

Foreign Aid as Border Policy: How the Political Right Deals with Migration

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Abstract

How do right-wing executives shape foreign policy once in office? I analyze foreign aid decisions driven by right-wing leadership to answer this question. Studies show that right-leaning governments should limit foreign aid to prioritize domestic issues and reject internationalism. This study argues that instead of less aid, right-wing executives increase bilateral aid when used for migration management. Right-wing executives favor bilateral aid to transit and origin countries to avoid delegation to third-parties that might not share their goals and prove to be unpopular with voters. Executives utilize foreign aid on migration strategically to show responsiveness and tackle a domestic point of contention. I employ a mixed-methods approach, including a fixed-effects Tobit model between 27 Western liberal donor countries and 76 aid-recipient countries from 1990-2013, a placebo test, and a case study on Italy-Libya foreign aid relations. Findings reveal right-wing executives engage in counterintuitive foreign policy outcomes with dangerous, unintended consequences. (150)

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Introduction

Controlling migration is a partisan issue, long politicized and securitized¹ often triggering incidents of political backlash and exclusionary attitudes across Western democracies (Dancygier 2010; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016; Hangartner et al. 2019). As such, governments have funded initiatives and agreements with neighboring nations to reduce migrant inflows before they reach national shores. Yet, as anti-immigrant movements exploit perceived economic and cultural threats from migration, right-wing populist parties continue to gain electoral traction (Betz 1994; Paul Taggart 2004; Mudde 2019). Right-wing populist parties capitalize on pro-people,² anti-migration, and anti-globalization sentiments from voters concerned with domestic issues to reach office (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Mudde 2007; Carter 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019). Although the effect of this political right-shift on domestic policy has received attention, a deeper analysis of the benefits, costs, and types of foreign engagement is necessary to update our perceptions of right-wing populist parties once in power.

How do right-wing executives shape foreign policy once in office? In this article, I analyze foreign aid decisions driven by right-wing leadership to answer this question. Foreign aid research indicates left-leaning governments prioritize development aid as an extension of their social welfare agenda (Thérien and Noel 2000; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Dietrich, Milner, and Slapin 2020; Milner and Tingley 2011; Milner and Tingley 2010; Brech and Potrafke 2014), while right-leaning administrations give less overall due to an isolationist foreign policy and disdain for internationalism (Lumsdaine and Risse-Kappen 1993; Heinrich, Kobayashi, and Lawson Jr 2021; Hammerschmidt, Meyer, and Pintsch 2022). Yet, donor behavior can also be linked to self-interest or domestic pressure rather than ideological leaning (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Berthélemy 2006; Mesquita and Smith 2009; Bermeo and Leblang 2015). With

¹The framing of immigration and immigrants being linked to security issues is further explained by Wæver et al. (1993), Weiner (1992), Buzan et al. (1998), and Huysmans (2000).

²Otherwise known as the in-group. An elusive term for people emanating from the 'heartland', an imagined idea rather than a construction of factual boundaries, where its imprecision works to its advantage (Paul Taggart 2004).

increasing economic shocks, perceived cultural threats, and the prioritization of domestic goals, right-wing executives in office should prefer economic austerity over aid commitments (Meijers and Zaslove 2021; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019; Hackenesh et al. 2022).

I argue instead that right-wing executives in government positively impact aid commitments when aid is bilateral and used for migration management.³ Right-wing executives favor bilateral aid to transit and origin countries⁴ to avoid delegation to third-parties that might not share their goals. Since foreign aid can be useful when utilized as a strategic tool for the political right (Dietrich, Milner, and Slapin 2020), delegation challenges the executive's perceived control over funding. Moreover, delegation presents challenges in implementation which might not benefit the executive in the eyes of voters. Weak alternative options and pledges to decrease migration further drive right-wing populist parties to seek the most efficient foreign aid policy without organizations to ensnare its impact.

Left-leaning executives would be weary of providing aid to non-democracies to control migration as good governance initiative and development aid is usually the preferred path. On the other hand, right-wing executives opt for bilateral aid on migration as a response to domestic pressures, the options available to deal with migration, and the challenges present in delegation. In short, it is in their best interest to directly fund countries to halt migration abroad while reaping electoral benefits at home.⁵

To test my argument, I utilize a mixed-methods approach including a dyad-year fixed-

³I define migration as cross-border movements involving refugees and migrants fleeing persecution and conflict, seeking safety or better lives and opportunities. This study acknowledges the ongoing debate in the literature as to whether we should employ mixed migration/mixed movements as a working definition of migration. However, the benefits of utilizing this definition allow us to incorporate a wide array of incoming migrants in the study to better reflect the complexity of migration flows.

⁴Transit countries refer to nations that have the potential or currently host migrants in their path towards a different country. Origin countries refer to migrants' claimed country of origin.

⁵Migration literature over the last 30 years has demonstrated the interest of Western liberal democracies to decrease migration (Hollifield 1992; Huysmans 2000; Rudolph 2003; Lahav 2004; Lavenex 2006; Godenau et al. 2008; Brettell and Hollifield 2022; Cassarino, Gabrielli, and Perrin 2023; Norman and Micinski 2023). Yet, the modes and trends of foreign migration policy are often relegated to qualitative assessments lacking the longitudinal and cross-national variation found in government bodies enabling such foreign policy.

effects Tobit model⁶ with an illustrative case focusing on the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya. I synthesize a pivotal dataset on right-wing executives in office across 27 developed Western liberal democracies with a constructed measure of aid commitments on migration targeting 76 aid-receiving countries over 23 years. Although the study covers a previous period of engagement with transit and origin countries, a substantial amount of funding was allocated to recipient states from 1990 to 2013. Foreign aid allocations amount to 1 trillion USD⁷ in aid committed to Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East from the selected donors during this period. The longitudinal and cross-national nature of my methodology allows me to exploit the extensive variation of right-wing populist parties, right-wing seat share, migrant flows, colonial legacies, and aid disbursements encountered in European Western liberal democracies to demonstrate a robust pattern lasting over 20 years.

The results support the proposed arguments with right-wing government executives positively impacting foreign aid on migration compared to other executives, especially when aid is not delegated. I employ a placebo test focused on health-related aid commitments to further illustrate the preference of right-wing executives for bilateral aid commitments on migration. A placebo test is in line with recent focus on testing underlying assumptions of research design and empirical credibility (Eggers, Tuñón, and Dafoe 2023).⁸ Results indicate a negative relationship between right-wing executives and foreign aid related to health, with the opposite being true for left-wing executives.

This study offers a two-fold contribution to our understanding of how partisanship shapes foreign policy amid rising polarization. First, my theoretical framework synthesizes the foreign aid and border externalization literature to explicate the domestic drivers forming contentious foreign policy. Previous work has advanced our knowledge of migration management

⁶In tandem with recent foreign aid literature and dyadic analyses such as Berthélemy and Tichit (2004), Berthélemy (2006), Bermeo and Leblang (2015), Bermeo (2017), Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider (2020), and Hammoud-Gallego and Luisa Feline Freier (2023)

⁷Constant to 2023.

⁸For recent examples refer to Cruz and Schneider (2017) and Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018).

aid and foreign aid driven by domestic interests (Connell, Moya, and Shin 2021; Norman and Micinski 2023; Angin, Shehaj, and Shin 2023). Yet, this study incorporates both literatures to explicate the domestic and international dynamics affecting a counterintuitive interest of right-wing executives on foreign aid.

Second, this study supports the nascent literature on populist foreign policy (Chryssogelos 2017; Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019; Destradi, Cadier, and Plagemann 2021; Voeten 2021; Cadier 2021; Wajner 2022; Lacatus and Meibauer 2022; Chryssogelos et al. 2023), and the international implications of right-wing populist actors (Boucher and Thies 2019; Pevehouse 2020; Thiers and Wehner 2022; Carnegie, R. Clark, and Kaya 2024; Carnegie, R. Clark, and Zucker 2024). Our theories of international relations are yet to map the different forms of engagement that right-wing populist executives can utilize in the international arena. The presence of right-wing executives in Western liberal democracies has transformed the approach to foreign policy by placing emphasis on domestic gains at the cost of international engagement. The findings provide an instance of such engagement and suggest a concerning push towards directing less-supervised aid to non-democracies, where migrants could experience hardships linked to unsupervised funding and growing autocratic oppression.

Foreign Aid and Migration Management

Western democracies have long used foreign aid to manage migration, with early research highlighting future income prospects as an important factor in individuals' decision to migrate (Sjaastad 1962; Borjas 1989). Foreign aid is therefore expected to mitigate the inverse relationship between income and migration by creating opportunities to remain at home. Advocates of foreign aid affirm its utility in alleviating poverty if accompanied by effective policies (Burnside and Dollar 2000) and by considering the spending priorities of the receiving country (Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas 2009). The Khartoum Process, for

example, brings African and European nations together to address migration across the Horn of Africa by strengthen in economic and “public administration in security and rule of law as well as improve border management.”⁹ In 2015, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) made way for hundreds of migration-related programs across 26 African nations with an endowment of 4.8 billion euros. The EUTF for Africa was a broad attempt to address governance and poverty issues driving migration towards Europe while working directly with institutions of transit-countries (Kervyn and Shilhav 2017). Both programs reflect attempts to effectively target and administer foreign aid on migration through a multilateral, comprehensive engagement.

Opposition is nonetheless vocal about the propensity of governments receiving foreign aid to become rent-seeking (Svensson 2000), or to forgo political incentives to democratic accountability (Djankov et al. 2008; Morrison 2009)—particularly when forced migrants are involved. Refugee rentierism has been successfully implemented to extract revenue from donor countries to maintain refugee populations within recipient states (Luisa F Freier, Micinski, and Tsourapas 2021). For example, Czaika and A. Mayer (2011) assert countries such as Australia and the United States (US) are sensitive to asylum seekers when formulating heir aid strategies, making it easier for migrant-sending countries to extract benefits from donors. Micinski (2023) further describes how the deportability of refugees can be a credible threat for donor countries to extract concessions, exemplified by the cases of Kenya and Pakistan. In most cases, however, migration management aid will depend on previous regional agreements, historical ties, supranational entities such as the EU, or the desire to offload responsibilities to other countries (Angin, Shehaj, and Shin 2023; Betts and Collier 2017; Norman 2020; Abdelaaty 2021).

To address concerns of fund misallocation or rentierism, governments often partner with organizations in specific initiatives. Two benefits arise from this approach. First, donors are able to bypass corrupt domestic institutions by finding suitable recipients capable of

⁹First introduced in the EU-Africa Action Plan on Migration and Mobility 2014-2017 (Valleta Summit 2015).

implementing funds such as NGOs or regional IOs (Dietrich 2013). Second, collaboration with organizations can bring normative benefits by relying on their reputation and expertise of these institutions while expecting a safer return on their investment. Humanitarian organizations are governed by a body of specialized experts with regional knowledge and years of experience. Projects such as the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration were implemented in hopes to stabilize regions through entrepreneurship initiatives and the access to rehabilitation alongside access to basic services (IOM 2022). Similarly, Sweden has frequently collaborated with IOM, dispatching Swedish experts to places hit by natural disasters and to manage joint projects through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (International Organization for Migration 2006; International Organization for Migration 2015). And in the case of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), governments can use IDMC data for operational and policy decisions to reduce future displacements of people (IMDC 2022). These multilateral approaches are expected to fare better by taking domestic and international considerations of all parties present. Consequently producing benefits for citizens of both partners by reducing migration and increasing economic opportunities to remain at home.

While multilateral strategies may yield better results and discourage extractive practices, such initiatives can impose significant financial and electoral cost for donors. Right-wing executives are cued by the public to focus on solving domestic situations (Paul Taggart 2004; Shehaj, Shin, and Inglehart 2021). Faced with domestic constraints, executives adapt foreign policy to align with domestic interests (Milner 1997). The ideological characteristic of donor countries is therefore a crucial factor in understanding foreign aid allocation on migration.

Ideology as a Donor Characteristic

The literature on donor ideology and foreign aid largely converges on the notion that social welfare drives aid from the left, while motivations for the right remain debated. Poverty alleviation and reducing inequality is especially associated with “leftist” policy agenda in developed liberal democracies. Thérien and Noel (2000) find evidence of for this by examining social-democratic parties’ impact on foreign aid across 16 OECD countries. Brech and Potrafke (2014) similarly find that left-of-center governments are more willing to invest and provide foreign aid due to its similarities to social welfare spending. Milner and Tingley (2010) show comparable results in presidential systems, where left-leaning US Representatives are more inclined to support foreign aid compared to conservative representatives. Milner and Tingley (2011) additionally find the effect of ideology on foreign aid to be three times as large as on trade, with some fluctuation once national security is attached to foreign aid. Furthermore, when Democrats control Congress, concerns over development feature more prominently in foreign aid allocations (Fleck and Kilby 2006).

On the other hand, right-wing governments are expected to restrict foreign aid. Control of the US Congress by the Republican party takes into consideration more commercial interests rather than alleviating poverty or increasing development when disbursing aid (Fleck and Kilby 2006). Conservative ideology should then favor domestic economic stability over economic development in other countries. During Donald Trump’s tenure, the US Agency for International Development’s budget was slashed and redirected towards an ‘America First’ agenda, with human rights and democracy being cast aside (Norris and Inglehart 2019, p. 416). The increase of domestic taxes to fund foreign allocations should also be evaded by more right-wing populist governments (Lumsdaine and Risse-Kappen 1993). In general, the relationship between foreign aid and ideology reflects the pursuit of core ideals in foreign policy (Blair 1969; Lumsdaine and Risse-Kappen 1993; Noël and Thérien 2008; Rapport and Rathbun 2021).

However, two issues arise when studying ideology as a donor characteristic. First, at-

tributing partisanship or ideology as an indicator of foreign aid allocation has proven to be fickle. In earlier work, Noël and Thérien (1995) argue that partisanship is less of a predictor when compared to the robustness of their welfare institutions. Recent examples similarly find little support for the idea of partisanship affecting foreign aid allocation (Fuchs, Dreher, and Nunnenkamp 2014). Second, the conventional wisdom that socialist governments will allocate more foreign aid compared to right-leaning governments. For example, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Schmaljohann (2015) find that a more Socialist-led Germany allocates actually *less* foreign aid on average. These concerns underscore the complexity of ideology and partisanship in foreign aid policy.

This study seeks to address these two issues by conducting a concrete cost-benefit analysis linking right-wing executives' platform to matching foreign policy behavior. It follows that executives hailing from right-wing populist parties are vote-seekers seeking policies to remain in power (Downs 1957; Müller and Strøm 1999, p. 9). As such, although migration management aid might be a subsection of larger aid packages, specifying the type of aid improves our understanding and expectations of right-wing executives in office. It would appear counterintuitive for right-wing executives to be interested in allocating national funds to other countries as their presence in office suggests domestic economic anxiety and cultural backlash. Yet, it is not counterintuitive for right-wing executives to allocate funds if aid is a strategic tool to fulfill political goals: control migration and display control over foreign policy. This leads me to my first conjecture:

H1: As cabinets shift further to the right, there will be an increase in migration management aid to transit and origin countries.

Issues with Delegation

Domestic Constraints

However, delegation of migration management aid poses several challenges for right-wing executives at the domestic and international level. First, it diminishes the political right's claims of shocking the status quo. Although this study acknowledges voters' inability to fully observe policy-making even in liberal democracies, voters' *can* attribute policy influence when policies have "strong" issue salience among the electorate (Fortunato et al. 2021). Western democracies are not strangers to the plight of refugees and migrants, with many of them receiving hundreds of thousands of asylum applications a year, or being home to historically resettled communities and temporary migrants.¹⁰ Since migration from less developed states is expected to trigger distributional conflicts and cultural backlash driven by beliefs of wage competition in donor countries, the electorate will pay attention to challenges by executives to improve the current situation (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007; Norris and Inglehart 2019, p. 182). Right-wing populist executives will capitalize on these cultural and economic anxieties alluded to migration, tagging in people-centric and anti-elitist remarks to their discourse on migration (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1997; P. Taggart 2000; Mudde 2007; Rooduijn et al. 2017; Shehaj, Shin, and Inglehart 2021). For example, Donald Trump's "Draining the Swamp" and "Make America Great Again" were popular, successful slogans indicating challenges to the status quo and capitalization of popular anxieties (Norris and Inglehart 2019, pp. 75, 258). Italy's recently elected Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Infrastructure and Transportation Matteo Salvini (*Lega*) has similarly been on the spotlight for hard-liner comments on migration and the future of European integration, claiming its uncontrolled growth has eroded European spirits (Schaart 2019).¹¹ Delegation

¹⁰The European public is particularly exposed to discourse on migration given historical internal strife with the Schengen Area and security concerns after 9/11 (Lahav 2004).

¹¹In a 2018 interview published by TIME magazine, Matteo Salvini claimed that "history will entrust [*Lega*] with the role of saving European values—from Judeo-Christian roots to the right to work, the right to security, the right to life." He further claimed [the EU] has grown too much, and too quickly" while *Lega* is trying to bring back the "European spirit" (Walt 2018).

would delude executives' arguments for maintaining tenure by continuing trends of previous administrations and failing to live up to their own words.

In line with the first challenge, right-wing executives publicly pander their disengagement from international organizations as a point of pride, as such, delegation counteracts executives' distancing efforts. Through heuristics or common wisdom, the public often overestimates spending and underestimates foreign aid impact (Scotto, Reifler, Hudson, et al. 2017). Although Scotto, Reifler, Hudson, et al. (2017) argue foreign aid framing could decrease such misconceptions, misinformation is not easily undermined even under time-intensive and multi-pronged interventions (Badrinathan 2021). Work has further shown that the public is less supportive of multilateral engagement in foreign aid if the organizations involved does not align with national values (Milner and Tingley 2013). And once security concerns encompass the subject of the foreign policy, which migration policy often suffers from, further control is desired by voters to reduce its threat (Wenzelburger and Böller 2020). Selective international disengagement from right-wing executive would therefore be preferred by public and their electorate alike on migration management aid.

International Concerns

On the intentional side, if right-wing executives utilize foreign aid as a strategic tool, third-parties might not necessarily be the fastest or most efficient in decreasing migration. Internal politics might shift resource allocation or project scope as organizations change. The monetary cost might also be affected by exogenous shocks and could quickly become burdensome when shopping and diversifying across organizations. Fund mismanagement will remain a prevalent concern for donors expecting a return on their investment. Donors mitigate mishaps by assessing recipients' merit during selection and throughout their relationship with the recipient. However, merit considerations might not be comprehensive enough to prevent fund appropriation or unexpected outcomes (focusing on general political freedom but not personal integrity rights, for example) (Neumayer 2003a; Neumayer 2003b). Merit

could also change depending on additional attributes important to the donor after some time. Nielsen (2013) finds recipients voting similarly to donors at the UN should expect a 9% increase in foreign aid even during rising human rights violations. Yet, if governments disengage to cut their losses, the lack of political engagement on this front could lead to a lack of good provisions and development (Moore 1998) and even increases the desire of receiving countries to ‘remain poor’ (Svensson 2000). Both increasing the propensity for either rentierism or fund misallocation.

Lastly, multilateral and comprehensive programs can also inadvertently create political tension even in ideal circumstances. Licht (2009) suggests aid enhances the durability of authoritarian regimes, while Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find that foreign aid is associated with a decrease in institutional quality and lack of democratization. For example, the EUTF for Africa was under attack due to increasing the capabilities to surveil, control, and hurt migrants (Enough Project 2017; Kervyn and Shillhav 2017; Norman and Micinski 2023). Norman and Micinski (2023) assert the precarious nature of foreign aid disbursement in recipient states as it foments expenditure in capabilities to control migration with possible spillover effects to citizens. The partnership between the EU and Sudan during the EUTF for Africa was particularly tenuous as it might have involved the use of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—one of the most abusive paramilitary groups in the country—to surveil Sudan’s borders (Enough Project 2017). Between 2015-2016, the RSF began receiving money from the EU in the form of projects and foreign aid, becoming at that point Sudan’s primary force in patrolling Sudanese borders to intervene with migrant’s flows (Enough Project 2017). Yet, the RSF has been a staple of Sudan for oppressing political dissent and as a dependable militia for Sudan’s regime.¹² Other agreements, such as the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan which funded Turkey’s domestic institutions with an initial 3 billion EUR, have remained contentious since inception especially as Turkey’s human rights’ record plummets.

In the end, officials in democratic settings respond to their constituency with political

¹²In 2013, the RSF deployed against peaceful demonstrations demanding basic commodities resulting in 170 deaths within a month.

survival in mind (Mayhew 2004). These challenges illustrate the inherent complexities and risks of delegation. Unintended consequences—ranging from voter disapproval, reinforcing autocratic institutions, to escalating political tensions—highlight the dilemma present for right-wing executives seeking to manage migration at the international level. Policies enacted by right-wing parties should then reflect their maximizing behavior and respond to these identifiable voter preferences. To fulfill expectations of right-wing voters to deter migrants from coming into their countries, the use of bilateral aid commitments with transit and origin countries to halt migration is then a viable solution. This leads to my second conjecture:

H2: As cabinets shift further to the right, migration management aid to transit and origin countries is expected to increase more significantly when delivered bilaterally rather than through delegation or involvement of third-party actors.

Empirical Strategy

Data

I construct a dataset of aid commitment between 27 donors (shown in Appendix A.5) countries and 76 recipient states (both transit and origin countries) in Africa, Europe, and Asia (shown in Appendix A.6) to measure the effect of right-wing populist executives on migration aid. The data results in 49,248 dyad-year observations with 2,052 unique dyads. I exclude the Americas and Oceania due to alternative destination countries being closer than attempting travel to the donors located in Western Europe. This country selection provides variation in the region, political structures, and socioeconomic characteristics. To answer my first hypothesis, I construct a measure of foreign aid commitments on migration overall. For my second hypothesis, I focus on bilateral foreign aid commitments excluding the involvement of third parties as this type of commitment is in line with the argument

that right-wing populist executives would prefer less delegation on foreign policy.

I bundle transit and origins countries together for two specific reasons. First, states can be both transit and origin countries—such as the case of Libya or Morocco—at any given year based on political, economic, or environmental issues. Claiming that a country is either one or the other would provide an imprecise picture of migration flows and would attribute incorrect characteristics to the data. Second, if migrants arrive to European shores they have incentives to change their country of origin. Marking particular states as origin countries based on migrant data would wrongly label states as transit or origin. Bundling transit and origin countries together limits the scope of the study but treats migration as constantly changing phenomenon beyond time-specific labels.¹³

Foreign aid data is sourced from the AidData Core Research Release V3.1 (AidData) (Tierney et al. 2011). AidData provides description of aid disbursements and organizations involved in administering funds. Project descriptions allow for the identification of key words indicating migration-focused third parties such as the United Nations, the UNHCR, and CARE international (shown in Table 1). Any disbursement given to recipient countries excludes any mention of unspecified programs or aid given to a third-party organization present in the recipient country such as the UNHCR or IOM.¹⁴ This results in 5.6 billion USD allocated for migration management aid, with the unfiltered total assigned for management aid being a little over 9 billion USD.

¹³Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the UN, makes this point in his 2006 address to the High-Level Dialogue of the UN General Assembly on International Migration and Development: “countries are now significantly involved in, and affected by, international migration than at any time in history. And they are no longer so easily divided into ‘countries of origin’ and ‘countries of destination.’ Many are now both” (Annan 2006).

¹⁴A qualitative inspection of the cleaned AidData was additionally conducted to account for grammatical mistakes affecting data selection, which encompasses the whole universe of aid commitments that mention a mixed flow of migrants (asylum seekers, refugees, and economic migrants) in line with my definition. Refer to Norman and Micinski (2023) for an additional measure of migration management aid that includes funds distributed by international organizations.

Abbreviation	Full Form
-	CARE International
-	Danish Refugee Council
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Table 1: Foreign aid on migration with such terms in the description are removed from the dataset. The Danish Refugee Council and CARE International abbreviations are not included due to the unintentional removal of descriptions with the word “care” or “IRC” (often referring to the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

AidData combines financial data from a wide array of organizations such as the African Development Fund or World Trade Organization in conjunction with donor documents from government websites and other resources. It is a robust collection of aid commitments with descriptive characteristics, allowing to identify aid commitments with higher level of certainty than other resources available. The complete dataset compiles a total of 1.5 million projects or 9.5 trillion USD in commitments in its entirety (Tierney et al. [2011](#)).




Figure 1: Aid commitments by type to all recipients from 1990-2013. *AidData, 2016.*

Fixed-Effects Tobit Model

I estimate dyad and year fixed-effects Tobit regression on the full dataset for several reasons.¹⁵ First, the Tobit estimator is implemented due to a large number of observations of the dependent variable are zero values. Zeroes are expected since we cannot foresee countries to constantly allocate aid on migration with transit countries throughout the years (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004). Additionally, some donor countries might not have enough migrants at their borders prompting aid allocation to deal with this issue. Even if they do receive a large amount of asylum seekers, it does not indicate the donor country's willingness to engage in these commitments. Hence, the use of a left-censoring model such as Tobit is adequate.

Second, dyad fixed-effects are crucial to account for the diplomatic and economic rela-

¹⁵Additional OLS and fixed-effects regressions are found in Appendix C.

tionship between the donor and recipient country. Additional controls such as whether the recipient country was a colony of the donor country are equally important, yet dyads can account of unmeasured intricate relations beyond any control presented. Although the use of fixed-effects in Tobit models might present incorrect estimates of standard errors, Greene (2004) utilizes Monte Carlo simulations to show the issue is negligible.¹⁶

The Tobit model additionally allows us to take into consideration not only the donor type but also recipient characteristics. The effect of right-wing presence on foreign aid targeting migration is complex with underlying immeasurable events affecting it. In addition, it is important to note the effect of recipient characteristics such as the economy and regime type in the relationships between migrant-sending countries and countries with large numbers of migrants (Bermeo and Leblang 2015).

For my first dependent variable I measure the logged amount of commitment aid targeting migration distributed to recipient countries. Refer to Appendix A.2 for foreign aid commitment totals. I lead the dependent variable up to two years to analyze the explanatory variable's effect on future disbursements. My second dependent variable is a subset of the first, focusing on bilateral aid commitments on migration as explained above. My main independent variable is a logit-scaled right-left leaning score (RILE) of government in office in line with **prosser**, which recombines Lehmann et al. (2024a) and the original Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) (Lehmann et al. 2024b) RILE measure for a better fit.¹⁷ An increase in the RILE score indicates parties begin exhibiting more right-wing traits leading to right-wing populism. These traits include less interest for internationalism, multiculturalism, and social welfare, with a preference for political authority and nationalism.¹⁸

¹⁶In line with Tobit models in the foreign aid and policy literature such as Bermeo and Leblang (2015), Neumayer (2003b), Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Schmaljohann (2015), and Ferry, Hafner-Burton, and Schneider (2020).

¹⁷The approach taken by Prosser (2014) improves the original MARPOR RILE measure and builds upon Lowe et al. (2011) measure by accounting for items not mentioned in manifestos and weighting across manifesto size.

¹⁸Operationalization of variables are extracted from Bergman, Bäck, and Hellström (2021), Hellström, Bergman, and Lindahl (2024), and E. Bergman et al. (2024). Summary statistics for MARPOR and Prosser's

Key Control Variables

Controls for the models include individual donor and recipient characteristics that would impact enactment of aid commitments and continuous engagement with recipient countries. First, I control for the cohesion of the donors' government (*Ideologically Connected Cabinet*) as an alternative explanation for aid commitments. The binary variable measures whether parties in cabinet are next to each other using MARPOR's RILE measure. A binary value of 1 indicates higher cohesion, with less 'ideological connection' most likely leading to a decrease of aid commitments due to cabinet politics and polarization. Second, I control for gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) from the World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI) (The World Bank 2022) as a control for donor and recipient (*GDP Per Capita in USD*) economic status. I utilize life expectancy to additionally measure domestic institutions that attend the general public's basic needs in the recipient country (*Recipient Life Expectancy in Years*). Both GDPPC and life expectancy address concerns of need being the main driver for aid commitments, regardless of donors' domestic environment. For example, a higher life expectancy would indicate domestic welfare institutions are relatively strong enough to not require foreign aid. As such, these controls account for economic and institutional push-factors important in explaining aid commitments.

I also take into account factors that are expected to influence migration-related aid commitments, such as refugee stocks, asylum applications, and migration-related protests. Countries currently caring for a large number of refugees might be less willing to further allocate resources to migration in any way—especially if funding is tight.¹⁹ To incorporate this into the model, the stock of people recognized as refugees in the donor country (*Donor Refugee Stocks (log)*) is included as a control. These are refugees recognized under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, the 1969 African Unity Convention, and in accordance with the UNHCR. The measure also includes people with refugee-like

RILE measure are available in Appendix A.4.

¹⁹For a test focusing on how migrant stocks affect foreign aid allocation refer to Bermeo and Leblang (2015).

humanitarian status or temporary protection granted within the state. Moreover, asylum seekers are accounted for using the logged total asylum applications submitted to the donor (*Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)*) provided by Eurostat's historical and current application data. There could be an opposite explanation where donor countries with larger refugee populations have experience with migrant flows and would not want an increase in their refugee population and thus provide more aid to decrease stocks and asylum applications, but results will challenge this notion.

Migration-related protests in donor countries (*Donor Migration Protest*) are also incorporated into the model as a count variable, once again controlling for domestic desire to address migration (D. Clark and Regan 2016). Donor governments, regardless of partisanship, might be driven by domestic outcry to control migration, thus causing an uptick of aid commitments. I argue domestic concern over migration is necessary for the rise of the right and their subsequent need to address migration but not enough to see such uptick. Donor governments are able to measure the impact of such protests without fully be swayed by them as budget constraints and political statements might be more salient predictors for aid commitments.

These additional variables are useful in measuring other plausible explanations for aid commitments to support security efforts. Political turmoil in recipient countries could be positively associated with aid commitments as they serve to stabilize communities and support insitutuions. I include a binary variable that controls for *Civil War (Recipient)* in the recipient country for that year. The control takes into consideration the desire of developed nations to allocate aid to victims of civil wars and to possibly reduce spillover security issues (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg 2023). Similarly, migrants as a security issue after 9/11 became a trend that countries such as the United States helped to propagate. Given that governments would try to halt undocumented migrants reaching their countries in fear of terrorism, this would increase commitment aid toward transit countries on migration. I similar control for this phenomenon with a binary variable (*Post 9/11*).

Lastly, the colonial relationship and distance between donor and recipient countries are important points in their economic relationship. I use a binary variable to control for the recipient country being a former colony of the donor country (*Previous Colony of Donor*), obtained from the Correlates of War-Colonial Contiguity Data, 1816-2016 V3.1. To control for distance, I measure the logged simple distance in kilometers (*Distance (log)*) from the most populated cities in a dyad (T. Mayer and Zignago 2011). I also include a binary measure of the recipient’s polyarchy (*Non-Democracy (Recipient)*) in which a score below 0.60 is considered a non-democracy (Coppedge et al. 2021). The democracy measure incorporates the notion of donors punishing non-democratic partners by reducing aid commitments, although we understand aid sanctions can vary even across similar violations (Nielsen 2013). Results will find some inconclusive results in this area. Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Appendix A.4.

Results

Model 1 and Model 2 from Table 2 are basic models with minimal controls to demonstrate a general trend.²⁰ Model 3 represents the baseline model with controls, while Models 4 and 5 feature a one-year and two-year lead of the dependent variable, respectively, along with full controls. Results are mixed across all models and show only negative statistical significance, negating my first hypothesis. That is, as governments shift further to the right, there will be an increase in migration management aid to transit and origin countries. Model 3 indicates a negative association for *Cabinet RILE*.

Some of the expected patterns seen in the control models are, for example, recipient GDPPC being negatively correlated across the board, meaning that the higher GDPPC a recipient has, the lower the likelihood of aid commitments. Conversely, the higher the GDPPC for the donor, the more aid commitments will be made across the board. A more

²⁰Statistical models supporting my first hypothesis are found in Table 2. All models are estimated using dyad and year fixed-effects Tobit, with left censoring at 0. Donor profiles available in Appendix A.3.

nuanced measure of countries in need of foreign assistance is life expectancy, which with a year increased in life expectancy there is a statistically significant decrease in commitment aid on migration. This is likely related to countries with higher life expectancy generally having better economic systems and thus requiring less foreign aid in general.

Recipients experiencing a civil war require support to rebuild and house newly displaced internal or regional migrants, thus an increase in aid commitments is expected (although not significant in this case). On the contrary, aid commitments are negatively impacted by the 9/11 attacks in US soil most likely to due to fears of supporting non-state armed groups. This is quite interesting as one year after this negative effect is cut in half, although with Model 3 missing statistical significance for this variable.

DRAFT

Table 2: FE Tobit models of all aid on migration committed from 1990 to 2023, with up to 2 years lead. Additional tables utilizing MARPOR's RILE measure are found in Appendix B.

	<i>DV: Migration Aid Committed to Recipients</i>				
	DV (1)	DV (2)	DV (3)	DV (1 Yr Lead) (4)	DV (2 Yr Lead) (5)
Cabinet RILE	0.292 (0.232)	-1.107*** (0.323)	-0.945** (0.326)	0.315 (0.322)	-0.440 (0.316)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	-0.379 (0.565)	5.239*** (0.806)	6.187*** (0.808)	4.681*** (0.821)	0.663 (0.821)
Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)		1.564*** (0.347)	0.696 (0.373)	1.550*** (0.368)	0.328 (0.355)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		-1.653*** (0.382)	-2.365*** (0.417)	-0.851* (0.414)	1.183** (0.428)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			41.25*** (3.665)	45.13*** (3.458)	51.24*** (3.456)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-2.098*** (0.592)	-1.970*** (0.584)	-1.446* (0.591)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			-0.303*** (0.0822)	-0.317*** (0.0781)	-0.287*** (0.0783)
Donor Migration Protests			-3.373*** (0.453)	-5.601*** (0.506)	-2.013*** (0.417)
Civil War (Recipient)			1.033 (0.651)	0.382 (0.650)	1.013 (0.665)
Post 9/11			-119.3 (2929.5)	-44.14*** (3.056)	-56.48*** (3.153)
Previous Colony of Donor			-75.57 (92677.3)	-69.62 (88671.8)	-71.96 (74351.6)
Distance (log)			-15.15 (9.374)	-23.81* (9.996)	-29.57** (10.05)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			1.814 (1.667)	2.345 (1.697)	0.884 (1.696)
Constant	-76.20 (1424.4)	-88.70 (2671.6)	-245.4** (87.50)	-239.0** (91.71)	-257.4** (92.11)
$\sigma^2(DV)$	189.8*** (5.695)	206.2*** (7.084)	194.3*** (6.757)		
$\sigma^2(DV\ 1\ Yr\ Lead)$				191.2*** (6.646)	
$\sigma^2(DV\ 2\ Yr\ Lead)$					192.6*** (6.726)
Observations	49374	38610	36661	36661	36661

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3: FE Tobit models of selected (not delegated) aid on migration committed from 1990 to 2023, with up to 2 years lead. Additional tables utilizing MARPOR’s RILE measure are found in Appendix B.

	<i>DV: Selected Migration Aid Committed to Recipients</i>				
	DV (1)	DV (2)	DV (3)	DV (1 Yr Lead) (4)	DV (2 Yr Lead) (5)
Cabinet RILE	2.329*** (0.309)	0.709 (0.464)	1.144* (0.478)	1.632*** (0.481)	0.921 (0.483)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	3.841*** (0.696)	11.71*** (1.080)	12.52*** (1.101)	11.47*** (1.113)	4.299*** (1.083)
Total Asylum Applications to Donor (log)		-0.562 (0.468)	-0.549 (0.505)	-1.604** (0.501)	-2.422*** (0.501)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		-3.929*** (0.489)	-4.279*** (0.515)	-2.518*** (0.521)	0.221 (0.549)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			26.48*** (4.899)	36.22*** (4.630)	46.86*** (4.729)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-1.585* (0.798)	-1.155 (0.800)	-1.467 (0.823)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			-0.232* (0.109)	-0.277** (0.107)	-0.231* (0.109)
Donor Migration Protests			-3.345*** (0.765)	-0.850 (0.687)	-0.687 (0.720)
Civil War (Recipient)			2.200* (0.877)	1.383 (0.886)	0.358 (0.922)
Post 9/11			-109.7 (3074.4)	-43.76*** (4.131)	-57.88*** (4.502)
Previous Colony of Donor			-81.78 (95641.4)	-77.99 (48415.0)	-80.51 (109773.9)
Distance (log)			-11.76 (11.81)	-16.87 (12.33)	-28.08* (12.71)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			2.061 (2.192)	1.913 (2.265)	1.972 (2.322)
Constant	-83.74 (1461.3)	-42.09 (1821.9)	-103.8 (110.7)	-168.9 (113.7)	-195.1 (116.8)
$\sigma^2(DV)$	221.7*** (8.071)	250.5*** (11.00)	242.8*** (10.81)		
$\sigma^2(DV\ 1\ Yr\ Lead)$				246.3*** (10.98)	
$\sigma^2(DV\ 2\ Yr\ Lead)$					252.8*** (11.35)
Observations	48108	37620	35671	35671	35671

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Interestingly, being a previous colony does not have any positive or statistical significance.

Possibly as a result governments diversify their investments across donor and transit countries regardless of historical connections. Some negative effects are also observed in relation to distance. This falls in line with our expectations of a larger distance between countries reducing the need for migration management aid as those migrants will likely have less chances of reaching their destination overall. However, common wisdom would expect a stronger relationship for distance as a strong predictor of aid commitments on migration.

On the other side, the results from Table 3 follow a trend in line with theoretical expectations. Subsetting the data to less-delegated foreign aid supports the second hypothesis: as governments shift further to the right, migration management aid to transit and origin countries is expected to increase more significantly when delivered bilaterally rather than through delegation or involvement of third-party actors. Table 3 confirms our expectation of commitment aid on migration being positively associated with a more right-wing executive presence in government. Model 3 is especially salient with *Cabinet RILE* having a positive coefficient. Overall, the findings support only my second hypothesis. A more right-wing government is statistically significant and positively associated with foreign aid targeting migration.

Placebo Test on Health-Related Aid Commitments

I test the robustness of my findings using a placebo test focused on health-related aid commitments. A placebo test is in line with recent focus on testing underlying assumptions of research design and empirical credibility (Eggers, Tuñón, and Dafoe 2023).²¹ The lack of interest and general support for health-related issues by right-wing parties will make these types of aid commitments strategically useless for political gain. Right-wing executives are therefore expected to have negligible impacts on health-related aid commitments. To test this argument, I similarly test all health-related aid commitments and show results in Table 5, and then focus on bilateral aid commitments without the involvement of third-party

²¹For recent examples refer to Cruz and Schneider (2017) and Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018).

health-related organizations by removing projects with specific descriptions similar to the migration test (shown in Table 4). This result in 2,052 unique dyads across the same aid recipients, resulting in a total of 27 billion USD in health-related aid commitments, with the model results found in Table 6.

Abbreviation	Full Form
-	Doctors Without Borders
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
-	Red Crescent
-	Red Cross
UN	United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization

Table 4: Foreign aid on health with such terms in the description are removed from the dataset.

The first set of models are unfiltered health-related aid commitments. Results from Table 5 indicate a strong, mostly negative and significant relationship across the board. In particular, Model 3 displays a negative relationship, and Models 4-5 negative although not statistically significant relationship *Cabinet RILE*. Results indicate that a more right-wing cabinet decrease aid commitments related to health soon after taking power, with a continuing (not statistically significant) trend.

Table 5: FE Tobit models of all aid on health committed from 1990 to 2023, with up to 2 years lead. Additional tables utilizing MARPOR’s RILE measure are found in Appendix B.

	<i>DV: Health Aid Committed to Recipients</i>				
	DV (1)	DV (2)	DV (3)	DV (1 Yr Lead) (4)	DV (2 Yr Lead) (5)
Cabinet RILE	-0.131 (0.195)	-0.579* (0.239)	-0.642** (0.247)	-0.286 (0.248)	-0.172 (0.248)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.739 (0.489)	-1.754** (0.604)	-1.803** (0.627)	-2.694*** (0.624)	-1.860** (0.626)
Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)		-0.443 (0.227)	-1.954*** (0.263)	-1.529*** (0.259)	-1.092*** (0.261)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		2.342*** (0.267)	1.027*** (0.298)	0.221 (0.289)	0.572* (0.287)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			36.75*** (2.445)	32.33*** (2.317)	30.33*** (2.247)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-0.449 (0.532)	-0.295 (0.533)	-1.226* (0.524)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			0.0727 (0.0623)	0.0699 (0.0620)	0.0334 (0.0613)
Donor Migration Protests			0.00917 (0.291)	1.739*** (0.268)	1.172*** (0.270)
Civil War (Recipient)			0.860 (0.560)	1.195* (0.568)	1.253* (0.569)
Post 9/11			-110.2 (4400.3)	-31.63*** (2.048)	-29.40*** (2.075)
Previous Colony of Donor			-3.997 (5.103)	-4.142 (5.226)	-1.943 (5.258)
Distance (log)			12.35 (8.581)	11.68 (8.832)	10.68 (9.008)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			1.958 (1.110)	1.143 (1.088)	0.371 (1.072)
Constant	-90.48 (2167.0)	-112.4 (1988.3)	-478.6*** (78.80)	-425.0*** (80.75)	-398.3*** (82.17)
$\sigma^2(DV)$	167.7*** (4.158)	170.1*** (4.687)	161.8*** (4.540)		
$\sigma^2(DV\ 1\ Yr\ Lead)$				167.4*** (4.704)	
$\sigma^2(DV\ 2\ Yr\ Lead)$					170.9*** (4.809)
Observations	48108	37620	35671	35671	35671

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Results in Table 6 show a similar trend with Models 1-4 demonstrating a negatively and statistically significant coefficient. Total asylum applications in Tables 5 and 6 are both negatively associated to health-related aid commitments, yet refugee stocks seem to increase health-related aid commitments. These findings partially mirror work by Bermeo

and Leblang (2015) where recognized refugees might have an impact on aid commitments. Similarly to previous tests, GDPPC is a strong predictor of aid commitments followed by a civil war in recipient countries.

Table 6: FE Tobit models of selected (not delegated) aid on health committed from 1990 to 2023, with up to 2 years lead. Additional tables utilizing MARPOR's RILE measure are found in Appendix B.

	<i>DV: Selected Health Aid Committed to Recipients</i>				
	DV (1)	DV (2)	DV (3)	DV (1 Yr Lead) (4)	DV (2 Yr Lead) (5)
Cabinet RILE	-0.0485*** (0.0132)	-0.0691*** (0.0149)	-0.0728*** (0.0153)	-0.0365* (0.0152)	-0.0267 (0.0150)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.764 (0.489)	-1.502* (0.608)	-1.464* (0.632)	-2.521*** (0.629)	-1.737** (0.630)
Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)		-0.458* (0.223)	-1.920*** (0.255)	-1.524*** (0.253)	-1.099*** (0.255)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		2.384*** (0.267)	1.067*** (0.298)	0.257 (0.289)	0.603* (0.287)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			36.81*** (2.451)	32.34*** (2.319)	30.31*** (2.247)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-0.436 (0.532)	-0.280 (0.533)	-1.213* (0.524)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			0.0726 (0.0623)	0.0698 (0.0619)	0.0335 (0.0613)
Donor Migration Protests			-0.103 (0.289)	1.678*** (0.266)	1.132*** (0.268)
Civil War (Recipient)			0.847 (0.560)	1.193* (0.568)	1.250* (0.569)
Post 9/11			-110.4 (4394.9)	-31.86*** (2.053)	-29.56*** (2.078)
Previous Colony of Donor			-3.719 (5.100)	-4.025 (5.225)	-1.921 (5.255)
Distance (log)			12.72 (8.583)	11.89 (8.836)	10.89 (9.009)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			1.947 (1.110)	1.145 (1.089)	0.380 (1.072)
Constant	-90.05 (2159.7)	-111.4 (1997.6)	-482.3*** (78.84)	-427.0*** (80.79)	-400.0*** (82.18)
$\sigma^2(DV)$	167.5*** (4.152)	169.8*** (4.679)	161.5*** (4.531)		
$\sigma^2(DV\ 1\ Yr\ Lead)$				167.3*** (4.702)	
$\sigma^2(DV\ 2\ Yr\ Lead)$					170.9*** (4.807)
Observations	48108	37620	35671	35671	35671

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The estimates are generally consistent with the study's expectations and provide confi-

dence that the effects of the main findings. Tables 2 and Table 3 are robust to similar scope conditions with migration-related aid commitments and showcase an opposite effect than Table 2 and Table 3. Overall, these results support the claim that more right-wing cabinets tend to spend less on public welfare, a trend that extends to foreign policy on health, largely due to its low strategic value domestically. We could expect additional issue areas not featured positively in right-wing agendas to fare similarly. Additional OLS and fixed-effects OLS models for the health aid test are found in Appendix D.

Italy and Libya's Partnership

The case of Italy and Libya serves to illustrate the relationship between aid commitments and migration above other relationships. Italy's strategic position in the Mediterranean exemplifies circumstances by which bilateral funding can be effectively used to pause asylum. The Italian island of Lampedusa sits close to 300 km North of Libya and has historically been a reachable destination for migrants seeking asylum. From 2004-2007, more than 50,000 individuals reached the island with close to 60% originating from the Maghreb region ("[Lampedusa's migrants](#)" 2008; Severoni 2011). Even before the Arab Spring caused massive migration movements, 2008 saw a peak with 31,200 migrants reaching the island itself (Eurostat 2022; Severoni 2011). Yet, what caused a drop of 13,000 asylum applications to Italy the following year (2009)? And how did these numbers continue to drop until the Arab Spring, with subsequent drops past 2017?

Such monumental decreases come as a result of bilateral agreements between Italy and Libya set in place to halt migration at any cost, with funding prioritized for naval missions. Italy and Libya's collaboration represents one of the many instances when governments choose to ally with non-democratic states under the pressures of right-shift in parliament and associated securitization of migrants. Although the island is not the only strategic arrival port for migrants attempting to seek asylum—Greece's island of Lesbos is a similar case—the

mechanisms set in place to stop migration exemplify the benefits of less-controlled bilateral monetary arrangements. As such, the occurrence of bilateral agreements presents humanitarian and normative challenges to asylum seeking (Betts and Collier 2017; FitzGerald 2019; Abdelaaty 2021). Capacity building for third countries is a recognized priority for the EU in order to stop migration in the modern system (Lahav 2004; Betts 2014; Mann 2016). This case embodies the impact of bilateral foreign aid allocation alongside their efficacy by pausing asylum process for thousands of migrants with little regard to its consequences.

Italy's involvement with Libya is the result of smaller partnerships over the years, setting the stage for a continuous stable relationship while testing the feasibility of off-shoring and border externalization. A memorandum confirming intentions of cooperation against illegal migration was drafted and signed between Italy and Libya in 2006 (Ronzitti 2009; Vari 2020). One year later, the 2007 Protocol and Additional Protocol further reaffirmed commitments to engage in joint efforts to curb illegal migration. The 2007 Protocol also entrusted Libya with maritime equipment and assistance in the form of technical support and training (Ronzitti 2009; Vari 2020). Although these two agreements had engaged Libya's ability to carry out security operations on behalf of Italy, the subsequent treaty solidified their relationship and created a precedent that is seen to this day.

In August 2008, previous pacts between the two nations culminated in the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation (TFPC) where two major objectives were highlighted: (1) to move past the historical hostilities between Libya and Italy—which included asserting sovereignty equality and non-interference in internal affairs—and (2) to engage in regional cooperation to pause migration towards Italy (Ronzitti 2009). In order to fulfill the second objective, financial investments were promised by Italian authorities to create infrastructure—a total of 4.5 billion EUR were promised at the time over a period of 20 years (Ronzitti 2009). Furthermore, the Treaty (Article 19) calls for previous memorandums to be continued and expanded with close to 2000 km of Libyan coasts to be patrolled by a mixture of Italian and Libyan forces (Ronzitti 2009; Vari 2020). Additional surveillance of

Libya's coast would be jointly patrolled through satellite detection systems funded by Italy and the European Union.

Commitment aid given to Libya coincides with the presence of a right-wing parties in Italy's parliament according to the Comparative Politics Data Set. From 2002 to 2005, the Italian parliament remained majority right-wing with the influence of the left parties being overshadowed by the coalitions set by Silvio Berlusconi. Specifically, 70% of cabinet posts and close to 50% of parliament seats from 2002 to 2006 were controlled by right-wing parties. A slight switch from right-wing control to social-democratic parties began in 2006 and 2007, but quickly reverted back in the 2008 elections. With 62% of cabinet posts and 34% of parliament seats taken by the right-wing parties, once again the alliances by Berlusconi, combining the People of Freedom (PdL), *Lega Nord* (LN), and the Movement for Autonomy (MPA), took hold of parliament (["Italy: Parliamentary Elections" 2022](#)). The TFPC was created shortly thereafter. We can observe how increased domestic pressure created by asylum applications and domestic political push from a populist and worried constituency increased the willingness to provide aid to a transit-country under a dictatorship.

Did the agreement work as intended? In short, yes. Asylum applications to Italy in subsequent years decreased from more than 30,000 asylum applications received in 2008, to 17,725 in 2009, and barely 10,000 in 2010. Its success can be attributed to the extensive funding and security cooperation provided by the Treaty. The initial agreement committed Italy to building 4.5 billion EUR worth of basic infrastructure over the next 20 years (ending in 2028) as part of reparations for Italy's occupation of Libya (Ronzitti 2009). Expenditure for Article 19 of the Treaty, which delineates cooperation on migration, is left partially unspecified with Articles 10, 19, and 8 coupled together but a general estimate can be drawn which allocates €127,706,016 to be spent on housing, special projects, and migration until the end of the Treaty.

However, monetary support is clearer when looking at the subsequent Italian decrees from 2009-2014. From January 1st to June 30th, 2010, €8,220,842 were allocated to Libya




Figure 2: Asylum applications received by the Italian government before and after the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation, and 2017 Memorandum of Understanding. *Eurostat, 2020.*

to “guarantee the ordinary maintenance and efficiency of the naval units transferred by the Italian Government to the Libyan Government” to address the issue of illegal immigration and human trafficking.²² One year later, another aid bundle of €8,297,164 was disbursed for the maintenance of naval equipment used in abating migration.²³ And not long after, a third disbursement of €4,613,612 from January 1st to June 30th, 2013—half of what is usually disbursed—was similarly allocated for maintaining naval vessels provided by Italy to Libya for migration control.²⁴

Financial aid disbursements were still not as hefty as in 2014. From January 1st to Decem-

²²(*Disposizioni urgenti per la cessione di unità navali italiane a supporto della Guardia costiera del Ministero della difesa e degli organi per la sicurezza costiera del Ministero dell'interno libici. (18G00111) 2018*)

²³(*Proroga degli interventi di cooperazione allo sviluppo e a sostegno dei processi di pace e di stabilizzazione, nonché delle missioni internazionali delle forze armate e di polizia. (10G0257) 2010*)

²⁴(*Disposizioni urgenti per la tutela, la valorizzazione e il rilancio dei beni e delle attività culturali e del turismo. (12G0257) 2012*)

ber 31st 2014, €10,479,565 were allocated for the use of military personnel in the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya). With another €5,277,671 directly funded to Libya from Italy for vessel maintenance.²⁵ The funding was also extended to the Libyan military personnel to support their training activities. The EUBAM Libya is an ongoing mission developed by the EU in conjunction with the Libyan government to improve border security, decrease human smuggling, and combat terrorism. The mission was renewed for another two years in 2023 and has been a steady source of European control over Libyan borders since its launch in 2013.

The TFPC came to an end soon after the Arab Spring and resulted in an increase in the number of asylum applications. Operation *Mare Nostrum*, an Italian government rescue mission for people at sea, saved close to 100,000 individuals from boats in the Mediterranean just in 2014 (Mann 2016; FitzGerald 2019). The operation subsided due to lack of funding from member states, although Italy had been largely funding its interests in Libya. The 2008 TFPC is an example of how the aid provided could assist in maintaining border procedures and increasing the capabilities of an autocratic regime while migrants are still allowed to pass through. Migrants traveling through Libya would report abuses but also tolerance in their transportation across Libya (Lutterbeck 2013).

A newer development in cooperation between Italy and Libya is seen through the 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which is meant to incorporate and expand on the 2008 TFPC (Vari 2020). Direct continuations of the TFPC are evident such as the expansion of satellite detection capabilities—found both in Article 2 of MOU and Article 19 of the TFPC—and an initial €2,520,000 for vessel maintenance. Said ships include a maximum of 10 CP naval units, class 500, and 2 naval units Corrubia class,²⁶ 22 meters long, donated to Libya.²⁷ The continuation of these agreements is again evident, yet the 2008 TFPC

²⁵(*Disposizioni urgenti dirette a fronteggiare emergenze ambientali e industriali ed a favorire lo sviluppo delle aree interessate. (14G00005) 2014; Misure urgenti per il contrasto della violenza di genere, nonché per la tutela delle vittime di reati. (14G00109) 2014*)

²⁶See Appendix A.1 for vessel examples.

²⁷(*Disposizioni urgenti per la cessione di unità navali italiane a supporto della Guardia costiera del Ministero della difesa e degli organi per la sicurezza costiera del Ministero dell'interno libici. (18G00111) 2018*).

still showcases how strong these commitments can become even if the face of an autocratic partner. Such measures can become easier as a new Italian government is brewing.

As stated before, Italy's recently elected Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni barreled through a fractured left-center parliament making history as the foremost right-wing leader since Benito Mussolini (R. Martin and Kakissis 2022). The right-wing coalition led by Meloni's *FdI* controls the government of Italy in coalition with other right parties—including Berlusconi's *Forza Italia* party (R. Martin and Kakissis 2022; Roberts 2022). With Meloni's stances on immigration—"keeping migrants out and keeping Christian values in"—supporters alongside members of parliament are enthralled by the government policies she enables (R. Martin and Kakissis 2022).

Conclusion

Understanding the preferences, goals, and subsequent choices driven by right-wing executives presents a challenge, yet is of paramount importance as democratic governments face the reality of right-wing challenger parties rising in power (Pevehouse 2020). The presence of right-wing government in Western liberal democracies has transformed the approach to foreign policy by placing emphasis on domestic gains at the cost of international engagement. Wave after wave of right-wing politics and populist parties²⁸ cue that less pluralist practices have continued in Western liberal democracies, particularly European states (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Paul Taggart 2004; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008; Akkerman, De Lange, and Rooduijn 2016; Mudde 2019). These cues call for a reshape of foreign policies, including foreign aid, making the cost-benefit calculation of right-wing executives in government a necessary step to understand current foreign policy decisions.

This study set out to examine the relationship between right-wing executives and foreign aid allocation towards transit and origin countries for the purpose of migration management.

²⁸Mudde (2019) describes the current right-wing presence as the fourth wave of its kind with nativism and authoritarianism at the forefront.

Through a mixed-methods approach, combining a fixed-effects Tobit model, a placebo test, and a case study, the findings reveal that the presence of right-wing executives in power significantly increases the likelihood of bilateral aid disbursements aimed at controlling migration in origin and transit countries. Counter to our expectation of right-wing governments to detach from foreign aid to focus on national matters, the findings suggest that right-wing presence in government matters when foreign aid on migration is disbursed to non-democratic countries. The result also suggest that there is a trade-off between domestic benefits and intervening in foreign policy.

Overall, this study provides insight into how domestic issues of donor countries influence foreign policies related to migration. With the erosion of the international liberal order due to political backsliding, populism, and rightward changes in many governments (Lake, L. L. Martin, and Risse 2021; Haggard and Kaufman 2021), immigration emerges as a key area demonstrating that this trend has persisted for a long time. International relations benefits from understanding that migration can fundamentally change international norms long-held by liberal democratic countries which could affect the standing of oppressive autocratic regimes in the future. This shift could mean better negotiation terms for autocratic nations, as they hold leverage over migrants—an issue that the Global North cares about—coupled with increased capabilities facilitated by unmonitored aid commitments. The results of this study underscore the importance of examining right-wing politics as a phenomenon that affects not only domestic policies but also international dynamics. With increasing polarization in governments worldwide, researchers must observe the tactics used to curb migration as indicators of tangible changes in international norms. These changes set off a chain of effects that further demonstrate the growing power of autocratic governments in international relations.

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A General Supplements and Additional Models

A.1 Example of Naval Ship Donated to Libya Under the 2018 Memorandum of Understanding



Figure 3: Corrubia class naval unit, 27 meters long, similar to the one supplied to Libya under the Memorandum of Understanding. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Guardia_di_Finanza_boat_02.JPGWikipedia.

A.2 Foreign Aid Commitments to Recipient, by Region (AidData)

The tables showcase aid commitments from EU members only to recipients excluding the Americas and Far East Asia, as previously stated. Notice that South Sudan will only receive aid after 2011 when it became a UN member. Regions are defined by AidData and USD is constant to 2023.

	Recipient	Net Aid	Net Migration Aid	Migration Aid (Filtered)	Health Aid (Filtered)
1	Iran	6,580,547,482	360,936,009	263,314,229	7,248,782
2	Iraq	32,527,697,721	1,119,035,219	683,270,326	71,099,443
3	Israel	1,611,586,924	88,970	88,970	6,071,199
4	Jordan	6,232,572,865	161,877,967	149,551,751	64,447,807
5	Lebanon	6,017,209,943	141,717,067	111,766,941	116,535,357
6	Palestinian Adm. Areas	12,057,509,607	93,803,085	43,218,280	326,797,424
7	Saudi Arabia	80,901,507	343,323	343,323	106,933
8	Syria	3,797,828,640	150,121,457	79,857,361	13,657,164
9	Yemen	5,040,518,746	15,722,750	13,892,776	439,084,308

Table 7: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to the Middle East (1990-2013)

	Recipient	Net Aid	Net Migration Aid	Migration Aid (Filtered)	Health Aid (Filtered)
1	Afghanistan	18,310,116,353	563,218,213	392,733,355	305,352,677
2	Armenia	1,916,555,619	113,420,828	64,570,312	29,275,322
3	Azerbaijan	1,314,264,192	100,713,830	49,807,774	35,967,384
4	Bangladesh	18,337,774,761	58,080,865	31,773,979	1,869,460,785
5	Bhutan	915,049,231	2,700,283	1,474,171	117,049,340
6	Georgia	2,941,810,066	94,785,250	57,670,414	32,871,845
7	India	38,354,578,732	53,683,317	40,544,469	3,127,347,956
8	Kazakhstan	1,287,204,204	10,135,931	6,434,738	18,518,052
9	Kyrgyz Republic	1,128,926,215	10,426,107	8,742,625	121,465,110
10	Maldives	243,126,158	28,793	28,793	931,346
11	Nepal	6,467,973,979	17,136,329	14,227,054	298,993,517
12	Pakistan	14,906,799,098	163,506,563	76,844,685	1,013,089,406
13	Sri Lanka	6,206,716,981	184,062,475	75,076,883	96,301,243
14	Tajikistan	967,277,470	24,343,925	19,204,969	35,862,573
15	Turkmenistan	61,661,790	1,604,252	1,468,895	968,188
16	Uzbekistan	1,085,925,523	12,598,502	10,365,477	77,311,721

Table 8: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to South and Central Asia (1990-2013)

	Recipient	Net Aid	Net Migration Aid	Migration Aid (Filtered)	Health Aid (Filtered)
1	Algeria	10,933,835,601	90,547,008	40,066,649	19,819,523
2	Egypt	26,012,170,113	12,356,921	7,214,472	186,861,445
3	Libya	450,909,346	12,980,292	7,821,818	1,767,629
4	Morocco	22,420,099,778	44,842,215	38,455,851	116,854,897
5	Tunisia	12,777,404,431	11,635,267	1,976,339	23,963,708

Table 9: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to African Countries, North of Sahara (1990-2013)

	Recipient	Net Aid	Net Migration Aid	Migration Aid (Filtered)	Health Aid (Filtered)
1	Angola	7,789,703,043	219,512,435	101,183,741	195,720,000
2	Benin	5,715,390,890	1,823,682	1,048,288	180,218,589
3	Burkina Faso	9,155,871,636	2,524,010	1,479,882	352,608,667
4	Burundi	3,726,021,753	181,543,678	106,482,650	85,862,475
5	Cameroon	21,038,816,772	29,245,743	17,748,350	153,874,743
6	Cape Verde	2,827,619,681	545,249	293,655	20,300,379
7	Central African Republic	1,875,823,816	5,748,050	1,794,571	45,919,780
8	Chad	3,294,927,779	86,468,818	47,522,053	44,401,343
9	Comoros	620,392,792	3,630,177	79,221	10,116,269
10	Congo, Democratic Republic of	24,484,904,093	244,521,853	112,842,561	433,272,331
11	Congo, Republic of	9,099,539,377	49,949,835	19,810,389	22,264,242
12	Cote d'Ivoire	19,068,324,650	44,502,159	18,579,388	67,547,058
13	Djibouti	1,549,062,305	9,715,911	9,314,031	38,837,199
14	Equatorial Guinea	678,924,919	144,828	44,045	24,444,398
15	Eritrea	2,094,828,606	111,342,187	87,364,188	91,149,722
16	Ethiopia	15,969,258,773	186,224,539	150,939,789	965,495,704
17	Gabon	4,120,892,486	962,979	454,347	26,178,847
18	Gambia	460,793,138	7,111,654	6,406,721	16,287,738
19	Ghana	14,997,048,883	15,337,178	12,848,256	1,163,262,438
20	Guinea	3,453,139,171	53,070,071	36,656,687	82,358,143
21	Guinea-Bissau	1,933,721,027	23,201,039	1,733,060	85,319,414
22	Kenya	15,726,819,318	168,570,831	109,461,016	1,094,328,880
23	Liberia	3,635,326,234	127,232,502	79,406,190	178,606,472
24	Madagascar	6,978,326,920	5,068,820	36,968	58,706,642
25	Malawi	7,398,399,562	9,891,261	8,608,678	724,354,243
26	Mali	8,771,978,925	26,535,448	13,465,535	264,305,226
27	Mauritania	3,305,981,062	40,460,177	7,607,936	44,380,967
28	Mauritius	2,286,862,869	528,055	186,608	657,267
29	Mozambique	31,769,567,954	67,158,613	34,417,081	1,630,447,820
30	Namibia	3,511,034,281	4,513,882	4,513,882	148,796,761
31	Niger	4,988,888,720	10,068,839	8,535,517	131,625,938
32	Nigeria	31,690,432,529	107,246,775	81,445,727	1,169,338,239
33	Rwanda	6,911,493,723	127,235,588	84,918,274	186,060,947
34	Senegal	12,089,445,454	9,942,354	5,956,792	126,429,069
35	Sierra Leone	3,547,860,708	137,900,250	43,740,989	115,775,731
36	Somalia	4,526,124,215	376,612,983	318,770,241	148,571,138
37	South Africa	11,673,210,752	8,412,690	7,215,596	298,335,508
38	South Sudan	1,152,567,665	26,722,013	4,015,861	33,860,543
39	St. Helena	803,726,214	19,734	19,734	50,552,558
40	Sudan	10,046,831,293	255,444,989	156,288,747	445,454,766
41	Swaziland	403,800,065	190,523	119,434	12,158,715
42	Tanzania	29,772,024,647	87,718,970	53,925,375	1,680,710,950
43	Togo	3,057,532,206	24,452,707	7,173,838	33,339,829
44	Uganda	16,846,936,681	98,335,441	89,074,042	1,189,683,717
45	Zambia	17,134,025,476	34,687,304	31,320,334	1,189,407,757
46	Zimbabwe	7,701,350,951	18,672,867	11,733,475	324,529,933

Table 10: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) to African Countries, South of Sahara (1990-2013)

A.3 Foreign Aid Commitments from Donors, by Region (Aid-Data)

Donor	Net Aid	Net Migration Aid	Migration Aid (Filtered)	Health Aid (Filtered)
1 Austria	10,518,623,844	478,375,536	470,748,354	193,247,607
2 Belgium	24,332,425,501	28,143,680	11,640,154	186,842,975
3 Bulgaria	0	0	0	0
4 Croatia	0	0	0	0
5 Czechia	0	0	0	0
6 Denmark	28,093,999,280	254,237,460	196,776,967	3,189,844,898
7 Estonia	10,594,246	0	0	0
8 Finland	9,123,337,960	285,022,996	208,328,192	501,198,957
9 France	149,816,068,547	549,423,571	8,558,904	391,094,715
10 Germany	135,135,499,615	1,371,380,144	631,141,053	2,917,828,136
11 Greece	910,558,193	15,732,402	1,712,364	40,742,182
12 Hungary	14,786,408	0	0	0
13 Iceland	136,583,088	1,267,500	1,015,492	25,542,158
14 Ireland	6,213,843,034	10,492,764	5,443,275	887,834,510
15 Italy	44,513,560,430	257,746,098	205,857,344	1,269,267,274
16 Latvia	1,144,301	0	0	0
17 Lithuania	8,089,252	0	0	0
18 Netherlands	49,040,080,285	1,017,731,189	610,643,903	2,294,757,845
19 Norway	38,732,583,176	1,512,531,328	1,386,825,381	1,202,473,307
20 Poland	0	0	0	0
21 Portugal	8,768,607,981	2,532,634	2,233,906	66,242,432
22 Romania	3,564,876	0	0	0
23 Slovakia	0	0	0	0
24 Slovenia	1,972,508	0	0	0
25 Spain	20,766,983,166	296,442,269	213,799,232	661,814,173
26 Sweden	31,408,867,125	299,122,012	107,995,727	1,658,609,510
27 United Kingdom	103,218,606,313	297,232,800	125,781,099	8,473,600,503

Table 11: Foreign Aid Commitments (in USD Constant) from All Donors (1990-2013)

A.4 Summary Statistics for Predictors

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	39368	-0.42	14	-37	-9.7	8.1	33
Cabinet RILE (Prosser)	39368	-2.1	0.93	-4.9	-2.8	-1.5	-0.14
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	39596	0.63	0.48	0	0	1	1
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	39140	9.9	0.86	7	9.5	11	12
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	38632	6.8	1.1	3.1	6	7.5	11
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	39600	60	9.5	14	53	68	82
Asylum Applications to Donor (log)	40128	7.4	3.3	0	5.8	9.8	13
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	37696	9	2.8	1.6	7.3	11	14
Donor Migration Protests	40128	0.15	0.54	0	0	0	5
Civil War (Recipient)	40128	0.24	0.43	0	0	0	1
Post 9/11	40128	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1
Previous Colony of Donor	39072	0.039	0.19	0	0	0	1
Distance (log)	39072	8.5	0.42	6.3	8.3	8.8	9.4
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	39006	0.88	0.33	0	1	1	1

Table 12: Summary Statistics for Migration Aid

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Pctl. 25	Pctl. 75	Max
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	48108	0.73	14	-37	-9.1	8.6	47
Cabinet RILE (Prosser)	48108	-2.1	0.92	-4.9	-2.6	-1.5	-0.14
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	48336	0.65	0.48	0	0	1	1
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	48260	9.7	0.97	7	9.2	10	12
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	47412	6.8	1.1	3.1	6	7.5	11
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	48600	60	9.5	14	53	68	82
Asylum Applications to Donor (log)	40584	7.2	3.2	0	5.9	9.5	13
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	46132	8.8	2.6	1.6	6.9	11	14
Donor Migration Protests	49248	0.11	0.47	0	0	0	5
Civil War (Recipient)	49248	0.24	0.43	0	0	0	1
Post 9/11	49248	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1
Previous Colony of Donor	47952	0.032	0.17	0	0	0	1
Distance (log)	47952	8.5	0.42	6.3	8.3	8.8	9.4
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	47871	0.88	0.33	0	1	1	1

Table 13: Summary Statistics for Health Aid

A.5 Table of All Donors of Migration Aid

Country				
Austria	France	Ireland	Norway	Sweden
Belgium	Germany	Italy	Portugal	United Kingdom
Denmark	Greece	Latvia	Romania	Austria
Estonia	Hungary	Lithuania	Slovenia	
Finland	Iceland	Netherlands	Spain	

Table 14: All donors (N = 22) in alphabetical order.

A.6 Table of All Recipients of Migration Aid

Country			
Afghanistan	Egypt	Liberia	Sierra Leone
Algeria	Equatorial Guinea	Libya	Somalia
Angola	Eritrea	Madagascar	South Africa
Armenia	Ethiopia	Malawi	South Sudan
Azerbaijan	Gabon	Maldives	Sri Lanka
Bangladesh	Gambia	Mali	St. Helena
Benin	Georgia	Mauritania	Sudan
Bhutan	Ghana	Mauritius	Swaziland
Burkina Faso	Guinea	Morocco	Syria
Burundi	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique	Tajikistan
Cameroon	India	Namibia	Tanzania
Cape Verde	Iran	Nepal	Togo
Central African Republic	Iraq	Niger	Tunisia
Chad	Israel	Nigeria	Turkmenistan
Comoros	Jordan	Pakistan	Uganda
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Kazakhstan	Palestinian Adm. Areas	Uzbekistan
Congo, Republic of	Kenya	Rwanda	Yemen
Cote d'Ivoire	Kyrgyz Republic	Saudi Arabia	Zambia
Djibouti	Lebanon	Senegal	Zimbabwe

Table 15: All recipients ($N = 76$) in alphabetical order.

B Additional Tobit Models for Migration Aid

B.1 Tobit Model for Using Manifesto Measure for All Migration Aid

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	allmig_constant_aid_l	allmig_constant_aid_l	allmig_constant_aid_l	allmig_constant_aid_l1	allmig_constant_aid_l2
Cabinet RILE	0.0666*** (0.0155)	0.0364 (0.0189)	0.0000161 (0.0193)	0.0722*** (0.0188)	0.0474* (0.0187)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	-0.318 (0.559)	4.448*** (0.808)	5.796*** (0.815)	4.180*** (0.827)	-0.0113 (0.831)
Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)		1.975*** (0.346)	0.964** (0.368)	1.657*** (0.362)	0.533 (0.349)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		-1.751*** (0.386)	-2.371*** (0.420)	-1.026* (0.417)	1.077* (0.430)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			41.55*** (3.673)	44.24*** (3.456)	51.23*** (3.456)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-2.120*** (0.592)	-1.971*** (0.584)	-1.471* (0.591)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			-0.305*** (0.0823)	-0.318*** (0.0781)	-0.290*** (0.0784)
Donor Migration Protests			-3.443*** (0.451)	-5.433*** (0.507)	-1.956*** (0.416)
Civil War (Recipient)			1.043 (0.651)	0.381 (0.650)	1.010 (0.665)
Post 9/11			-120.0 (3475.0)	-43.09*** (3.057)	-56.00*** (3.153)
Previous Colony of Donor			-76.33 (103118.3)	-70.20 (88282.4)	-72.85 (81757.3)
Distance (log)			-15.39 (9.391)	-23.63* (9.995)	-29.44** (10.05)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			1.782 (1.669)	2.333 (1.699)	0.819 (1.696)
Constant	-76.11 (1259.9)	-85.06 (1408.0)	-246.9** (87.67)	-230.9* (91.72)	-257.8** (92.10)
$\sigma^2(\text{allmig_constant_aid}_l)$	189.4*** (5.682)	206.7*** (7.102)	194.8*** (6.772)		
$\sigma^2(\text{allmig_constant_aid}_{l1})$				190.8*** (6.634)	
$\sigma^2(\text{allmig_constant_aid}_{l2})$					192.6*** (6.726)
Observations	49374	38610	36661	36661	36661

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.2 Tobit Model for Using Manifesto Measure for Selected Migration Aid

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	constant_aid_l1	constant_aid_l1	constant_aid_l1	constant_aid_l1	constant_aid_l2
Cabinet RILE	0.115*** (0.0199)	0.0390 (0.0262)	0.0315 (0.0266)	0.0796** (0.0259)	0.0660** (0.0255)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	3.041*** (0.680)	11.62*** (1.092)	12.62*** (1.117)	11.28*** (1.124)	3.933*** (1.101)
Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)		-0.588 (0.466)	-0.709 (0.500)	-1.723*** (0.498)	-2.474*** (0.497)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		-4.006*** (0.495)	-4.314*** (0.520)	-2.681*** (0.526)	0.0788 (0.552)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			25.30*** (4.864)	34.75*** (4.580)	46.07*** (4.678)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-1.539 (0.798)	-1.093 (0.800)	-1.437 (0.822)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			-0.229* (0.109)	-0.276** (0.107)	-0.230* (0.109)
Donor Migration Protests			-3.217*** (0.765)	-0.694 (0.690)	-0.566 (0.723)
Civil War (Recipient)			2.211* (0.877)	1.386 (0.886)	0.359 (0.922)
Post 9/11			-109.6 (3390.6)	-42.49*** (4.110)	-56.99*** (4.475)
Previous Colony of Donor			-82.95 (111006.8)	-78.73 (48603.9)	-81.23 (107978.5)
Distance (log)			-11.39 (11.80)	-16.43 (12.33)	-27.49* (12.69)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			2.080 (2.192)	1.935 (2.265)	1.994 (2.319)
Constant	-90.61 (3047.3)	-41.14 (1550.9)	-95.37 (110.6)	-157.9 (113.6)	-191.7 (116.6)
$\sigma^2(constant_aid_l1)$	222.9*** (8.117)	250.6*** (11.00)	243.1*** (10.82)		
$\sigma^2(constant_aid_l1)$				246.5*** (10.99)	
$\sigma^2(constant_aid_l2)$					252.5*** (11.34)
Observations	48108	37620	35671	35671	35671

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.3 Tobit Model for Using Manifesto Measure for All Health Aid

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	health_constant_aid_1	health_constant_aid_1	health_constant_aid_1	health_constant_aid_11	health_constant_aid_12
Cabinet RILE	-0.0342** (0.0123)	-0.0620*** (0.0141)	-0.0674*** (0.0144)	-0.0375** (0.0144)	-0.0241 (0.0143)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	-0.682 (0.448)	-1.528** (0.572)	-1.611** (0.594)	-1.746** (0.593)	-0.660 (0.598)
Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)		-0.425* (0.212)	-1.895*** (0.242)	-1.566*** (0.240)	-1.317*** (0.241)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		2.076*** (0.252)	0.781** (0.282)	0.0146 (0.273)	0.357 (0.272)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			35.95*** (2.322)	30.63*** (2.195)	28.16*** (2.124)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-0.291 (0.502)	-0.207 (0.504)	-1.079* (0.495)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			0.0592 (0.0588)	0.0601 (0.0587)	0.0289 (0.0580)
Donor Migration Protests			0.120 (0.274)	1.730*** (0.253)	1.086*** (0.255)
Civil War (Recipient)			0.769 (0.525)	1.066* (0.534)	1.275* (0.537)
Post 9/11			-105.4 (2488.1)	-31.37*** (1.950)	-28.31*** (1.971)
Previous Colony of Donor			-4.732 (4.886)	-3.911 (5.005)	-1.819 (5.040)
Distance (log)			13.39 (8.220)	12.59 (8.478)	11.93 (8.666)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			1.188 (1.047)	1.000 (1.033)	0.356 (1.019)
Constant	-86.61 (1861.6)	-104.8 (1681.3)	-475.9*** (75.43)	-412.4*** (77.45)	-383.3*** (78.99)
$\sigma^2(\text{health_constant_aid}_1)$	152.4*** (3.603)	157.6*** (4.163)	150.0*** (4.037)		
$\sigma^2(\text{health_constant_aid}_{11})$				155.6*** (4.195)	
$\sigma^2(\text{health_constant_aid}_{12})$					159.4*** (4.302)
Observations	48108	37620	35671	35671	35671

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

B.4 Tobit Model for Using Manifesto Measure for Selected Health Aid

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	health_constant_aid_1	health_constant_aid_1	health_constant_aid_1	health_constant_aid_11	health_constant_aid_12
Cabinet RILE	-0.0485*** (0.0132)	-0.0691*** (0.0149)	-0.0728*** (0.0153)	-0.0365* (0.0152)	-0.0267 (0.0150)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.764 (0.489)	-1.502* (0.608)	-1.464* (0.632)	-2.521*** (0.629)	-1.737** (0.630)
Total Asylum Applications Submitted to Donor (log)		-0.458* (0.223)	-1.920*** (0.255)	-1.524*** (0.253)	-1.099*** (0.255)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)		2.384*** (0.267)	1.067*** (0.298)	0.257 (0.289)	0.603* (0.287)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			36.81*** (2.451)	32.34*** (2.319)	30.31*** (2.247)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)			-0.436 (0.532)	-0.280 (0.533)	-1.213* (0.524)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years			0.0726 (0.0623)	0.0698 (0.0619)	0.0335 (0.0613)
Donor Migration Protests			-0.103 (0.289)	1.678*** (0.266)	1.132*** (0.268)
Civil War (Recipient)			0.847 (0.560)	1.193* (0.568)	1.250* (0.569)
Post 9/11			-110.4 (4394.9)	-31.86*** (2.053)	-29.56*** (2.078)
Previous Colony of Donor			-3.719 (5.100)	-4.025 (5.225)	-1.921 (5.255)
Distance (log)			12.72 (8.583)	11.89 (8.836)	10.89 (9.009)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)			1.947 (1.110)	1.145 (1.089)	0.380 (1.072)
Constant	-90.05 (2159.7)	-111.4 (1997.6)	-482.3*** (78.84)	-427.0*** (80.79)	-400.0*** (82.18)
$\sigma^2(\text{health_constant_aid}_1)$	167.5*** (4.152)	169.8*** (4.679)	161.5*** (4.531)		
$\sigma^2(\text{health_constant_aid}_{11})$				167.3*** (4.702)	
$\sigma^2(\text{health_constant_aid}_{12})$					170.9*** (4.807)
Observations	48108	37620	35671	35671	35671

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C Additional Models for Selected Migration Aid

C.1 General OLS Models, Manifesto and Prosser Measure

Table 16: All migration aid based right-left value, and cabinet ideological distance in government to all recipients.

	All Migration Aid to Recipients					
	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				0.090*** (0.020)	0.118*** (0.020)	0.047** (0.020)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.296*** (0.035)	0.298*** (0.035)	0.205*** (0.035)	0.312*** (0.035)	0.320*** (0.035)	0.220*** (0.035)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	0.325*** (0.026)	0.329*** (0.026)	0.309*** (0.026)	0.312*** (0.026)	0.309*** (0.026)	0.286*** (0.026)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.266*** (0.019)	-0.273*** (0.019)	-0.271*** (0.019)	-0.268*** (0.019)	-0.275*** (0.019)	-0.272*** (0.019)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Asylum Applications to Donor (log)	0.056*** (0.009)	0.069*** (0.009)	0.065*** (0.009)	0.059*** (0.009)	0.072*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.009)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	0.193*** (0.010)	0.183*** (0.010)	0.187*** (0.010)	0.195*** (0.010)	0.186*** (0.010)	0.195*** (0.010)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.448*** (0.032)	-0.529*** (0.032)	-0.345*** (0.032)	-0.457*** (0.032)	-0.539*** (0.032)	-0.343*** (0.032)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.515*** (0.039)	0.491*** (0.039)	0.508*** (0.039)	0.514*** (0.039)	0.489*** (0.039)	0.507*** (0.039)
Post 9/11	0.311*** (0.039)	0.136*** (0.039)	-0.108*** (0.039)	0.306*** (0.039)	0.125*** (0.039)	-0.129*** (0.039)
Previous Colony of Donor	-0.202* (0.107)	-0.184* (0.107)	-0.263** (0.107)	-0.217** (0.107)	-0.209* (0.107)	-0.291*** (0.107)
Distance (log)	-0.410*** (0.045)	-0.433*** (0.045)	-0.445*** (0.044)	-0.413*** (0.045)	-0.436*** (0.045)	-0.443*** (0.045)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	0.255*** (0.051)	0.239*** (0.051)	0.212*** (0.051)	0.254*** (0.051)	0.238*** (0.051)	0.212*** (0.051)
Constant	0.019 (0.487)	0.429 (0.486)	0.945* (0.485)	0.332 (0.489)	0.861* (0.488)	1.209** (0.487)
Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671
R ²	0.085	0.087	0.084	0.084	0.085	0.082
Adjusted R ²	0.085	0.087	0.084	0.084	0.084	0.081
Residual Std. Error (df = 35657)	3.059	3.052	3.046	3.061	3.057	3.050
F Statistic (df = 13; 35657)	256.104***	263.010***	252.482***	252.286***	254.093***	244.281***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Selected migration aid based on cabinet right-left value, and cabinet ideological distance in government to all recipients.

	Selected Migration Aid to All Recipients					
	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				0.145*** (0.016)	0.136*** (0.016)	0.106*** (0.016)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.246*** (0.029)	0.238*** (0.029)	0.157*** (0.029)	0.262*** (0.029)	0.256*** (0.029)	0.173*** (0.029)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	0.316*** (0.022)	0.338*** (0.022)	0.341*** (0.021)	0.314*** (0.021)	0.332*** (0.021)	0.330*** (0.021)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.182*** (0.016)	-0.172*** (0.016)	-0.173*** (0.016)	-0.183*** (0.016)	-0.174*** (0.016)	-0.175*** (0.016)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Asylum Applications to Donor (log)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.053*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.008)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	0.054*** (0.008)	0.046*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.008)	0.046*** (0.008)	0.041*** (0.008)	0.054*** (0.008)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.307*** (0.026)	-0.236*** (0.026)	-0.260*** (0.026)	-0.330*** (0.026)	-0.255*** (0.027)	-0.273*** (0.026)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.345*** (0.032)	0.332*** (0.032)	0.308*** (0.032)	0.343*** (0.032)	0.330*** (0.032)	0.307*** (0.032)
Post 9/11	0.209*** (0.032)	0.017 (0.032)	-0.163*** (0.032)	0.223*** (0.032)	0.024 (0.032)	-0.164*** (0.032)
Previous Colony of Donor	-0.434*** (0.088)	-0.482*** (0.088)	-0.458*** (0.088)	-0.437*** (0.088)	-0.490*** (0.088)	-0.472*** (0.088)
Distance (log)	-0.329*** (0.037)	-0.338*** (0.037)	-0.342*** (0.036)	-0.336*** (0.037)	-0.344*** (0.037)	-0.346*** (0.036)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	0.124*** (0.042)	0.116*** (0.042)	0.104** (0.042)	0.122*** (0.042)	0.114*** (0.042)	0.102** (0.042)
Constant	0.181 (0.400)	0.237 (0.400)	0.399 (0.398)	0.573 (0.401)	0.634 (0.401)	0.742* (0.399)
Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671
R ²	0.047	0.044	0.044	0.048	0.043	0.043
Adjusted R ²	0.047	0.043	0.044	0.047	0.043	0.043
Residual Std. Error (df = 35657)	2.513	2.514	2.497	2.512	2.514	2.499
F Statistic (df = 13; 35657)	135.546***	125.459***	127.190***	137.212***	124.008***	122.837***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.2 Fixed Effects OLS Model, Manifesto and Prosser Measure

Table 18: All migration aid based on Right, Center, and Left presence in government to all recipients, with dyad and year FE.

	All Migration Aid to All Recipients					
	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				0.039* (0.020)	0.085*** (0.020)	0.0004 (0.020)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.491*** (0.045)	0.501*** (0.045)	0.388*** (0.045)	0.502*** (0.045)	0.523*** (0.045)	0.400*** (0.045)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.137** (0.066)	-0.006 (0.066)	0.127* (0.066)	-0.143** (0.066)	-0.018 (0.066)	0.106 (0.066)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.312*** (0.038)	-0.391*** (0.038)	-0.445*** (0.038)	-0.315*** (0.038)	-0.399*** (0.038)	-0.445*** (0.038)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.006)	-0.024*** (0.006)
Asylum Applications to Donor (log)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.024** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	-0.017 (0.018)	0.013 (0.018)	0.096*** (0.018)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.025 (0.018)	0.112*** (0.018)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.423*** (0.031)	-0.524*** (0.031)	-0.324*** (0.031)	-0.426*** (0.031)	-0.530*** (0.031)	-0.316*** (0.031)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.024 (0.054)	-0.044 (0.053)	-0.006 (0.053)	0.023 (0.054)	-0.046 (0.053)	-0.006 (0.054)
Post 9/11	0.679*** (0.053)	0.506*** (0.053)	0.159*** (0.053)	0.674*** (0.053)	0.498*** (0.053)	0.134** (0.053)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	0.186* (0.101)	0.195* (0.101)	0.074 (0.101)	0.187* (0.101)	0.198** (0.101)	0.073 (0.101)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	36,169	36,169	36,169	36,169	36,169	36,169
R ²	0.017	0.020	0.015	0.017	0.019	0.014
Adjusted R ²	-0.032	-0.029	-0.035	-0.033	-0.031	-0.036
F Statistic (df = 11; 34433)	54.889***	64.484***	46.210***	53.633***	59.320***	42.845***

Table 19: Selected migration aid based right-left value, and cabinet ideological distance in government to all recipients, with dyad and year FE.

	Selected Migration Aid to All Recipients					
	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				0.151*** (0.017)	0.144*** (0.017)	0.107*** (0.017)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.528*** (0.038)	0.541*** (0.038)	0.411*** (0.038)	0.547*** (0.038)	0.562*** (0.038)	0.430*** (0.038)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.355*** (0.056)	-0.145*** (0.056)	0.067 (0.056)	-0.340*** (0.056)	-0.137** (0.056)	0.067 (0.056)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.156*** (0.032)	-0.161*** (0.032)	-0.217*** (0.032)	-0.169*** (0.032)	-0.173*** (0.032)	-0.227*** (0.032)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Asylums Applications to Donor (log)	0.004 (0.009)	0.003 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.012 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	-0.059*** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	-0.065*** (0.015)	-0.042*** (0.015)	0.024 (0.015)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.151*** (0.026)	-0.076*** (0.026)	-0.122*** (0.026)	-0.175*** (0.026)	-0.097*** (0.027)	-0.135*** (0.027)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.079* (0.045)	0.037 (0.045)	-0.021 (0.045)	0.075* (0.045)	0.033 (0.045)	-0.024 (0.045)
Post 9/11	0.670*** (0.045)	0.361*** (0.045)	0.051 (0.045)	0.696*** (0.045)	0.378*** (0.045)	0.057 (0.045)
Previous Colony of Donor	0.098 (0.085)	0.068 (0.085)	0.033 (0.085)	0.106 (0.085)	0.075 (0.085)	0.038 (0.085)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671
R ²	0.018	0.012	0.008	0.019	0.012	0.008
Adjusted R ²	-0.031	-0.037	-0.041	-0.030	-0.037	-0.042
F Statistic (df = 11; 33981)	55.754***	36.592***	25.722***	59.558***	37.434***	23.594***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D Additional Models for Selected Health Aid Placebo Test

D.1 Health Aid OLS Models, Manifesto and Prosser Measure

Table 20: All health aid based cabinet right-left value, and cabinet ideological distance in government to all recipients.

	<i>All Health Aid to Recipients</i>					
	DV (1)	DV (1 Year Lead) (2)	DV (2 Year Lead) (3)	DV (4)	DV (1 Year Lead) (5)	DV (2 Year Lead) (6)
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				-0.171*** (0.027)	-0.186*** (0.027)	-0.195*** (0.027)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.188*** (0.050)	0.172*** (0.050)	0.234*** (0.050)	0.144*** (0.050)	0.123** (0.050)	0.182*** (0.051)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	0.718*** (0.038)	0.735*** (0.039)	0.683*** (0.039)	0.674*** (0.038)	0.682*** (0.038)	0.625*** (0.038)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.557*** (0.028)	-0.572*** (0.028)	-0.609*** (0.028)	-0.556*** (0.028)	-0.571*** (0.028)	-0.608*** (0.028)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	-0.022*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.028*** (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.004)	-0.025*** (0.004)	-0.027*** (0.004)
Asylum Applications to Donor (log)	0.075*** (0.013)	0.078*** (0.013)	0.091*** (0.013)	0.052*** (0.013)	0.052*** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.013)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	0.200*** (0.014)	0.169*** (0.014)	0.156*** (0.015)	0.225*** (0.015)	0.199*** (0.015)	0.188*** (0.015)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.256*** (0.043)	0.071 (0.043)	0.080* (0.044)	-0.219*** (0.043)	0.114*** (0.044)	0.125*** (0.044)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.482*** (0.055)	0.485*** (0.055)	0.462*** (0.056)	0.485*** (0.055)	0.487*** (0.055)	0.464*** (0.056)
Post 9/11	0.826*** (0.054)	0.599*** (0.055)	0.455*** (0.055)	0.769*** (0.055)	0.532*** (0.055)	0.382*** (0.055)
Previous Colony of Donor	3.104*** (0.119)	3.028*** (0.120)	2.976*** (0.122)	3.136*** (0.119)	3.066*** (0.120)	3.016*** (0.121)
Distance (log)	0.130** (0.064)	0.097 (0.064)	0.082 (0.064)	0.147** (0.064)	0.116* (0.064)	0.102 (0.064)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	-0.393*** (0.073)	-0.436*** (0.073)	-0.457*** (0.073)	-0.391*** (0.073)	-0.433*** (0.073)	-0.454*** (0.073)
Constant	-4.187*** (0.687)	-3.373*** (0.689)	-2.230*** (0.691)	-4.312*** (0.686)	-3.468*** (0.688)	-2.309*** (0.690)
Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	35,636	35,564	35,492	35,636	35,564	35,492
R ²	0.119	0.116	0.115	0.120	0.117	0.115
Adjusted R ²	0.119	0.115	0.114	0.120	0.116	0.115
Residual Std. Error	4.345 (df = 35622)	4.356 (df = 35550)	4.362 (df = 35478)	4.343 (df = 35622)	4.354 (df = 35550)	4.360 (df = 35478)
F Statistic	370.852*** (df = 13; 35622)	357.921*** (df = 13; 35550)	353.313*** (df = 13; 35478)	373.823*** (df = 13; 35622)	360.903*** (df = 13; 35550)	356.312*** (df = 13; 35478)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 21: Selected health aid based on cabinet right-left value, and cabinet ideological distance in government to all recipients.

	Selected Health Aid to All Recipients					
	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				-0.108*** (0.025)	-0.120*** (0.025)	-0.147*** (0.025)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.161*** (0.044)	0.102** (0.044)	0.126*** (0.044)	0.163*** (0.044)	0.106** (0.044)	0.128*** (0.044)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	0.823*** (0.033)	0.833*** (0.033)	0.809*** (0.033)	0.792*** (0.033)	0.795*** (0.033)	0.769*** (0.033)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.398*** (0.024)	-0.411*** (0.024)	-0.443*** (0.024)	-0.397*** (0.024)	-0.410*** (0.024)	-0.442*** (0.024)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.032*** (0.003)	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.029*** (0.003)	-0.031*** (0.003)
Asylum Applications to Donor (log)	0.019* (0.011)	0.026** (0.012)	0.029** (0.012)	0.002 (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	0.143*** (0.012)	0.112*** (0.012)	0.109*** (0.012)	0.165*** (0.012)	0.138*** (0.012)	0.138*** (0.012)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.195*** (0.040)	0.174*** (0.040)	0.165*** (0.040)	-0.165*** (0.040)	0.209*** (0.040)	0.206*** (0.040)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.275*** (0.048)	0.276*** (0.048)	0.256*** (0.049)	0.277*** (0.048)	0.278*** (0.048)	0.258*** (0.049)
Post 9/11	0.330*** (0.048)	0.199*** (0.048)	0.102** (0.048)	0.283*** (0.048)	0.144*** (0.049)	0.041 (0.049)
Previous Colony of Donor	2.034*** (0.133)	1.839*** (0.134)	1.696*** (0.134)	1.998*** (0.133)	1.795*** (0.134)	1.650*** (0.134)
Distance (log)	-0.156*** (0.056)	-0.187*** (0.056)	-0.215*** (0.056)	-0.144*** (0.056)	-0.173*** (0.056)	-0.199*** (0.056)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	-0.427*** (0.064)	-0.470*** (0.064)	-0.506*** (0.064)	-0.426*** (0.064)	-0.468*** (0.064)	-0.504*** (0.064)
Constant	-2.454*** (0.606)	-1.678*** (0.606)	-0.758 (0.607)	-2.557*** (0.608)	-1.771*** (0.608)	-0.909 (0.609)
Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671
R ²	0.097	0.096	0.095	0.097	0.096	0.095
Adjusted R ²	0.097	0.096	0.095	0.097	0.095	0.094
Residual Std. Error (df = 35657)	3.806	3.810	3.815	3.806	3.811	3.815
F Statistic (df = 13; 35657)	295.564***	292.188***	287.700***	294.832***	290.247***	286.972***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.2 Fixed Effects Health Aid OLS Models, Manifesto and Prosser Measure

Table 22: All health aid based on Right, Center, and Left presence in government to all recipients, with dyad and year FE.

	All Health Aid to Recipients					
	DV (1)	DV (1 Year Lead) (2)	DV (2 Year Lead) (3)	DV (4)	DV (1 Year Lead) (5)	DV (2 Year Lead) (6)
Cabinet RILE (MARFOR)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				-0.037 (0.026)	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.027 (0.026)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.231*** (0.058)	0.258*** (0.059)	0.382*** (0.059)	0.242*** (0.058)	0.254*** (0.059)	0.372*** (0.060)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	0.232** (0.092)	0.445*** (0.092)	0.225** (0.093)	0.237*** (0.092)	0.442*** (0.092)	0.219** (0.093)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.276*** (0.049)	-0.410*** (0.050)	-0.566*** (0.050)	-0.273*** (0.049)	-0.409*** (0.050)	-0.565*** (0.050)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	0.048*** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.007)	0.048*** (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)	-0.018** (0.007)
Asylums Applications to Donor (log)	-0.045*** (0.015)	-0.048*** (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.045*** (0.015)	-0.049*** (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	0.242*** (0.026)	0.193*** (0.026)	0.216*** (0.026)	0.233*** (0.025)	0.193*** (0.026)	0.220*** (0.026)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.075* (0.039)	0.272*** (0.039)	0.279*** (0.039)	-0.072* (0.039)	0.275*** (0.039)	0.282*** (0.040)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.073 (0.070)	0.045 (0.071)	-0.033 (0.071)	0.073 (0.070)	0.045 (0.071)	-0.033 (0.071)
Post 9/11	0.584*** (0.070)	0.455*** (0.071)	0.636*** (0.071)	0.594*** (0.071)	0.451*** (0.071)	0.626*** (0.071)
Non-Democracy (Recipient)	-0.121 (0.131)	-0.171 (0.133)	-0.106 (0.133)	-0.122 (0.131)	-0.172 (0.133)	-0.108 (0.133)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35,636	35,564	35,492	35,636	35,564	35,492
R ²	0.017	0.012	0.013	0.017	0.012	0.013
Adjusted R ²	-0.029	-0.035	-0.034	-0.030	-0.035	-0.034
F Statistic	54.752*** (df = 11; 34019)	38.840*** (df = 11; 33947)	39.585*** (df = 11; 33875)	53.885*** (df = 11; 34019)	38.872*** (df = 11; 33947)	39.676*** (df = 11; 33875)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 23: Selected health aid based on cabinet right-left value, and cabinet ideological distance in government to all recipients, with dyad and year FE.

	Selected Health Aid to Recipients					
	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)	DV	DV (1 Year Lead)	DV (2 Year Lead)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cabinet RILE (MARPOR)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)			
Cabinet RILE, Logit (Prosser)				-0.044* (0.024)	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.056** (0.024)
Ideologically Connected Cabinet	0.268*** (0.053)	0.216*** (0.053)	0.299*** (0.053)	0.258*** (0.053)	0.213*** (0.053)	0.294*** (0.053)
Donor GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	0.088 (0.078)	0.288*** (0.079)	0.225*** (0.079)	0.092 (0.078)	0.283*** (0.079)	0.215*** (0.079)
Recipient GDP Per Capita in USD (log)	-0.225*** (0.045)	-0.352*** (0.045)	-0.513*** (0.045)	-0.221*** (0.045)	-0.349*** (0.045)	-0.508*** (0.045)
Recipient Life Expectancy in Years	0.021*** (0.007)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.035*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.034*** (0.007)
Asylums Applications to Donor (log)	-0.047*** (0.012)	-0.033*** (0.013)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.048*** (0.013)	-0.036*** (0.013)	-0.020 (0.013)
Donor Refugee Stocks (log)	0.151*** (0.021)	0.130*** (0.022)	0.171*** (0.022)	0.146*** (0.021)	0.133*** (0.022)	0.176*** (0.022)
Donor Migration Protests	-0.078** (0.037)	0.317*** (0.037)	0.293*** (0.037)	-0.074** (0.037)	0.323*** (0.037)	0.304*** (0.037)
Civil War (Recipient)	0.049 (0.063)	0.030 (0.063)	-0.023 (0.064)	0.051 (0.063)	0.031 (0.063)	-0.021 (0.064)
Post 9/11	0.520*** (0.063)	0.442*** (0.063)	0.548*** (0.063)	0.523*** (0.063)	0.434*** (0.063)	0.534*** (0.063)
Previous Colony of Donor	-0.120 (0.119)	-0.189 (0.119)	-0.195 (0.120)	-0.121 (0.119)	-0.191 (0.119)	-0.198* (0.120)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671	35,671
R ²	0.011	0.010	0.013	0.010	0.010	0.013
Adjusted R ²	-0.038	-0.039	-0.036	-0.039	-0.039	-0.036
F Statistic (df = 11; 33981)	33.352***	30.925***	39.641***	32.643***	31.093***	40.098***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01