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Research

Dissertation

Security Cooperation on Migration in the Age of Right-Wing Politics

Bilateral security cooperation on migration between Western democracies and illiberal states continues unabated by international, democratic, or humanitarian norms. Such agreements, which I denote as Cooperation Arrangements on Migration (CAMs), provide funding, training, military resources, personnel, and information to illiberal partners. This bilateral cooperation is domestically and internationally costly as it could strengthen autocratic regimes, create coercive codependencies between states, and place migrant lives at risk. At the same time, the rise of right-wing populist parties permeates legislatures and drive mainstream governments to adapt. These two phenomenon drive the main question of this project: under what conditions do Western democracies enter into security cooperation arrangements on migration with non-democratic states? I contend right-wing populist (RWP) parties drive illiberal cooperation on migration as attention is taken away from normative concerns to tangible outcomes for mainstream governments in Western democracies. Rise in RWP party presence in the legislature drive mainstream governments to coopt CAMs from RWP challengers to remain in power and fracture the opposition. Although a global phenomenon, I center my initial analysis on 11 frontier states of European Union. I employ a multimethod research approach consisting of a novel data collection of CAMs between Western democratic frontier states and their regional partners from 1990-2023, alongside case studies illustrating my theory. This project seeks to provide a novel data source for rigorous research and to expand our understanding of cooptation strategies for contentious foreign policy development under a polarized political landscape.

Working Papers

"How Right-Wing Parties Drive Illiberal Cooperation on Migration"
Rojas Venzor, Jesus E.

Bilateral security cooperation on migration between Western democracies and illiberal states continues unabated by international, democratic, or humanitarian norms. Such cooperation occurrences, which I denote as cooperation arrangements on migration (CAMs), provide funding, training, military resources, and information to non-democratic partners to control migration headed for Western democracies. Yet, cooperation on migration, through either issue linkage or ad hoc bargaining, opens the door to coercive migration policy in often non-optimal conditions. When do Western democracies enter into security cooperation arrangements on migration with non-democratic states? I contend right-wing populist (RWP) parties drive illiberal cooperation on migration as attention is taken away from normative concerns to tangible outcomes for mainstream governments in Western democracies. Rise in RWP party seat share in the legislature drive mainstream governments to co-opt CAMs from RWP challengers to remain in power and fracture the opposition. I utilize count and network models to analyze a novel dataset on CAMs between 11 European frontier states and their regional partners from 1990 to 2023. The findings support my argument and help us understand the effect of RWP parties enabling international contentious policies with non-democratic states in the age of polarization.

"Foreign Aid to Non-Democracies: How the Political Right Deals with Migration"
Rojas Venzor, Jesus E. 

How do right-wing executives shape foreign policy once in office? I analyze foreign aid decisions driven by right-wing leadership to answer this question. Studies show that right-leaning governments should limit foreign aid to prioritize domestic issues and reject internationalism. This study argues that instead of less aid, right-wing executives increase bilateral aid when used for migration management. Right-wing executives favor bilateral aid to transit and origin countries to avoid delegation to third-parties that might not share their goals and prove to be unpopular with voters. Executives utilize foreign aid on migration strategically to show responsiveness and tackle a domestic point of contention. I employ a mixed-methods approach, including a fixed effects Tobit model between 27 Western liberal donor countries and 75 aid-recipient countries from 1990-2013, a placebo test, and a case study on Italy-Libya foreign aid relations. Findings reveal right-wing executives engage in counterintuitive foreign policy outcomes with dangerous, unintended consequences.

Works in Progress

  1. “Does International Security Cooperation on Migration Work?” (Data Paper)
  2. “Dangerous Conditions: Right-Wing Votes and Domestic Terrorism Using Localized Data” with Wendy Wagner
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