708  | 137,900,250       | 43,740,989               | 115,775,731           |
| 36 | Somalia                       | 4,526,124,215  | 376,612,983       | 318,770,241              | 148,571,138           |
| 37 | South Africa                  | 11,673,210,752 | 8,412,690         | 7,215,596                | 298,335,508           |
| 38 | South Sudan                   | 1,152,567,665  | 26,722,013        | 4,015,861                | 33,860,543            |
| 39 | St. Helena                    | 803,726,214    | 19,734            | 19,734                   | 50,552,558            |
| 40 | Sudan                         | 10,046,831,293 | 255,444,989       | 156,288,747              | 445,454,766           |
| 41 | Swaziland                     | 403,800,065    | 190,523           | 119,434                  | 12,158,715            |
| 42 | Tanzania                      | 29,772,024,647 | 87,718,970        | 53,925,375               | 1,680,710,950         |
| 43 | Togo                          | 3,057,532,206  | 24,452,707        | 7,173,838                | 33,339,829            |
| 44 | Uganda                        | 16,846,936,681 | 98,335,441        | 89,074,042               | 1,189,683,717         |
| 45 | Zambia                        | 17,134,025,476 | 34,687,304        | 31,320,334               | 1,189,407,757         |
| 46 | Zimbabwe                      | 7,701,350,951  | 18,672,867        | 11,733,475               | 324,529,933           |

Table 7: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to African Countries, South of Sahara (1990-2013)

## A.2 Foreign Aid Commitments from Donors, by Region (Aid-Data)

|    | Donor          | Net Aid         | Net Migration Aid | Migration Aid (Filtered) | Health Aid (Filtered) |
|----|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1  | Austria        | 10,518,623,844  | 478,375,536       | 470,748,354              | 193,247,607           |
| 2  | Belgium        | 24,332,425,501  | 28,143,680        | 11,640,154               | 186,842,975           |
| 3  | Bulgaria       | 0               | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 4  | Croatia        | 0               | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 5  | Czechia        | 0               | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 6  | Denmark        | 28,093,999,280  | 254,237,460       | 196,776,967              | 3,189,844,898         |
| 7  | Estonia        | 10,594,246      | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 8  | Finland        | 9,123,337,960   | 285,022,996       | 208,328,192              | 501,198,957           |
| 9  | France         | 149,816,068,547 | 549,423,571       | 8,558,904                | 391,094,715           |
| 10 | Germany        | 135,135,499,615 | 1,371,380,144     | 631,141,053              | 2,917,828,136         |
| 11 | Greece         | 910,558,193     | 15,732,402        | 1,712,364                | 40,742,182            |
| 12 | Hungary        | 14,786,408      | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 13 | Iceland        | 136,583,088     | 1,267,500         | 1,015,492                | 25,542,158            |
| 14 | Ireland        | 6,213,843,034   | 10,492,764        | 5,443,275                | 887,834,510           |
| 15 | Italy          | 44,513,560,430  | 257,746,098       | 205,857,344              | 1,269,267,274         |
| 16 | Latvia         | 1,144,301       | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 17 | Lithuania      | 8,089,252       | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 18 | Netherlands    | 49,040,080,285  | 1,017,731,189     | 610,643,903              | 2,294,757,845         |
| 19 | Norway         | 38,732,583,176  | 1,512,531,328     | 1,386,825,381            | 1,202,473,307         |
| 20 | Poland         | 0               | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 21 | Portugal       | 8,768,607,981   | 2,532,634         | 2,233,906                | 66,242,432            |
| 22 | Romania        | 3,564,876       | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 23 | Slovakia       | 0               | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 24 | Slovenia       | 1,972,508       | 0                 | 0                        | 0                     |
| 25 | Spain          | 20,766,983,166  | 296,442,269       | 213,799,232              | 661,814,173           |
| 26 | Sweden         | 31,408,867,125  | 299,122,012       | 107,995,727              | 1,658,609,510         |
| 27 | United Kingdom | 103,218,606,313 | 297,232,800       | 125,781,099              | 8,473,600,503         |

Table 8: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) from All Donors (1990-2013)

### A.3 Summary Statistics and Extended Explanation of Controls

| Variable                              | N     | Mean  | Std. Dev. | Min    | Pctl. 25 | Pctl. 75 | Max   |
|---------------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|----------|----------|-------|
| Bilateral Migration Aid               | 49248 | 0.57  | 2.68      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 18.42 |
| Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)                 | 48108 | 0.73  | 14.41     | -37.32 | -9.13    | 8.59     | 47.37 |
| Cabinet RILE (Prosser)                | 48108 | -2.10 | 0.92      | -4.91  | -2.63    | -1.49    | -0.14 |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet       | 48336 | 0.65  | 0.48      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis     | 48336 | 0.65  | 1.59      | -4.34  | -0.37    | 1.68     | 4.80  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet            | 48336 | 0.14  | 0.34      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)     | 48260 | 9.69  | 0.97      | 7.00   | 9.16     | 10.38    | 11.55 |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log) | 47412 | 6.83  | 1.14      | 3.13   | 5.99     | 7.47     | 10.52 |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years    | 48600 | 59.71 | 9.48      | 14.10  | 52.60    | 67.57    | 82.06 |
| Asylum Applications to Donor (log)    | 44840 | 7.77  | 2.50      | 0.00   | 6.45     | 9.59     | 12.99 |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)            | 46132 | 8.76  | 2.64      | 1.61   | 6.89     | 10.82    | 14.16 |
| Donor Migration Protests              | 49248 | 0.11  | 0.47      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 5.00  |
| Civil War (Recipient)                 | 49248 | 0.24  | 0.43      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Previous Colony of Donor              | 47952 | 0.03  | 0.17      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Distance (log)                        | 47952 | 8.51  | 0.42      | 6.33   | 8.31     | 8.80     | 9.35  |
| Non-Democracy (Recipient)             | 47871 | 0.88  | 0.33      | 0.00   | 1.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |

Table 9: Summary Statistics for Bilateral Migration Aid

| Variable                                      | N     | Mean  | Std. Dev. | Min    | Pctl. 25 | Pctl. 75 | Max   |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|----------|----------|-------|
| Migration Aid                                 | 49248 | 0.83  | 3.18      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 18.66 |
| Cabinet RILE                                  | 48108 | 0.73  | 14.41     | -37.32 | -9.13    | 8.59     | 47.37 |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                 | 48108 | -2.10 | 0.92      | -4.91  | -2.63    | -1.49    | -0.14 |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet               | 48336 | 0.65  | 0.48      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Platform, Logit      | 48336 | 0.65  | 1.59      | -4.34  | -0.37    | 1.68     | 4.80  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet                    | 48336 | 0.14  | 0.34      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)             | 48260 | 9.69  | 0.97      | 7.00   | 9.16     | 10.38    | 11.55 |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)         | 47412 | 6.83  | 1.14      | 3.13   | 5.99     | 7.47     | 10.52 |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years            | 48600 | 59.71 | 9.48      | 14.10  | 52.60    | 67.57    | 82.06 |
| Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) | 44840 | 7.77  | 2.50      | 0.00   | 6.45     | 9.59     | 12.99 |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                    | 46132 | 8.76  | 2.64      | 1.61   | 6.89     | 10.82    | 14.16 |
| Donor Migration Protests                      | 49248 | 0.11  | 0.47      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 5.00  |
| Civil War (Recipient)                         | 49248 | 0.24  | 0.43      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Previous Colony of Donor                      | 47952 | 0.03  | 0.17      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Distance (log)                                | 47952 | 8.51  | 0.42      | 6.33   | 8.31     | 8.80     | 9.35  |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                     | 47871 | 0.88  | 0.33      | 0.00   | 1.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |

Table 10: Summary Statistics for Bilateral Migration Aid

| Variable                                      | N     | Mean  | Std. Dev. | Min    | Pctl. 25 | Pctl. 75 | Max   |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|----------|----------|-------|
| Bilateral Health Aid                          | 49248 | 1.24  | 3.93      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 20.51 |
| Cabinet RILE                                  | 48108 | 0.73  | 14.41     | -37.32 | -9.13    | 8.59     | 47.37 |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                 | 48108 | -2.10 | 0.92      | -4.91  | -2.63    | -1.49    | -0.14 |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet               | 48336 | 0.65  | 0.48      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis, Logit      | 48336 | 0.65  | 1.59      | -4.34  | -0.37    | 1.68     | 4.80  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet                    | 48336 | 0.14  | 0.34      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)             | 48260 | 9.69  | 0.97      | 7.00   | 9.16     | 10.38    | 11.55 |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)         | 47412 | 6.83  | 1.14      | 3.13   | 5.99     | 7.47     | 10.52 |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years            | 48600 | 59.71 | 9.48      | 14.10  | 52.60    | 67.57    | 82.06 |
| Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) | 44840 | 7.77  | 2.50      | 0.00   | 6.45     | 9.59     | 12.99 |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                    | 46132 | 8.76  | 2.64      | 1.61   | 6.89     | 10.82    | 14.16 |
| Donor Migration Protests                      | 49248 | 0.11  | 0.47      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 5.00  |
| Civil War (Recipient)                         | 49248 | 0.24  | 0.43      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Previous Colony of Donor                      | 47952 | 0.03  | 0.17      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Distance (log)                                | 47952 | 8.51  | 0.42      | 6.33   | 8.31     | 8.80     | 9.35  |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                     | 47871 | 0.88  | 0.33      | 0.00   | 1.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |

Table 11: Summary Statistics for Bilateral Migration Aid

| Variable                                      | N     | Mean  | Std. Dev. | Min    | Pctl. 25 | Pctl. 75 | Max   |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|----------|----------|-------|
| All Health Aid                                | 49248 | 1.35  | 4.11      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 20.51 |
| Cabinet RILE                                  | 48108 | 0.73  | 14.41     | -37.32 | -9.13    | 8.59     | 47.37 |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                 | 48108 | -2.10 | 0.92      | -4.91  | -2.63    | -1.49    | -0.14 |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet               | 48336 | 0.65  | 0.48      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis, Logit      | 48336 | 0.65  | 1.59      | -4.34  | -0.37    | 1.68     | 4.80  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet                    | 48336 | 0.14  | 0.34      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)             | 48260 | 9.69  | 0.97      | 7.00   | 9.16     | 10.38    | 11.55 |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)         | 47412 | 6.83  | 1.14      | 3.13   | 5.99     | 7.47     | 10.52 |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years            | 48600 | 59.71 | 9.48      | 14.10  | 52.60    | 67.57    | 82.06 |
| Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) | 44840 | 7.77  | 2.50      | 0.00   | 6.45     | 9.59     | 12.99 |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                    | 46132 | 8.76  | 2.64      | 1.61   | 6.89     | 10.82    | 14.16 |
| Donor Migration Protests                      | 49248 | 0.11  | 0.47      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 5.00  |
| Civil War (Recipient)                         | 49248 | 0.24  | 0.43      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Previous Colony of Donor                      | 47952 | 0.03  | 0.17      | 0.00   | 0.00     | 0.00     | 1.00  |
| Distance (log)                                | 47952 | 8.51  | 0.42      | 6.33   | 8.31     | 8.80     | 9.35  |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                     | 47871 | 0.88  | 0.33      | 0.00   | 1.00     | 1.00     | 1.00  |

Table 12: Summary Statistics for Bilateral Migration Aid

## Extended Explanation of Control Variables

Controls for the models include individual donor and recipient characteristics that would impact enactment of aid commitments and continuous engagement with recipient countries. First, I control for the cohesion of the donors' government Ideologically Connected Cabinet as an alternative explanation for aid commitments. The binary variable measures whether parties in cabinet are next to each other using MARPOR's RILE measure. A binary value of 1 indicates higher cohesion, with less 'ideological connection' most likely leading to a decrease of aid commitments due to cabinet politics and polarization. Second, I control for gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) from the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI)<sup>103</sup> as a control for donor and recipient GDP Per Capita economic status. I utilize

103. The World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, April 2022.

life expectancy to additionally measure domestic institutions that attend the general public's basic needs in the recipient country Recipient Life Expectancy in Years. Both GDPPC and life expectancy address concerns of need being the main driver for aid commitments, regardless of donors' domestic environment. For example, a higher life expectancy would indicate domestic welfare institutions are relatively strong enough to not require foreign aid. As such, these controls account for economic and institutional push-factors important in explaining aid commitments.

Migration-related protests in donor countries donor migration protests are also incorporated into the model as a count variable, once again controlling for domestic desire to address migration.<sup>104</sup> Donor governments, regardless of partisanship, might be driven by domestic outcry to control migration, thus causing an uptick of aid commitments. I argue domestic concern over migration is necessary for the rise of the right and their subsequent need to address migration but not enough to generate such an uptick. Donor governments are able to measure the impact of such protests without fully be swayed by them as budget constraints and political statements might be more salient predictors for aid commitments.

These additional variables are useful in measuring other plausible explanations for aid commitments to support security efforts. Political turmoil in recipient countries could be positively associated with aid commitments as they serve to stabilize communities and support institutions. I include a binary variable that controls for *Civil War (Recipient)* in the recipient country for that year. The control takes into consideration the desire of developed nations to allocate aid to victims of civil wars and to possibly reduce spillover security issues.<sup>105</sup>

Lastly, the colonial relationship and distance between donor and recipient countries are important points in their economic relationship. I use a binary variable to control for the recipient country being a former colony of the donor country (Previous Colony of Donor), obtained from the Correlates of War-Colonial Contiguity Data, 1816-2016 V3.1. To control for distance, I measure the logged simple distance in kilometers (Distance (log)) from the most populated cities in a dyad.<sup>106</sup> I also include a binary measure of the recipient's polyarchy (Non-Democracy (Recipient)) in which a score below 0.60 is considered a non-democracy.<sup>107</sup> The democracy measure incorporates the notion of donors punishing non-democratic partners by reducing aid commitments, although we understand aid sanctions can vary even across similar violations.<sup>108</sup> Results will find some inconclusive results in this area.

104. D. Clark and P. Regan, "Mass Mobilization Protest Data," 2016,

105. R. Sundberg and E. Melander, "Introducing the UCDP georeferenced event dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (2013): 523–532; S. Davies, T. Pettersson, and M. Öberg, "Organized violence 1989–2022, and the return of conflict between states," *Journal of Peace Research* 60, no. 4 (2023): 691–708.

106. T. Mayer and S. Zignago, "Notes on CEPII's distances measures: The GeoDist database," 2011,

107. M. Coppedge et al., "V-Dem Dataset v11. 1," 2021,

108. R. A. Nielsen, "Rewarding human rights? Selective aid sanctions against repressive states," *International Studies Quarterly* 57, no. 4 (2013): 791–803.

## A.4 RILE Measure

Final component selection for the new one dimensional general left–right scale constructed using the iterative referential content validity method.

| General left–right scale |                                            |       |                                    |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|
| Left                     |                                            | Right |                                    |
| 105                      | Military: Negative                         | 109   | Internationalism: Negative         |
| 106                      | Peace                                      | 401   | Free Enterprise: Positive          |
| 107                      | Internationalism: Positive                 | 407   | Protectionism: Negative            |
| 108                      | European Integration: Positive             | 414   | Economic Orthodoxy: Positive       |
| 202                      | Democracy                                  | 505   | Welfare State Limitation: Positive |
| 301                      | Decentralisation                           | 507   | Education Limitation: Positive     |
| 303                      | Governmental and Administrative Efficiency | 601   | National Way of Life: Positive     |
| 403                      | Market Regulation: Positive                | 603   | Traditional Morality: Positive     |
| 408                      | Economic Goals                             | 608   | Multiculturalism: Negative         |
| 411                      | Technology and Infrastructure              | 702   | Labour Groups: Negative            |
| 412                      | Controlled Economy: Positive               |       |                                    |
| 413                      | Nationalisation: Positive                  |       |                                    |
| 416                      | Anti-Growth Economy                        |       |                                    |
| 501                      | Environmental Protection                   |       |                                    |
| 502                      | Culture                                    |       |                                    |
| 503                      | Social Justice                             |       |                                    |
| 504                      | Welfare State Expansion: Positive          |       |                                    |
| 506                      | Education Expansion: Positive              |       |                                    |
| 602                      | National Way of Life: Negative             |       |                                    |
| 604                      | Traditional Morality: Negative             |       |                                    |
| 701                      | Labour Groups: Positive                    |       |                                    |
| 705                      | Underprivileged Minority Groups            |       |                                    |
| 706                      | Non-economic Demographic Groups            |       |                                    |

Figure 1: Table showcasing the components included in the general RILE measured, obtained directly from Prosser.<sup>109</sup>

My main independent variable is the ideological position of the cabinet in office, taken from the<sup>110</sup> dataset as the cabinet-level Prosser left–right score. The underlying party positions come from<sup>111</sup> reconstruction of the Manifesto Project’s RILE index, which selects scale components through an iterative referential content validity procedure rather than the a priori assignment used in the original measure, and scales them using the logit method of.<sup>112</sup>

110. J. Hellström, T. Bergman, and J. Lindahl, *Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Coalition Governance in Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset*, Version 2024.09, 2024.

111. C. Prosser, “Building policy scales from manifesto data: A referential content validity approach,” *Electoral Studies* 35 (2014): 88–101.

112. W. Lowe et al., “Scaling policy preferences from coded political texts,” *Legislative studies quarterly* 36, no. 1 (2011): 123–155.

| Code                                      | Category                            | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>608 Multiculturalism: Negative</b>     |                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 608.1                                     | General                             | The enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration. Appeals for cultural homogeneity in society.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 608.2                                     | Immigrant Integration: Assimilation | Calls for immigrants that are in the country to adopt the manifesto country's culture and fully assimilate. Reinforce integration. Only concerned with immigrants already in the manifesto country. For negative statements regarding the possibility of new immigrants, see 601.2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 608.3                                     | Indigenous rights: Negative         | Rejection of idea of special protection for indigenous people.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| <b>601 National Way of Life: Positive</b> |                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 601.1                                     | General                             | Favourable mentions of the manifesto country's nation, history, and general appeals. May include: support for established national ideas; general appeals to pride of citizenship; appeals to patriotism; appeals to nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion.                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 601.2                                     | Immigration: Negative               | Statement advocating the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants. Might include statements regarding: immigration being a threat to national character of the manifesto country, the 'boat is full' argument; the introduction of migration quotas, including restricting immigration from specific countries or regions. Only concerned with the possibility of new immigrants. For negative statements regarding immigrants already in the manifesto country, see 608.1. |
| <b>603 Traditional Morality: Positive</b> |                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 603                                       | Traditional Morality: Positive      | Favourable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values. May include: prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of the traditional family as a value; support for the role of religious institutions in state and society.                                                                                                                                                                                                           |

Table 13: Manifesto Project coding categories used in the cabinet ideology and platform measures.

## B Complete Tobit and PPML Models

### B.1 All Migration Aid

| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>                    | <i>DV: Migration Aid Committed to Recipients</i> |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                     | DV                                               | DV                   | DV                   | DV                   | DV                   |
|                                                     | (1)                                              | (2)                  | (3)                  | (1 Yr Lead)          | (2 Yr Lead)          |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                       | 0.395<br>(0.269)                                 | 0.578*<br>(0.273)    | 0.962***<br>(0.275)  | 1.390***<br>(0.272)  | 1.180***<br>(0.269)  |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                     | -0.361<br>(0.663)                                | -0.0809<br>(0.668)   | 0.390<br>(0.654)     | -0.225<br>(0.665)    | -2.412***<br>(0.670) |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) |                                                  | 1.098**<br>(0.336)   | 0.721*<br>(0.351)    | 1.077**<br>(0.349)   | 0.574<br>(0.339)     |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                          |                                                  | -1.160**<br>(0.395)  | -1.432***<br>(0.400) | -0.150<br>(0.402)    | 1.724***<br>(0.416)  |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                   |                                                  |                      | 10.70***<br>(2.499)  | 12.71***<br>(2.390)  | 13.92***<br>(2.367)  |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)               |                                                  |                      | -3.267***<br>(0.246) | -3.178***<br>(0.248) | -3.062***<br>(0.248) |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                  |                                                  |                      | 0.0200<br>(0.0288)   | 0.0210<br>(0.0285)   | 0.0119<br>(0.0283)   |
| Donor Migration Protests                            |                                                  |                      | -2.590***<br>(0.466) | -4.563***<br>(0.530) | -1.917***<br>(0.437) |
| Civil War (Recipient)                               |                                                  |                      | 6.584***<br>(0.412)  | 6.430***<br>(0.412)  | 6.703***<br>(0.413)  |
| Previous Colony of Donor                            |                                                  |                      | 5.353***<br>(0.954)  | 5.300***<br>(0.960)  | 5.137***<br>(0.956)  |
| Distance (log)                                      |                                                  |                      | -6.864***<br>(0.554) | -6.779***<br>(0.551) | -6.752***<br>(0.548) |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                           |                                                  |                      | 4.680***<br>(0.663)  | 4.834***<br>(0.674)  | 4.743***<br>(0.678)  |
| Constant                                            | -29.72***<br>(1.989)                             | -28.79***<br>(5.558) | -54.87*<br>(24.11)   | -86.61***<br>(22.98) | -112.5***<br>(22.70) |
| Observations                                        | 48108                                            | 44156                | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                |
| Log Likelihood                                      | -18579.6                                         | -18569.4             | -17387.6             | -17350.0             | -17245.9             |
| Chi-Squared                                         | 8471.9                                           | 7906.1               | 8711.3               | 8689.1               | 8669.6               |

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# The Political Right's Exception

|                                                     | Tobit                |                      |                      | PPML                  |                      |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                     | (1)<br>Full          | (2)<br>t+1           | (3)<br>t+2           | (4)<br>Full           | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2            |
| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>                    |                      |                      |                      |                       |                      |                       |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                       | 0.962***<br>(0.275)  | 1.390***<br>(0.272)  | 1.180***<br>(0.269)  | -0.00885<br>(0.0585)  | -0.0454<br>(0.0632)  | -0.255***<br>(0.0770) |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                     | 0.390<br>(0.654)     | -0.225<br>(0.665)    | -2.412***<br>(0.670) | -0.364<br>(0.234)     | -0.234<br>(0.215)    | -1.059***<br>(0.164)  |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                   | 10.70***<br>(2.499)  | 12.71***<br>(2.390)  | 13.92***<br>(2.367)  | 0.241<br>(1.046)      | -0.131<br>(1.059)    | 2.229<br>(1.291)      |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)               | -3.267***<br>(0.246) | -3.178***<br>(0.248) | -3.062***<br>(0.248) | -0.286***<br>(0.0799) | -0.267**<br>(0.0829) | -0.366***<br>(0.103)  |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                  | 0.0200<br>(0.0288)   | 0.0210<br>(0.0285)   | 0.0119<br>(0.0283)   | 0.0162<br>(0.0129)    | 0.0181<br>(0.0134)   | 0.0246<br>(0.0166)    |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) | 0.721*<br>(0.351)    | 1.077**<br>(0.349)   | 0.574<br>(0.339)     | 0.434*<br>(0.169)     | 0.535***<br>(0.115)  | 0.0107<br>(0.130)     |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                          | -1.432***<br>(0.400) | -0.150<br>(0.402)    | 1.724***<br>(0.416)  | -0.0341<br>(0.156)    | 0.206<br>(0.173)     | 0.00961<br>(0.165)    |
| Donor Migration Protests                            | -2.590***<br>(0.466) | -4.563***<br>(0.530) | -1.917***<br>(0.437) | -0.499***<br>(0.110)  | -0.512***<br>(0.114) | -0.309**<br>(0.112)   |
| Civil War (Recipient)                               | 6.584***<br>(0.412)  | 6.430***<br>(0.412)  | 6.703***<br>(0.413)  | 0.907***<br>(0.141)   | 0.962***<br>(0.122)  | 1.027***<br>(0.127)   |
| Previous Colony of Donor                            | 5.353***<br>(0.954)  | 5.300***<br>(0.960)  | 5.137***<br>(0.956)  | 0.0709<br>(0.284)     | 0.0809<br>(0.279)    | 0.0695<br>(0.285)     |
| Distance (log)                                      | -6.864***<br>(0.554) | -6.779***<br>(0.551) | -6.752***<br>(0.548) | -0.638***<br>(0.179)  | -0.593***<br>(0.176) | -0.660***<br>(0.186)  |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                           | 4.680***<br>(0.663)  | 4.834***<br>(0.674)  | 4.743***<br>(0.678)  | 1.667***<br>(0.320)   | 1.662***<br>(0.329)  | 1.601***<br>(0.314)   |
| Observations                                        | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                | 26448                 | 25296                | 24128                 |

Standard errors in parentheses. PPML SE clustered in donor-recipient pair.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## B.2 Bilateral Migration Aid

|                                                     | <i>DV: Bilateral Migration Aid Committed to Recipients</i> |                      |                      |                      |                      |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                     | DV                                                         | DV                   | DV                   | DV                   | DV                   |
|                                                     | (1)                                                        | (2)                  | (3)                  | (1 Yr Lead)          | (2 Yr Lead)          |
| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>                    |                                                            |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                       | 2.509***<br>(0.348)                                        | 2.462***<br>(0.347)  | 2.743***<br>(0.362)  | 2.716***<br>(0.362)  | 2.821***<br>(0.361)  |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                     | 4.031***<br>(0.799)                                        | 3.773***<br>(0.799)  | 4.027***<br>(0.788)  | 2.343**<br>(0.795)   | -1.519<br>(0.792)    |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) |                                                            | -0.910*<br>(0.428)   | -1.077*<br>(0.445)   | -1.792***<br>(0.441) | -1.509***<br>(0.434) |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                          |                                                            | -3.606***<br>(0.474) | -3.684***<br>(0.480) | -2.152***<br>(0.478) | 0.528<br>(0.492)     |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                   |                                                            |                      | 5.363<br>(3.081)     | 8.481**<br>(2.929)   | 8.483**<br>(2.891)   |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)               |                                                            |                      | -3.169***<br>(0.303) | -3.058***<br>(0.307) | -3.089***<br>(0.309) |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                  |                                                            |                      | 0.0526<br>(0.0361)   | 0.0528<br>(0.0359)   | 0.0521<br>(0.0357)   |
| Donor Migration Protests                            |                                                            |                      | -2.086**<br>(0.752)  | 0.371<br>(0.669)     | -0.455<br>(0.678)    |
| Civil War (Recipient)                               |                                                            |                      | 7.096***<br>(0.511)  | 6.861***<br>(0.513)  | 6.650***<br>(0.514)  |
| Previous Colony of Donor                            |                                                            |                      | 5.044***<br>(1.343)  | 4.798***<br>(1.363)  | 4.671***<br>(1.370)  |
| Distance (log)                                      |                                                            |                      | -6.567***<br>(0.695) | -6.496***<br>(0.695) | -6.547***<br>(0.693) |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                           |                                                            |                      | 4.151***<br>(0.815)  | 4.235***<br>(0.831)  | 4.209***<br>(0.840)  |
| Constant                                            | -30.27***<br>(2.451)                                       | 14.05*<br>(6.845)    | 32.41<br>(30.01)     | -1.906<br>(28.28)    | -28.82<br>(27.73)    |
| Observations                                        | 48108                                                      | 44156                | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                |
| Log Likelihood                                      | -13382.1                                                   | -13352.9             | -12531.7             | -12562.7             | -12472.2             |
| Chi-Squared                                         | 6591.9                                                     | 6250.7               | 6732.5               | 6596.9               | 6538.7               |

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# The Political Right's Exception

|                                       | Tobit                |                      |                      | PPML                 |                      |                      |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                       | (1)<br>Full          | (2)<br>t+1           | (3)<br>t+2           | (4)<br>Full          | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2           |
| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Cabinet RILE (Prosser)                | 2.743***<br>(0.362)  | 2.716***<br>(0.362)  | 2.821***<br>(0.361)  | 0.301**<br>(0.102)   | 0.324***<br>(0.0785) | 0.124<br>(0.0940)    |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet       | 4.027***<br>(0.788)  | 2.343**<br>(0.795)   | -1.519<br>(0.792)    | 0.171<br>(0.248)     | 0.0900<br>(0.255)    | -0.837***<br>(0.199) |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)     | 5.363<br>(3.081)     | 8.481**<br>(2.929)   | 8.483**<br>(2.891)   | 0.816<br>(1.104)     | 1.131<br>(0.942)     | 2.622*<br>(1.229)    |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log) | -3.169***<br>(0.303) | -3.058***<br>(0.307) | -3.089***<br>(0.309) | -0.264**<br>(0.0985) | -0.199<br>(0.105)    | -0.258*<br>(0.105)   |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years    | 0.0526<br>(0.0361)   | 0.0528<br>(0.0359)   | 0.0521<br>(0.0357)   | 0.00925<br>(0.0125)  | 0.00960<br>(0.0120)  | 0.00930<br>(0.0149)  |
| Asylum Applications to Donor (log)    | -1.077*<br>(0.445)   | -1.792***<br>(0.441) | -1.509***<br>(0.434) | -0.0708<br>(0.214)   | -0.0639<br>(0.154)   | -0.460**<br>(0.160)  |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)            | -3.684***<br>(0.480) | -2.152***<br>(0.478) | 0.528<br>(0.492)     | -0.402*<br>(0.175)   | -0.178<br>(0.199)    | -0.355<br>(0.200)    |
| Donor Migration Protests              | -2.086**<br>(0.752)  | 0.371<br>(0.669)     | -0.455<br>(0.678)    | -0.100<br>(0.136)    | 0.329*<br>(0.133)    | 0.162<br>(0.165)     |
| Civil War (Recipient)                 | 7.096***<br>(0.511)  | 6.861***<br>(0.513)  | 6.650***<br>(0.514)  | 0.843***<br>(0.174)  | 0.904***<br>(0.160)  | 0.912***<br>(0.159)  |
| Previous Colony of Donor              | 5.044***<br>(1.343)  | 4.798***<br>(1.363)  | 4.671***<br>(1.370)  | -0.142<br>(0.342)    | -0.175<br>(0.344)    | -0.187<br>(0.355)    |
| Distance (log)                        | -6.567***<br>(0.695) | -6.496***<br>(0.695) | -6.547***<br>(0.693) | -0.752***<br>(0.190) | -0.687***<br>(0.192) | -0.789***<br>(0.208) |
| Non-Democracy (Recipient)             | 4.151***<br>(0.815)  | 4.235***<br>(0.831)  | 4.209***<br>(0.840)  | 1.664***<br>(0.361)  | 1.651***<br>(0.370)  | 1.593***<br>(0.359)  |
| Observations                          | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                | 26448                | 25296                | 24128                |

Standard errors in parentheses. PPML SE clustered in donor-recipient pair.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### B.3 All Health Aid

| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>                    | <i>DV: Health Aid Committed to Recipients</i> |                      |                       |                       |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                     | DV                                            | DV                   | DV                    | DV                    | DV                    |
|                                                     | (1)                                           | (2)                  | (3)                   | (1 Yr Lead)           | (2 Yr Lead)           |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                       | 0.131<br>(0.227)                              | 0.119<br>(0.230)     | 0.490*<br>(0.233)     | 0.316<br>(0.229)      | 0.562*<br>(0.229)     |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                     | -0.601<br>(0.575)                             | -0.873<br>(0.577)    | -1.319*<br>(0.565)    | -0.834<br>(0.573)     | 0.847<br>(0.590)      |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) |                                               | -0.0531<br>(0.251)   | -1.148***<br>(0.266)  | -0.948***<br>(0.261)  | -0.592*<br>(0.259)    |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                          |                                               | 1.680***<br>(0.295)  | 0.641*<br>(0.306)     | 0.193<br>(0.298)      | 0.622*<br>(0.295)     |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                   |                                               |                      | 21.04***<br>(2.050)   | 17.19***<br>(1.974)   | 15.23***<br>(1.913)   |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)               |                                               |                      | -4.418***<br>(0.210)  | -4.367***<br>(0.212)  | -4.448***<br>(0.213)  |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                  |                                               |                      | -0.167***<br>(0.0244) | -0.168***<br>(0.0243) | -0.171***<br>(0.0242) |
| Donor Migration Protests                            |                                               |                      | 0.231<br>(0.331)      | 1.914***<br>(0.302)   | 1.338***<br>(0.306)   |
| Civil War (Recipient)                               |                                               |                      | 2.596***<br>(0.363)   | 2.697***<br>(0.364)   | 2.706***<br>(0.365)   |
| Previous Colony of Donor                            |                                               |                      | 16.14***<br>(0.699)   | 16.09***<br>(0.707)   | 15.92***<br>(0.714)   |
| Distance (log)                                      |                                               |                      | 1.063*<br>(0.477)     | 1.188*<br>(0.478)     | 1.240**<br>(0.478)    |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                           |                                               |                      | -2.975***<br>(0.495)  | -3.098***<br>(0.497)  | -3.117***<br>(0.502)  |
| Constant                                            | -34.61***<br>(1.499)                          | -50.47***<br>(3.901) | -206.4***<br>(19.80)  | -169.5***<br>(18.87)  | -152.6***<br>(18.12)  |
| Observations                                        | 48108                                         | 44156                | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 |
| Log Likelihood                                      | -28229.3                                      | -28212.7             | -25879.0              | -25966.6              | -26030.9              |
| Chi-Squared                                         | 9900.5                                        | 9001.4               | 10634.8               | 10420.6               | 10296.1               |

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# The Political Right's Exception

|                                                     | Tobit                 |                       |                       | PPML                 |                      |                      |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                     | (1)<br>Full           | (2)<br>t+1            | (3)<br>t+2            | (4)<br>Full          | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2           |
| main                                                |                       |                       |                       |                      |                      |                      |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                       | 0.490*<br>(0.233)     | 0.316<br>(0.229)      | 0.562*<br>(0.229)     | -0.0313<br>(0.0740)  | -0.00908<br>(0.0618) | -0.00908<br>(0.0618) |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                     | -1.319*<br>(0.565)    | -0.834<br>(0.573)     | 0.847<br>(0.590)      | 0.137<br>(0.157)     | -0.0635<br>(0.142)   | -0.0635<br>(0.142)   |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                   | 21.04***<br>(2.050)   | 17.19***<br>(1.974)   | 15.23***<br>(1.913)   | 2.215**<br>(0.753)   | 1.836*<br>(0.745)    | 1.836*<br>(0.745)    |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)               | -4.418***<br>(0.210)  | -4.367***<br>(0.212)  | -4.448***<br>(0.213)  | -0.659***<br>(0.124) | -0.689***<br>(0.130) | -0.689***<br>(0.130) |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                  | -0.167***<br>(0.0244) | -0.168***<br>(0.0243) | -0.171***<br>(0.0242) | 0.0101<br>(0.0156)   | 0.00888<br>(0.0154)  | 0.00888<br>(0.0154)  |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) | -1.148***<br>(0.266)  | -0.948***<br>(0.261)  | -0.592*<br>(0.259)    | -0.185*<br>(0.0785)  | -0.0953<br>(0.0789)  | -0.0953<br>(0.0789)  |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                          | 0.641*<br>(0.306)     | 0.193<br>(0.298)      | 0.622*<br>(0.295)     | 0.246*<br>(0.0957)   | 0.160<br>(0.0935)    | 0.160<br>(0.0935)    |
| Donor Migration Protests                            | 0.231<br>(0.331)      | 1.914***<br>(0.302)   | 1.338***<br>(0.306)   | -0.133<br>(0.0721)   | 0.0818<br>(0.0740)   | 0.0818<br>(0.0740)   |
| Civil War (Recipient)                               | 2.596***<br>(0.363)   | 2.697***<br>(0.364)   | 2.706***<br>(0.365)   | 0.370<br>(0.217)     | 0.300<br>(0.217)     | 0.300<br>(0.217)     |
| Previous Colony of Donor                            | 16.14***<br>(0.699)   | 16.09***<br>(0.707)   | 15.92***<br>(0.714)   | 1.505***<br>(0.290)  | 1.524***<br>(0.292)  | 1.524***<br>(0.292)  |
| Distance (log)                                      | 1.063*<br>(0.477)     | 1.188*<br>(0.478)     | 1.240**<br>(0.478)    | 1.470***<br>(0.395)  | 1.457***<br>(0.407)  | 1.457***<br>(0.407)  |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                           | -2.975***<br>(0.495)  | -3.098***<br>(0.497)  | -3.117***<br>(0.502)  | -0.780<br>(0.402)    | -0.833*<br>(0.412)   | -0.833*<br>(0.412)   |
| Observations                                        | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 | 26448                | 25296                | 25296                |

Standard errors in parentheses. PPML SE clustered in donor-recipient pair.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## B.4 Bilateral Health Aid

| <i>Main Explanatory Variable</i>                    | <i>DV: Bilateral Health Aid Committed to Recipients</i> |                      |                       |                       |                       |
|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|                                                     | DV                                                      | DV                   | DV                    | DV                    | DV                    |
|                                                     | (1)                                                     | (2)                  | (3)                   | (1 Yr Lead)           | (2 Yr Lead)           |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                       | -0.0691<br>(0.239)                                      | -0.0662<br>(0.242)   | 0.374<br>(0.245)      | 0.300<br>(0.242)      | 0.577*<br>(0.241)     |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                     | 0.768<br>(0.613)                                        | 0.439<br>(0.615)     | 0.0753<br>(0.606)     | -0.563<br>(0.610)     | 0.398<br>(0.622)      |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) |                                                         | 0.0458<br>(0.261)    | -1.113***<br>(0.279)  | -0.846**<br>(0.276)   | -0.306<br>(0.273)     |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                          |                                                         | 1.827***<br>(0.308)  | 0.708*<br>(0.322)     | 0.105<br>(0.314)      | 0.491<br>(0.311)      |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                   |                                                         |                      | 23.88***<br>(2.168)   | 21.64***<br>(2.094)   | 19.65***<br>(2.023)   |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)               |                                                         |                      | -4.314***<br>(0.222)  | -4.245***<br>(0.224)  | -4.340***<br>(0.226)  |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                  |                                                         |                      | -0.178***<br>(0.0257) | -0.181***<br>(0.0256) | -0.184***<br>(0.0255) |
| Donor Migration Protests                            |                                                         |                      | -0.226<br>(0.348)     | 1.628***<br>(0.317)   | 1.244***<br>(0.320)   |
| Civil War (Recipient)                               |                                                         |                      | 2.608***<br>(0.384)   | 2.746***<br>(0.384)   | 2.685***<br>(0.385)   |
| Previous Colony of Donor                            |                                                         |                      | 15.86***<br>(0.737)   | 15.79***<br>(0.745)   | 15.58***<br>(0.753)   |
| Distance (log)                                      |                                                         |                      | 1.239*<br>(0.504)     | 1.388**<br>(0.505)    | 1.439**<br>(0.506)    |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                           |                                                         |                      | -3.056***<br>(0.524)  | -3.233***<br>(0.526)  | -3.298***<br>(0.530)  |
| Constant                                            | -37.60***<br>(1.584)                                    | -55.75***<br>(4.069) | -239.9***<br>(20.99)  | -217.6***<br>(20.07)  | -200.5***<br>(19.23)  |
| Observations                                        | 48108                                                   | 44156                | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 |
| Log Likelihood                                      | -26436.5                                                | -26418.2             | -24297.7              | -24376.3              | -24430.4              |
| Chi-Squared                                         | 8974.9                                                  | 8159.1               | 9656.9                | 9461.8                | 9348.4                |

Standard errors in parentheses.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

# The Political Right's Exception

|                                                     | Tobit                 |                       |                       | PPML                 |                      |                      |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                     | (1)<br>Full           | (2)<br>t+1            | (3)<br>t+2            | (4)<br>Full          | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2           |
| main                                                |                       |                       |                       |                      |                      |                      |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)                       | 0.374<br>(0.245)      | 0.300<br>(0.242)      | 0.577*<br>(0.241)     | -0.0732<br>(0.0839)  | -0.0137<br>(0.0690)  | -0.0137<br>(0.0690)  |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                     | 0.0753<br>(0.606)     | -0.563<br>(0.610)     | 0.398<br>(0.622)      | 0.393*<br>(0.181)    | -0.0989<br>(0.168)   | -0.0989<br>(0.168)   |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                   | 23.88***<br>(2.168)   | 21.64***<br>(2.094)   | 19.65***<br>(2.023)   | 2.604**<br>(0.815)   | 2.592**<br>(0.802)   | 2.592**<br>(0.802)   |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)               | -4.314***<br>(0.222)  | -4.245***<br>(0.224)  | -4.340***<br>(0.226)  | -0.654***<br>(0.134) | -0.695***<br>(0.140) | -0.695***<br>(0.140) |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                  | -0.178***<br>(0.0257) | -0.181***<br>(0.0256) | -0.184***<br>(0.0255) | 0.0114<br>(0.0168)   | 0.0107<br>(0.0166)   | 0.0107<br>(0.0166)   |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log) | -1.113***<br>(0.279)  | -0.846**<br>(0.276)   | -0.306<br>(0.273)     | -0.198*<br>(0.0888)  | -0.105<br>(0.0872)   | -0.105<br>(0.0872)   |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                          | 0.708*<br>(0.322)     | 0.105<br>(0.314)      | 0.491<br>(0.311)      | 0.193<br>(0.101)     | 0.0668<br>(0.103)    | 0.0668<br>(0.103)    |
| Donor Migration Protests                            | -0.226<br>(0.348)     | 1.628***<br>(0.317)   | 1.244***<br>(0.320)   | -0.145<br>(0.0761)   | 0.0591<br>(0.0780)   | 0.0591<br>(0.0780)   |
| Civil War (Recipient)                               | 2.608***<br>(0.384)   | 2.746***<br>(0.384)   | 2.685***<br>(0.385)   | 0.349<br>(0.232)     | 0.260<br>(0.233)     | 0.260<br>(0.233)     |
| Previous Colony of Donor                            | 15.86***<br>(0.737)   | 15.79***<br>(0.745)   | 15.58***<br>(0.753)   | 1.530***<br>(0.300)  | 1.554***<br>(0.303)  | 1.554***<br>(0.303)  |
| Distance (log)                                      | 1.239*<br>(0.504)     | 1.388**<br>(0.505)    | 1.439**<br>(0.506)    | 1.436***<br>(0.418)  | 1.430***<br>(0.434)  | 1.430***<br>(0.434)  |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                           | -3.056***<br>(0.524)  | -3.233***<br>(0.526)  | -3.298***<br>(0.530)  | -0.855*<br>(0.416)   | -0.920*<br>(0.422)   | -0.920*<br>(0.422)   |
| Observations                                        | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 | 26448                | 25296                | 25296                |

Standard errors in parentheses. PPML SE clustered in donor-recipient pair.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## C Additional Models for Migration Aid

### C.1 Pooled and FE OLS for Bilateral

Table 14: OLS and Fixed Effects OLS, Bilateral Migration Aid

|                                       | OLS                   |                       |                       | Fixed Effects OLS     |                        |                        |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
|                                       | (1)<br>Full           | (2)<br>t+1            | (3)<br>t+2            | (4)<br>Full           | (5)<br>t+1             | (6)<br>t+2             |
| Cabinet RILE (Prosser)                | -0.00489<br>(0.0297)  | 0.0415<br>(0.0303)    | 0.0789*<br>(0.0311)   | 0.237***<br>(0.0247)  | 0.270***<br>(0.0272)   | 0.298***<br>(0.0327)   |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet       | 0.152**<br>(0.0502)   | 0.107*<br>(0.0498)    | -0.0166<br>(0.0493)   | 0.0649<br>(0.0589)    | 0.0547<br>(0.0619)     | -0.0883<br>(0.0605)    |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)     | 0.517***<br>(0.0334)  | 0.465***<br>(0.0307)  | 0.399***<br>(0.0282)  | 0.0652<br>(0.0753)    | 0.294***<br>(0.0776)   | 0.498***<br>(0.0817)   |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log) | -0.222***<br>(0.0296) | -0.237***<br>(0.0298) | -0.254***<br>(0.0294) | -0.150***<br>(0.0255) | -0.145***<br>(0.0253)  | -0.147***<br>(0.0246)  |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years    | 0.00604<br>(0.00415)  | 0.00465<br>(0.00424)  | 0.00365<br>(0.00427)  | 0.00449<br>(0.00327)  | 0.00375<br>(0.00333)   | 0.00312<br>(0.00335)   |
| Asylum Applications to Donor (log)    | 0.0653***<br>(0.0140) | 0.0581***<br>(0.0133) | 0.0507***<br>(0.0117) | -0.0185<br>(0.0166)   | -0.0418**<br>(0.0158)  | -0.0242<br>(0.0160)    |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)            | 0.0499***<br>(0.0144) | 0.0641***<br>(0.0139) | 0.0896***<br>(0.0128) | -0.112***<br>(0.0169) | -0.0856***<br>(0.0152) | -0.0333*<br>(0.0137)   |
| Donor Migration Protests              | -0.389***<br>(0.0297) | -0.319***<br>(0.0259) | -0.343***<br>(0.0285) | -0.129***<br>(0.0277) | -0.0286<br>(0.0209)    | -0.0922***<br>(0.0219) |
| Civil War (Recipient)                 | 0.405***<br>(0.0725)  | 0.389***<br>(0.0724)  | 0.385***<br>(0.0734)  | 0.464***<br>(0.0566)  | 0.452***<br>(0.0563)   | 0.447***<br>(0.0567)   |
| Previous Colony of Donor              | -0.569***<br>(0.0988) | -0.590***<br>(0.103)  | -0.572***<br>(0.103)  | 0.158<br>(0.0975)     | 0.147<br>(0.0991)      | 0.146<br>(0.101)       |
| Distance (log)                        | -0.307***<br>(0.0732) | -0.326***<br>(0.0733) | -0.337***<br>(0.0730) | -0.277***<br>(0.0638) | -0.282***<br>(0.0631)  | -0.290***<br>(0.0623)  |
| Non-Democracy (Recipient)             | 0.165*<br>(0.0674)    | 0.149*<br>(0.0657)    | 0.130*<br>(0.0635)    | 0.227***<br>(0.0599)  | 0.220***<br>(0.0585)   | 0.206***<br>(0.0571)   |
| Observations                          | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 | 41899                 | 41827                  | 41755                  |
| R-squared                             | 0.057                 | 0.053                 | 0.053                 | 0.176                 | 0.175                  | 0.175                  |
| Adjusted R-squared                    | 0.057                 | 0.053                 | 0.053                 | 0.175                 | 0.174                  | 0.174                  |
| Fixed Effects                         | No                    | No                    | No                    | Yes                   | Yes                    | Yes                    |

Standard errors clustered by dyad. Fixed effects models absorb donor and year.

## C.2 Pooled and FE OLS for All

Table 15: OLS and Fixed Effects OLS, All Migration Aid

|                                       | OLS                   |                       |                       | Fixed Effects OLS     |                       |                       |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
|                                       | (1)<br>Full           | (2)<br>t+1            | (3)<br>t+2            | (4)<br>Full           | (5)<br>t+1            | (6)<br>t+2            |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)         | -0.0438<br>(0.0318)   | 0.0328<br>(0.0331)    | 0.0367<br>(0.0343)    | 0.151***<br>(0.0263)  | 0.217***<br>(0.0291)  | 0.206***<br>(0.0361)  |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet       | 0.180**<br>(0.0584)   | 0.155**<br>(0.0595)   | 0.0129<br>(0.0588)    | -0.0316<br>(0.0584)   | -0.0230<br>(0.0599)   | -0.161**<br>(0.0578)  |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)     | 0.543***<br>(0.0363)  | 0.488***<br>(0.0341)  | 0.388***<br>(0.0328)  | 0.166<br>(0.0925)     | 0.589***<br>(0.101)   | 0.963***<br>(0.107)   |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log) | -0.294***<br>(0.0362) | -0.320***<br>(0.0359) | -0.340***<br>(0.0357) | -0.219***<br>(0.0328) | -0.213***<br>(0.0323) | -0.209***<br>(0.0316) |
| Recipient Life                        | 0.00756<br>(0.00535)  | 0.00560<br>(0.00549)  | 0.00385<br>(0.00556)  | 0.00427<br>(0.00435)  | 0.00311<br>(0.00445)  | 0.00169<br>(0.00449)  |
| Total Asylums (log)                   | 0.0493**<br>(0.0151)  | 0.0600***<br>(0.0142) | 0.0429***<br>(0.0129) | -0.0178<br>(0.0196)   | 0.0177<br>(0.0187)    | 0.0209<br>(0.0185)    |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)            | 0.188***<br>(0.0230)  | 0.193***<br>(0.0224)  | 0.226***<br>(0.0216)  | -0.0566**<br>(0.0193) | -0.0323<br>(0.0179)   | 0.0191<br>(0.0167)    |
| Donor Migration Protests              | -0.469***<br>(0.0352) | -0.553***<br>(0.0367) | -0.367***<br>(0.0335) | -0.367***<br>(0.0424) | -0.466***<br>(0.0510) | -0.298***<br>(0.0275) |
| Civil War (Recipient)                 | 0.558***<br>(0.0865)  | 0.539***<br>(0.0878)  | 0.571***<br>(0.0894)  | 0.624***<br>(0.0694)  | 0.614***<br>(0.0699)  | 0.649***<br>(0.0708)  |
| Previous Colony                       | -0.499**<br>(0.185)   | -0.486**<br>(0.187)   | -0.501**<br>(0.190)   | 0.421*<br>(0.175)     | 0.415*<br>(0.178)     | 0.413*<br>(0.181)     |
| Distance (log)                        | -0.378***<br>(0.0917) | -0.408***<br>(0.0920) | -0.422***<br>(0.0923) | -0.409***<br>(0.0810) | -0.418***<br>(0.0806) | -0.428***<br>(0.0803) |
| Non-Democracy (Recipient)             | 0.285***<br>(0.0824)  | 0.266***<br>(0.0808)  | 0.234**<br>(0.0789)   | 0.349***<br>(0.0778)  | 0.341***<br>(0.0765)  | 0.317***<br>(0.0754)  |
| Observations                          | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 |
| R-squared                             | 0.089                 | 0.089                 | 0.087                 | 0.208                 | 0.209                 | 0.209                 |
| Adjusted R-squared                    | 0.088                 | 0.088                 | 0.087                 | 0.207                 | 0.208                 | 0.208                 |
| Fixed Effects                         | No                    | No                    | No                    | Yes                   | Yes                   | Yes                   |

Standard errors clustered by dyad. Fixed effects models absorb donor and year.

## D Additional Models for Health Aid Placebo Test

### D.1 Pooled and FE OLS for Bilateral

Table 16: OLS and Fixed Effects OLS, Bilateral Health Aid

|                                       | OLS                    |                         |                         | Fixed Effects OLS      |                         |                         |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                                       | (1)<br>Full            | (2)<br>t+1              | (3)<br>t+2              | (4)<br>Full            | (5)<br>t+1              | (6)<br>t+2              |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)         | -0.168***<br>(0.0403)  | -0.150***<br>(0.0392)   | -0.135***<br>(0.0384)   | -0.0341<br>(0.0314)    | -0.0147<br>(0.0286)     | 0.0115<br>(0.0276)      |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet       | 0.161*<br>(0.0745)     | 0.0953<br>(0.0749)      | 0.109<br>(0.0741)       | 0.228***<br>(0.0597)   | 0.159**<br>(0.0528)     | 0.203***<br>(0.0514)    |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)     | 0.792***<br>(0.0490)   | 0.755***<br>(0.0474)    | 0.692***<br>(0.0455)    | -0.00502<br>(0.127)    | 0.446***<br>(0.122)     | 0.897***<br>(0.120)     |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log) | -0.423***<br>(0.0495)  | -0.447***<br>(0.0492)   | -0.486***<br>(0.0493)   | -0.401***<br>(0.0486)  | -0.387***<br>(0.0476)   | -0.387***<br>(0.0469)   |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years    | -0.0197**<br>(0.00703) | -0.0232***<br>(0.00702) | -0.0256***<br>(0.00702) | -0.0195**<br>(0.00645) | -0.0218***<br>(0.00638) | -0.0233***<br>(0.00634) |
| Asy Apps (Log)                        | 0.0816***<br>(0.0159)  | 0.0866***<br>(0.0166)   | 0.0832***<br>(0.0167)   | -0.0515<br>(0.0291)    | -0.00621<br>(0.0289)    | 0.0372<br>(0.0294)      |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)            | 0.143***<br>(0.0220)   | 0.127***<br>(0.0225)    | 0.135***<br>(0.0225)    | 0.195***<br>(0.0356)   | 0.141***<br>(0.0349)    | 0.116***<br>(0.0322)    |
| Donor Migration Protests              | -0.233***<br>(0.0613)  | 0.122<br>(0.0809)       | 0.109<br>(0.0795)       | 0.0703<br>(0.0463)     | 0.379***<br>(0.0679)    | 0.304***<br>(0.0708)    |
| Civil War (Recipient)                 | 0.362**<br>(0.110)     | 0.360**<br>(0.113)      | 0.336**<br>(0.111)      | 0.396***<br>(0.0987)   | 0.417***<br>(0.102)     | 0.427***<br>(0.0997)    |
| Previous Colony of Donor              | 2.818***<br>(0.450)    | 2.783***<br>(0.464)     | 2.739***<br>(0.474)     | 3.433***<br>(0.439)    | 3.427***<br>(0.440)     | 3.370***<br>(0.444)     |
| Distance (log)                        | 0.0464<br>(0.144)      | 0.0211<br>(0.143)       | -0.000912<br>(0.143)    | 0.134<br>(0.128)       | 0.132<br>(0.127)        | 0.128<br>(0.126)        |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)             | -0.335*<br>(0.143)     | -0.372**<br>(0.142)     | -0.393**<br>(0.140)     | -0.273*<br>(0.133)     | -0.288*<br>(0.131)      | -0.295*<br>(0.129)      |
| Observations                          | 41899                  | 41827                   | 41755                   | 41899                  | 41827                   | 41755                   |
| R-squared                             | 0.115                  | 0.114                   | 0.112                   | 0.194                  | 0.192                   | 0.191                   |
| Adjusted R-squared                    | 0.115                  | 0.113                   | 0.112                   | 0.192                  | 0.191                   | 0.189                   |
| Fixed Effects                         | No                     | No                      | No                      | Yes                    | Yes                     | Yes                     |

Standard errors clustered by dyad. Fixed effects models absorb donor and year.

## D.2 Pooled and FE OLS for All

Table 17: OLS and Fixed Effects OLS, All Health Aid

|                                       | OLS                   |                        |                        | Fixed Effects OLS      |                        |                         |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
|                                       | (1)<br>Full           | (2)<br>t+1             | (3)<br>t+2             | (4)<br>Full            | (5)<br>t+1             | (6)<br>t+2              |
| Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)         | -0.167***<br>(0.0430) | -0.173***<br>(0.0421)  | -0.177***<br>(0.0417)  | -0.0221<br>(0.0325)    | -0.0196<br>(0.0303)    | -0.00695<br>(0.0293)    |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet       | 0.121<br>(0.0779)     | 0.0932<br>(0.0780)     | 0.141<br>(0.0781)      | 0.0800<br>(0.0559)     | 0.0967<br>(0.0496)     | 0.211***<br>(0.0503)    |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)     | 0.886***<br>(0.0521)  | 0.838***<br>(0.0503)   | 0.768***<br>(0.0481)   | -0.445***<br>(0.132)   | -0.0454<br>(0.122)     | 0.394***<br>(0.114)     |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log) | -0.445***<br>(0.0529) | -0.473***<br>(0.0527)  | -0.516***<br>(0.0527)  | -0.461***<br>(0.0524)  | -0.446***<br>(0.0514)  | -0.443***<br>(0.0507)   |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years    | -0.0174*<br>(0.00759) | -0.0212**<br>(0.00757) | -0.0241**<br>(0.00756) | -0.0186**<br>(0.00697) | -0.0210**<br>(0.00689) | -0.0228***<br>(0.00685) |
| Asy Apps (Log)                        | 0.0888***<br>(0.0164) | 0.0838***<br>(0.0173)  | 0.0708***<br>(0.0175)  | -0.0848**<br>(0.0305)  | -0.0398<br>(0.0305)    | -0.00319<br>(0.0308)    |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)            | 0.161***<br>(0.0236)  | 0.153***<br>(0.0243)   | 0.168***<br>(0.0245)   | 0.215***<br>(0.0369)   | 0.176***<br>(0.0360)   | 0.162***<br>(0.0327)    |
| Donor Migration Protests              | -0.295***<br>(0.0635) | 0.0801<br>(0.0823)     | 0.0640<br>(0.0816)     | 0.103*<br>(0.0480)     | 0.419***<br>(0.0691)   | 0.324***<br>(0.0731)    |
| Civil War (Recipient)                 | 0.408***<br>(0.117)   | 0.411***<br>(0.120)    | 0.389**<br>(0.118)     | 0.423***<br>(0.105)    | 0.446***<br>(0.108)    | 0.465***<br>(0.106)     |
| Previous Colony of Donor              | 3.203***<br>(0.517)   | 3.170***<br>(0.535)    | 3.133***<br>(0.545)    | 3.849***<br>(0.486)    | 3.850***<br>(0.489)    | 3.798***<br>(0.493)     |
| Distance (log)                        | 0.0974<br>(0.155)     | 0.0693<br>(0.154)      | 0.0418<br>(0.154)      | 0.143<br>(0.138)       | 0.142<br>(0.137)       | 0.140<br>(0.136)        |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)             | -0.338*<br>(0.155)    | -0.372*<br>(0.154)     | -0.391**<br>(0.152)    | -0.294*<br>(0.142)     | -0.303*<br>(0.140)     | -0.307*<br>(0.138)      |
| Observations                          | 41899                 | 41827                  | 41755                  | 41899                  | 41827                  | 41755                   |
| R-squared                             | 0.128                 | 0.126                  | 0.125                  | 0.213                  | 0.211                  | 0.209                   |
| Adjusted R-squared                    | 0.128                 | 0.126                  | 0.125                  | 0.212                  | 0.210                  | 0.208                   |
| Fixed Effects                         | No                    | No                     | No                     | Yes                    | Yes                    | Yes                     |

Standard errors clustered by donor-recipient pair. Fixed effects models absorb donor and year.

## E Aid Classification

### E.1 Bilateral and All Migration Aid Classification

Bilateral and all migration-management aid is identified from the AidData Core Research Release (v3.1), which records individual aid commitments with a short project description. I restrict the data to commitments made between 1990 and 2013 due to data limitations, by the twenty-seven European donors to the seventy-six recipient countries in the sample, and identify migration-related projects by searching the project description for the terms for both

bilateral and all migration aid. These terms are: asylum, asylum seeker, immigration, refuge, refugee, migration, migrant and migrants. Projects recorded against unspecified, regional or multi-country recipients are excluded, projects to recipients that are themselves donors in the sample, and to regions outside the migration corridors the argument concerns. The bilateral measure drops projects whose descriptions identify delivery through an international organization or a major transnational implementing agency are removed, leaving commitments the donor government administers directly, shown below. Surviving projects are aggregated to the donor-recipient-year and summed in constant United States dollars. First table below reports the full search terms with the number of projects and total value each retrieves, and second table shows the multilateral and transnational implementing organizations excluded from the bilateral measure.

| Term          | Projects retrieved | Bilateral projects | Value (USD M) |
|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| asylum        | 855                | 847                | 878.2         |
| asylum seeker | 520                | 516                | 509.7         |
| immigration   | 56                 | 49                 | 6.6           |
| refuge        | 7,554              | 4,694              | 5,714.8       |
| refugee       | 7,512              | 4,664              | 5,706.8       |
| migration     | 510                | 420                | 682.3         |
| migrant       | 223                | 175                | 117.9         |
| migrants      | 122                | 88                 | 44.3          |

Table 18: Search terms used to identify migration-management aid.

| Organization                             | Search terms                                                          |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| United Nations (general)                 | united nations, un                                                    |
| International Organization for Migration | iom, international organization for migration                         |
| UN High Commissioner for Refugees        | unhcr, united nations high commissioner for refugees                  |
| UN Children's Fund                       | unicef, united nations childrens fund, united nations children's fund |
| International Rescue Committee           | irc, international rescue committee                                   |
| CARE International                       | care international                                                    |
| Norwegian Refugee Council                | nrc, norwegian refugee council                                        |
| Danish Refugee Council                   | danish refugee council                                                |

Table 19: Multilateral and transnational implementing organizations excluded from the bilateral measure.

## E.2 Bilateral and All Health Aid Classification

Health aid is identified from the same source and by the same procedure. I search the project description for the terms: health, healthcare, healthy, sanitation, clinics, injury

and injuries, and apply the same recipient restrictions used for migration aid, which are projects recorded against unspecified, regional or multi-country recipients are excluded, as are projects to recipients that are themselves donors in the sample and to regions outside those the argument concerns. The bilateral health measure additionally drops projects delivered through multilateral organizations and major transnational humanitarian agencies. For health aid this exclusion is applied to the implementing agency field rather than the project description, since health projects routinely name a delivery partner there, and the excluded organizations are those listed below. Surviving projects are aggregated to the donor-recipient-year and summed in constant United States dollars. The first table reports the search terms with the number of projects and total value each retrieves, while the second lists the organizations excluded from the bilateral measure.

| Term       | Projects retrieved | Bilateral projects | Value (USD M) |
|------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| health     | 41,261             | 33,075             | 117,635.0     |
| healthcare | 294                | 214                | 346.0         |
| healthy    | 897                | 866                | 260.0         |
| sanitation | 5,999              | 5,258              | 52,642.0      |
| clinics    | 214                | 147                | 235.0         |
| injury     | 79                 | 75                 | 9.3           |
| injuries   | 375                | 373                | 16.0          |

Table 20: Search terms used to identify health aid.

| Organization                             | Search terms                                   |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| United Nations (general)                 | united nations, un                             |
| World Health Organization                | who, world health organization                 |
| International Committee of the Red Cross | icrc, international committee of the red cross |
| Red Cross and Red Crescent societies     | red cross, red crescent                        |
| Médecins Sans Frontières                 | doctors without borders                        |
| World Bank                               | world bank                                     |

Table 21: Multilateral and transnational implementing organizations excluded from the bilateral health measure.

## F Far-Right Presence

### F.1 Far-Right Measure and Interaction

Although RILE is a better, more balanced measure, I create a measure from the Manifesto Project for additional testing. For each party, I take the quasi-sentences devoted to restrictive positions on immigration and national identity, given by categories 601 (“National Way of Life: Positive, which includes statements advocating restriction of immigration”) and

608 (“Multiculturalism: Negative, which includes calls for immigrant assimilation”), and set them against those devoted to the opposing positions, categories 602 (“National Way of Life: Negative, including favourable statements about new immigrants”) and 607 (“Multiculturalism: Positive”). The two sides are combined using the logit scaling of,<sup>113</sup> taking the log ratio of the two counts with a half-count added to each. Because parties issue manifestos only at elections, each party’s score is carried forward from its most recent manifesto. Party scores are then averaged (dropping those with missing seat information), unweighted, across the parties holding cabinet membership, using the PAGED (<sup>114</sup>) cabinet composition data, and each cabinet’s score applies from its formation until the next takes office. Higher values indicate a governing coalition whose manifestos give more weight to restricting immigration. Two of the four categories are also components of the<sup>115</sup> scale.

To identify which governments contain a far-right party, I use The PopuList v4.0 dataset’s binary variable on far-right party classification developed by.<sup>116</sup> I match PopuList to the cabinet party data on Party Facts by<sup>117</sup> through identifiers and code a cabinet as containing a far-right party if any party holding portfolios in that year is so classified in PopuList. Parties absent from PopuList are unclassified on any of its dimensions and are coded accordingly. Each cabinet’s coding applies from its formation until the next cabinet takes office. I then interact my *Far-Right Party in Cabinet* variable with *Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis* from the Manifesto project as my main explanatory variable.

That said, the interaction models constructed are generally more limited than the continuous specification, and as such, I present them as supplementary. For example, far-right participation in cabinet is much rarer for the time period, so any interaction involving it rests on a narrow and geographically concentrated base which reflects the composition of the sample rather than a difference in how those governments behave. The continuous measure establishes that cabinets positioned further to the right commit more bilateral migration aid while accounting for a myriad of genuine, more reflective measures. Even so, results from this interaction showcase higher coefficients for bilateral aid than for all migration aid with less difference on volume, and still results in similar null values across the placebo test.

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113. Lowe et al., “Scaling policy preferences from coded political texts.”

114. Hellström, Bergman, and Lindahl, *Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Coalition Governance in Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset*.

115. Prosser, “Building policy scales from manifesto data: A referential content validity approach.”

116. M. Rooduijn et al., “The PopuList: A database of populist, far-left, and far-right parties using expert-informed qualitative comparative classification (EiQCC),” *British Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 3 (2024): 969–978.

117. Hellström, Bergman, and Lindahl, *Party Government in Europe Database (PAGED) – Coalition Governance in Central Eastern and Western Europe Dataset*.

## F.2 Results

Table 22: Bilateral Migration Aid.

|                                                                         | Tobit                |                      |                      | PPML                 |                      |                      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                                         | (1)<br>Full          | (2)<br>t+1           | (3)<br>t+2           | (4)<br>Full          | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2           |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1                                            | -9.116***<br>(1.874) | -27.21***<br>(2.369) | -17.14***<br>(2.337) | -2.056***<br>(0.423) | -3.621***<br>(0.429) | -2.148***<br>(0.550) |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis                                       | -0.219<br>(0.209)    | -0.699***<br>(0.209) | -0.128<br>(0.216)    | -0.144<br>(0.0857)   | -0.142<br>(0.0958)   | -0.0542<br>(0.0818)  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1 $\times$ Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis | 8.857***<br>(1.083)  | 17.10***<br>(1.444)  | 12.62***<br>(1.423)  | 1.185***<br>(0.333)  | 1.933***<br>(0.325)  | 1.722***<br>(0.298)  |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                                         | 1.692*<br>(0.815)    | 1.165<br>(0.801)     | -2.946***<br>(0.821) | -0.00521<br>(0.280)  | -0.0294<br>(0.302)   | -0.980***<br>(0.257) |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                       | 1.739<br>(3.314)     | 1.173<br>(3.103)     | 5.688<br>(3.080)     | -1.414<br>(1.214)    | -1.166<br>(1.141)    | 2.225<br>(1.136)     |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                   | -3.167***<br>(0.303) | -3.065***<br>(0.305) | -3.093***<br>(0.310) | -0.264**<br>(0.0987) | -0.199<br>(0.105)    | -0.258*<br>(0.105)   |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                                      | 0.0538<br>(0.0360)   | 0.0549<br>(0.0357)   | 0.0548<br>(0.0357)   | 0.00926<br>(0.0124)  | 0.00963<br>(0.0119)  | 0.00929<br>(0.0149)  |
| Asylum Applications to Donor (log)                                      | -1.927***<br>(0.458) | -1.955***<br>(0.442) | -1.935***<br>(0.443) | -0.0664<br>(0.208)   | 0.0223<br>(0.186)    | -0.504**<br>(0.164)  |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                                              | -3.637***<br>(0.480) | -2.283***<br>(0.471) | 0.338<br>(0.494)     | -0.313*<br>(0.146)   | -0.161<br>(0.179)    | -0.351*<br>(0.164)   |
| Donor Migration Protests                                                | -1.231<br>(0.745)    | 1.062<br>(0.672)     | 0.0915<br>(0.683)    | -0.0674<br>(0.142)   | 0.357**<br>(0.134)   | 0.293<br>(0.164)     |
| Civil War (Recipient)                                                   | 7.096***<br>(0.509)  | 6.854***<br>(0.509)  | 6.661***<br>(0.514)  | 0.843***<br>(0.174)  | 0.904***<br>(0.160)  | 0.912***<br>(0.158)  |
| Previous Colony of Donor                                                | 5.209***<br>(1.344)  | 5.163***<br>(1.360)  | 4.990***<br>(1.377)  | -0.140<br>(0.344)    | -0.169<br>(0.349)    | -0.184<br>(0.357)    |
| Distance (log)                                                          | -6.515***<br>(0.692) | -6.466***<br>(0.692) | -6.498***<br>(0.695) | -0.752***<br>(0.189) | -0.687***<br>(0.191) | -0.790***<br>(0.208) |
| Non-Democracy (Recipient)                                               | 4.198***<br>(0.814)  | 4.262***<br>(0.827)  | 4.258***<br>(0.842)  | 1.664***<br>(0.361)  | 1.651***<br>(0.370)  | 1.593***<br>(0.359)  |
| Observations                                                            | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                | 26448                | 25296                | 24128                |
| Log Likelihood                                                          | -12524               | -12489               | -12456               | -1.03e+10            | -1.01e+10            | -9.55e+09            |
| Chi-Squared                                                             | 6748                 | 6745                 | 6572                 | 156                  | 231                  | 140                  |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 23: All Migration Aid.

|                                                                                | Tobit                |                      |                      | PPML                  |                      |                      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                                                | (1)<br>Full          | (2)<br>t+1           | (3)<br>t+2           | (4)<br>Full           | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2           |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1                                                   | -3.230*<br>(1.617)   | -20.55***<br>(1.930) | -15.77***<br>(1.956) | -1.759***<br>(0.488)  | -2.846***<br>(0.445) | -1.680***<br>(0.497) |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Platform, Logit                                       | -0.344*<br>(0.158)   | 0.00159<br>(0.158)   | 0.348*<br>(0.163)    | -0.171***<br>(0.0503) | -0.106*<br>(0.0458)  | -0.0454<br>(0.0492)  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1 $\times$ Cabinet Anti-Immigration Platform, Logit | 7.143***<br>(0.951)  | 13.47***<br>(1.189)  | 11.55***<br>(1.202)  | 1.235***<br>(0.286)   | 1.409***<br>(0.307)  | 1.388***<br>(0.264)  |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                                                | -1.650*<br>(0.680)   | -0.751<br>(0.678)    | -2.839***<br>(0.692) | -0.415<br>(0.261)     | -0.117<br>(0.238)    | -0.876***<br>(0.163) |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                              | 12.93***<br>(2.642)  | 12.80***<br>(2.487)  | 16.47***<br>(2.491)  | -0.390<br>(1.152)     | -0.731<br>(1.192)    | 2.526<br>(1.387)     |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                          | -3.254***<br>(0.244) | -3.186***<br>(0.246) | -3.070***<br>(0.248) | -0.286***<br>(0.0801) | -0.267**<br>(0.0830) | -0.366***<br>(0.103) |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                                             | 0.0202<br>(0.0286)   | 0.0213<br>(0.0284)   | 0.0127<br>(0.0282)   | 0.0162<br>(0.0129)    | 0.0181<br>(0.0134)   | 0.0246<br>(0.0166)   |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log)                            | -0.352<br>(0.361)    | 0.672<br>(0.349)     | 0.125<br>(0.344)     | 0.395**<br>(0.151)    | 0.615***<br>(0.137)  | 0.0763<br>(0.130)    |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                                                     | -1.333***<br>(0.401) | -0.487<br>(0.398)    | 1.283**<br>(0.415)   | 0.0422<br>(0.138)     | 0.190<br>(0.154)     | 0.0175<br>(0.151)    |
| Donor Migration Protests                                                       | -2.287***<br>(0.460) | -4.230***<br>(0.531) | -1.593***<br>(0.435) | -0.485***<br>(0.121)  | -0.524***<br>(0.119) | -0.358**<br>(0.118)  |
| Civil War (Recipient)                                                          | 6.575***<br>(0.410)  | 6.425***<br>(0.410)  | 6.696***<br>(0.411)  | 0.907***<br>(0.140)   | 0.962***<br>(0.122)  | 1.028***<br>(0.127)  |
| Previous Colony of Donor                                                       | 5.362***<br>(0.950)  | 5.414***<br>(0.957)  | 5.226***<br>(0.955)  | 0.0737<br>(0.284)     | 0.0847<br>(0.280)    | 0.0725<br>(0.283)    |
| Distance (log)                                                                 | -6.817***<br>(0.550) | -6.772***<br>(0.548) | -6.740***<br>(0.547) | -0.638***<br>(0.179)  | -0.593***<br>(0.176) | -0.660***<br>(0.186) |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                                                      | 4.732***<br>(0.661)  | 4.856***<br>(0.671)  | 4.770***<br>(0.677)  | 1.667***<br>(0.321)   | 1.662***<br>(0.329)  | 1.601***<br>(0.314)  |
| Observations                                                                   | 41899                | 41827                | 41755                | 26448                 | 25296                | 24128                |
| Log Likelihood                                                                 | -17345               | -17283               | -17197               | -1.52e+10             | -1.49e+10            | -1.43e+10            |
| Chi-Squared                                                                    | 8797                 | 8824                 | 8767                 | 236                   | 252                  | 175                  |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 24: Bilateral Health Aid.

|                                                                                | Tobit                 |                       |                       | PPML                 |                      |                      |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                                                | (1)<br>Full           | (2)<br>t+1            | (3)<br>t+2            | (4)<br>Full          | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2           |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1                                                   | 0.0847<br>(1.354)     | 1.104<br>(1.323)      | 0.0509<br>(1.331)     | 0.400<br>(0.343)     | -0.0638<br>(0.358)   | -0.516<br>(0.319)    |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis, Logit                                       | -0.300*<br>(0.138)    | -0.00524<br>(0.137)   | 0.286*<br>(0.138)     | -0.0349<br>(0.0432)  | -0.0168<br>(0.0375)  | -0.0376<br>(0.0398)  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1 $\times$ Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis, Logit | -0.176<br>(0.878)     | -0.513<br>(0.883)     | -0.103<br>(0.888)     | 0.0607<br>(0.246)    | 0.242<br>(0.181)     | 0.540**<br>(0.202)   |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                                                | -0.140<br>(0.630)     | -0.727<br>(0.634)     | 0.374<br>(0.643)      | 0.360<br>(0.186)     | -0.120<br>(0.182)    | -0.208<br>(0.201)    |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                              | 20.85***<br>(2.429)   | 21.29***<br>(2.260)   | 20.56***<br>(2.174)   | 2.688**<br>(0.983)   | 2.591**<br>(0.884)   | 2.445**<br>(0.866)   |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                          | -4.309***<br>(0.222)  | -4.243***<br>(0.224)  | -4.339***<br>(0.226)  | -0.653***<br>(0.134) | -0.695***<br>(0.140) | -0.702***<br>(0.178) |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                                             | -0.178***<br>(0.0256) | -0.181***<br>(0.0256) | -0.184***<br>(0.0255) | 0.0114<br>(0.0168)   | 0.0107<br>(0.0166)   | 0.00931<br>(0.0180)  |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log)                            | -1.057***<br>(0.293)  | -0.913**<br>(0.282)   | -0.446<br>(0.277)     | -0.207*<br>(0.0950)  | -0.107<br>(0.0941)   | -0.0501<br>(0.0892)  |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                                                     | 0.847*<br>(0.333)     | 0.165<br>(0.322)      | 0.476<br>(0.317)      | 0.187<br>(0.105)     | 0.0477<br>(0.108)    | -0.0851<br>(0.110)   |
| Donor Migration Protests                                                       | -0.181<br>(0.346)     | 1.673***<br>(0.315)   | 1.374***<br>(0.317)   | -0.162*<br>(0.0810)  | 0.0557<br>(0.0805)   | 0.160<br>(0.0892)    |
| Civil War (Recipient)                                                          | 2.607***<br>(0.383)   | 2.744***<br>(0.384)   | 2.685***<br>(0.385)   | 0.350<br>(0.232)     | 0.260<br>(0.233)     | 0.244<br>(0.252)     |
| Previous Colony of Donor                                                       | 15.90***<br>(0.736)   | 15.82***<br>(0.745)   | 15.61***<br>(0.753)   | 1.529***<br>(0.300)  | 1.553***<br>(0.303)  | 1.550***<br>(0.298)  |
| Distance (log)                                                                 | 1.242*<br>(0.504)     | 1.391**<br>(0.505)    | 1.436**<br>(0.506)    | 1.436***<br>(0.418)  | 1.430***<br>(0.434)  | 1.432**<br>(0.453)   |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                                                      | -3.054***<br>(0.523)  | -3.231***<br>(0.525)  | -3.298***<br>(0.530)  | -0.854*<br>(0.416)   | -0.919*<br>(0.422)   | -0.963*<br>(0.424)   |
| Observations                                                                   | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 | 26448                | 25296                | 24128                |
| Log Likelihood                                                                 | -24296                | -24377                | -24431                | -5.50e+10            | -5.40e+10            | -5.30e+10            |
| Chi-Squared                                                                    | 9659                  | 9461                  | 9347                  | 143                  | 136                  | 130                  |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Table 25: All Health Aid.

|                                                                         | Tobit                 |                       |                       | PPML                 |                      |                      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                                                                         | (1)<br>Full           | (2)<br>t+1            | (3)<br>t+2            | (4)<br>Full          | (5)<br>t+1           | (6)<br>t+2           |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1                                            | 0.120<br>(1.303)      | 1.244<br>(1.275)      | -0.0492<br>(1.285)    | 0.423<br>(0.331)     | -0.0877<br>(0.350)   | -0.516<br>(0.322)    |
| Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis, Logit                                | -0.444***<br>(0.131)  | -0.224<br>(0.130)     | 0.159<br>(0.131)      | -0.0463<br>(0.0397)  | -0.0349<br>(0.0348)  | -0.0491<br>(0.0378)  |
| Far-Right Party in Cabinet=1 × Cabinet Anti-Immigration Emphasis, Logit | -0.236<br>(0.841)     | -0.144<br>(0.841)     | 0.523<br>(0.845)      | 0.0146<br>(0.232)    | 0.135<br>(0.179)     | 0.384<br>(0.197)     |
| Ideologically Connected Cabinet                                         | -1.619**<br>(0.588)   | -1.190*<br>(0.595)    | 0.657<br>(0.611)      | 0.0960<br>(0.171)    | -0.0788<br>(0.156)   | -0.128<br>(0.168)    |
| Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                       | 16.72***<br>(2.285)   | 15.79***<br>(2.127)   | 15.83***<br>(2.057)   | 2.111*<br>(0.916)    | 1.633<br>(0.870)     | 1.493<br>(0.867)     |
| Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)                                   | -4.410***<br>(0.210)  | -4.362***<br>(0.211)  | -4.445***<br>(0.214)  | -0.659***<br>(0.124) | -0.689***<br>(0.130) | -0.695***<br>(0.162) |
| Recipient Life Expectancy in Years                                      | -0.167***<br>(0.0244) | -0.168***<br>(0.0243) | -0.171***<br>(0.0242) | 0.0101<br>(0.0156)   | 0.00888<br>(0.0154)  | 0.00746<br>(0.0165)  |
| Total Asylums Applications Submitted to Donor (log)                     | -1.061***<br>(0.278)  | -0.995***<br>(0.267)  | -0.736**<br>(0.263)   | -0.193*<br>(0.0831)  | -0.0847<br>(0.0866)  | -0.0635<br>(0.0841)  |
| Donor Refugee Stocks (log)                                              | 0.846**<br>(0.316)    | 0.284<br>(0.305)      | 0.589<br>(0.301)      | 0.237*<br>(0.0987)   | 0.152<br>(0.100)     | 0.0398<br>(0.104)    |
| Donor Migration Protests                                                | 0.284<br>(0.329)      | 1.929***<br>(0.300)   | 1.453***<br>(0.303)   | -0.144<br>(0.0762)   | 0.0785<br>(0.0766)   | 0.129<br>(0.0856)    |
| Civil War (Recipient)                                                   | 2.594***<br>(0.363)   | 2.694***<br>(0.363)   | 2.705***<br>(0.365)   | 0.371<br>(0.217)     | 0.301<br>(0.217)     | 0.265<br>(0.237)     |
| Previous Colony of Donor                                                | 16.19***<br>(0.699)   | 16.12***<br>(0.707)   | 15.95***<br>(0.715)   | 1.505***<br>(0.290)  | 1.523***<br>(0.292)  | 1.523***<br>(0.289)  |
| Distance (log)                                                          | 1.064*<br>(0.477)     | 1.194*<br>(0.478)     | 1.241**<br>(0.478)    | 1.471***<br>(0.395)  | 1.457***<br>(0.407)  | 1.457***<br>(0.422)  |
| Non-Democracy (Polyarchy)                                               | -2.972***<br>(0.494)  | -3.094***<br>(0.497)  | -3.116***<br>(0.502)  | -0.780<br>(0.403)    | -0.833*<br>(0.412)   | -0.861*<br>(0.422)   |
| Observations                                                            | 41899                 | 41827                 | 41755                 | 26448                | 25296                | 24128                |
| Log Likelihood                                                          | -25875                | -25965                | -26033                | -5.92e+10            | -5.82e+10            | -5.72e+10            |
| Chi-Squared                                                             | 10642                 | 10423                 | 10293                 | 154                  | 136                  | 119                  |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$